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Purpose:  The purpose of this paper is to investigate how private equity-backed 
IPOs perform once they go public. That is, to investigate whether or 
not these private equity firms have created highly competitive, high-
performance portfolio companies and to see if the portfolio companies 
are able to retain those qualities even after going public. These results 
are then to be compared with previous research done on the general 
IPO and its short- and long-term performance. It also sets out to 
measure what effect M&A-activity during the fund holding period 
may have on the fund companies after being exited onto the public 
market.  
  
Methodology:  The performance of the private equity-backed IPOs has been 
measured as the abnormal return using two methods, cumulative 
abnormal returns and buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Two types of 
benchmarks have been used, S&P Europe 350 as well as an 
industry-specific version of that index.  
  
Literature review: Theories used in this study are based partially on previous research 
on the private equity industry as well as general IPO-theory, such as 
long-term underperformance and the “hot issue” anomaly. Some 
M&A-theory has also been used to explain the effects of M&A-
activity, with regards to e.g. indigestion. 
  
Empirical  foundation:  This quantitative study is based on a raw sample of 318 private 
equity-backed IPOs in Europe during the period 1994-2007. These 
IPOs outperformed both its industry peers as well as the market with 
18.02% and 14.75%, respectively, on a three-year basis. 
 
Conclusions:  Private equity-backed IPOs perform abnormal returns, both short- 
and long-term. This goes against previous research on the general 
IPO, which outperforms the market short-term and underperforms 
long-term. However, it is in line with previous research on reversed 
LBOs.  
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1 Introduction 
Here, the reader will get an introduction to the topic and a statement to as why the subject is worth 
investigating. The reader will also be introduced to the purpose of this study as well as what it 
intends to measure and not. 
 
1.1 Background 
The private equity industry was initially instigated in the 1940’s but it was not until the 1980’s it 
really took off (Nyman, 2002). Jensen (1989) even stated that the capital structure of leveraged 
buyouts (LBOs), a vital part of the private equity business, was superior to any existing capital 
structure and argued that soon all companies would adopt such a structure. A lot has happened since 
the 1980’s, then, debt levels around 85 to 90% were not unusual and the slightest upward change in 
firm value generated a lot of return (Cao and Lerner, 2009). Private equity firms use leverage as a 
means of financing and today their debt levels are a bit more modest at around 70%, while the 
average listed company average around 30-50% debt (Unionen, 2009). They use the high leverage 
to make the most use out of the cheapest source of capital, debt, and the tax-shield that comes with 
it. 
 
The European private equity industry has not been active for as long as the U.S. equivalent. 
However, it has today become a vital part of the financial mechanism, attracting foreign capital and 
enabling European companies with access to the capital market, thus making private equity funds 
function as a bridge between domestic companies and foreign investors. In fact, of the capital raised 
in private equity funds globally, more than 65% was invested in European companies during 2003 to 
2007. Furthermore, the aggregated private equity industry has grown rapidly over the last few years, 
with raised funds close to USD 155.73 billion in 2006, up by more than 300% compared to 2004. In 
absolute terms, the U.K. market is the unquestionable leading market. However, relative to the GDP, 
Sweden and the Netherlands both raised significant funds (Raade and Dantas Machado, 2008). 
 
Criticism has been circling around the private equity industry ever since the first companies were 
becoming active, arguing that it is value destroying rather than creating and it has become 
synonymic with lay-offs and downsizing.  Private equity companies have also been accused of having 
a far too short investment horizon, thus being beneficial for no one except the firm behind the 
acquisition. Moreover, the high leverage of the average private equity acquisition puts, in the eyes of 
critics, a dangerously high pressure on cash-flow and interest payments and leaves the company with 
unnecessary high dependence on market changes and default risk. However, private equity firms 
obviously disagree, stating that they always evaluate the default risk for the acquired firm and then 
leverage it accordingly. That statement finds comfort in the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority 
and its analysis on the lending of Swedish banks to private equity, stating that: “the level of risk was 
reasonable.” In contrast to the general opinion, private equity firms are certain their restructuring is 
beneficial for the companies and increases their competitiveness even in the long run, since their 
intention is to increase the value of the company in order to sell it off with a profit (Unionen, 2009). 
Furthermore, private equity firms are not the ones with a short investment horizon according to 
practitioners, as Harald Mix, CEO of the Swedish private equity firm Altor expresses it: ”It is not the 
private equity firms with an investment horizon of five to seven years that are short-sighted, it is the 
public market” (Ekelund and Lundell, 2011b).  
 
1.2 Issue 
Investing in a private equity fund usually turns out to be a good investment, over time private equity 
funds have been outperforming the market index by 3-4% (SVCA, 2011). As mentioned earlier it is 
partly due to the fundamental in the private equity business, high leverage and the use of a large tax-
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shield. Debt also increases monitoring through banks, thereby reducing agency and monitoring costs, 
followed by the added pressure on management and cash flow (Jensen 1986). Furthermore, as the 
company no longer is traded publically, information asymmetry is more or less non-existing between 
managers and the equity owners as they are often the same. No attention needs to be diverted to 
media and focus can instead be directed towards running the firm efficiently. The corporate 
governance structure of a fund portfolio firm generally differs from the average firm. Attempts of 
aligning the interests of management with those of stakeholders are more common in portfolio firms 
than others, having a further positive effect on minimising agency costs (Kaplan and Strömberg, 
2008). The private equity firm and its fund managers are also in general specialised in the industry of 
the acquired firm and thus posses a lot of knowledge useful for optimising the firms strategy. The 
strategic part of the value creation process has become more and more important, as stated in 
Mattson and Mårild (2006), internal value creation is today the most important factor for private 
equity firms. The success or failure of a portfolio firm has increasingly become a matter of improving 
operational efficiency and less dependent on capital structure. It poses the question if these portfolio 
firms are better off from having been under private equity ownership and whether or not they are 
able to maintain these benefits in terms of e.g. knowledge and corporate governance structure in the 
long run, even after the issuance?  
 
The performance of the general IPO has been studied numerous of times and researchers have 
discovered multiple anomalies associated with floatings, of which the two most common ones are the 
under-pricing phenomenon and thus short-run outperformance, and the subsequent long run 
underperformance. However, given the previously stated advantages with private equity ownership, 
the private equity-backed firm seems to differ from most companies in many positive respects. One 
may wonder if these differences are attributable also to the performance of IPOs. Are private equity-
backed fund portfolio firms of higher quality than the average floated firm? 
 
Furthermore, the financial strength of a private equity fund also enables for portfolio firms to acquire 
or merge two or more companies to be added as one to the fund, as the need or opportunity to 
acquire progresses. This is another example where portfolio firms can profit from private equity funds 
and its capital injections, offering companies the possibility to acquire e.g. a competitor or a partner 
in the production chain. The firm can then benefit from synergies and expand its reach to new 
markets or perhaps lower its costs and risk by having its production chain in-house. However, there 
are potential problems with merging companies, such as overestimating the synergy potential and 
problems of indigestion when acquiring too many companies too fast (Bower, 2001). One would 
wonder whether or not any of these benefits and advantages inherited by the fund firm is kept over 
the short-, medium- or long-term as well as how the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity affects 
the performance of the exited fund companies. Are firms with high M&A-activity left with problems 
of indigestion or have they inherited synergy effects they could not have on their own? 
 
The overall problem of the study can be summarised in the following main research questions: 
 
• Do private equity backed IPOs outperform the market over time? 
• How do M&A-activity within those companies affect the outcome? 
• How do the results differ from the performance of the average IPO, studied in previous 
research? 
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1.3 Purpose 
The way a fund of a private equity firm earns its return is quite straightforward and is achieved by, 
in some manner, selling one or more companies in its fund at a higher price than initially bought for, 
denoted as an exit. A company is acquired to the fund either from private owners or public owners. 
An acquisition from a public company is referred to as a buyout and since the majority of the 
financing is debt, it is denoted as a leveraged buyout. There are a number of ways for a private 
equity firm to exit one of its portfolio companies.  It could do a trade sale, where the portfolio 
company is sold off to another company, usually in the same industry. It could also sell the company 
on to another fellow private equity firm, referred to as a secondary buyout, or it could turn to the 
public capital market through an IPO (Cao and Lerner, 2009).  
 
Previous research has focused primarily on the average IPO and its performance, where strong 
evidence has been shown for short-term underperformance and long-term outperformance (Ritter, 
1991). Focus has also been directed towards, and somewhat restricted to, leveraged buyouts and the 
subsequent re-floating, a secondary IPO, referred to as a reversed leveraged buyout (RLBO). Cao 
and Lerner (2009) and Mian and Rosenfeld (1993) could both show results indicating that reversed 
LBOs performed positive abnormal stock returns compared to the market. Cao and Lerner (2009) 
studied the U.S. market during the period 1981 to 2003 and Mian and Rosenfeld (1993) researched 
85 RLBOs during 1983 to 1988. Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993), similarly to Cao and Lerner 
(2009), studied the performance of RLBOs post IPO on the U.S. market, but with even more focus 
towards pre- and post-IPO operational performance. This study also intends to measure the short-
term stock performance of private equity-backed IPOs, both Mian and Rosenfeld (1993) as well as 
Cao and Lerner (2009) concentrates on long-term performance. To my knowledge, there have only 
been a few studies made on the share price performance of the general private equity-backed IPOs 
and the ones I have found have been fairly limited. Henrysson and Petterson (2007) studied private 
equity-backed IPOs on the Stockholm Stock Exchange, however, they narrowed their research to 
focusing only on a few companies. Björcke and Menzel (2006) did a similar study, on a larger 
sample, but were also limited to the Swedish equity market and long-term performance. Levis 
(2008) studied the British private equity market, but also concentrated on buyouts similar to Cao 
and Lerner (2009), as well as venture capitalist-backed IPOs. Thus, there seems to be a gap in the 
previously conducted research in the field. Either there has been made distinctions on the type of 
acquisition by the private equity fund, e.g. leveraged buyout, or the studies have focused on other 
stock exchanges or time periods. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how firms, previously owned by a private equity firm or 
syndicate, perform once they go public. That is, to investigate whether or not these private equity 
firms have created highly competitive, high-performance portfolio companies and to see if the 
portfolio companies are able to retain those qualities even after going public. In this study I make no 
distinction between the types of acquisition, only the type of exit, and the intention is to focus on the 
stock price performance, not the operational. These results are then to be compared to previous 
research done on the general IPO and its short- and long-term performance. It also sets out to 
measure what effect M&A-activity during the fund holding period may have on the fund companies 
after being exited by the private equity funds on to the public market. This paper may be unique in 
its focus towards M&A-activity during the holding period for the portfolio companies. Hopefully, the 
study can shed some light on this matter, which has seen little to none attention earlier, and thereby 
improving the awareness of the issue both for practitioners and academics. It may also be unique in 
its attempt to cover the larger part of the European Union and thus analysing the aggregated private 
equity market and private equity-backed IPOs on a European basis. 
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1.4 Demarcations 
Similar to the studies performed by Ritter (1980, 1991), I intend to study both the short-term and 
long-term performance post-IPO. I will thus test if the previously mentioned anomaly associated with 
long-term underperformance could be attributed to private equity-backed IPOs as well, and if and 
how the under-pricing may affect the short-run performance. However I do not intend to investigate 
the initial day return or under-pricing phenomenon (Ritter, 1991) specifically, only use previous 
research on IPOs to explain the results in my analysis. There are already studies such as the ones by 
Ritter (1980, 1991) on the general IPO initial day performance, however, to put these results in 
context of the private equity-backed IPOs, average initial returns has actually been calculated in 
table 6. Neither do I have any intentions of measuring the performance of general IPOs during the 
investigated period. When comparing the results of private equity-backed IPOs to the general IPOs I 
will instead again turn to previous research for the same reasons. The purpose of this study is to add 
something new to the foundation of IPO research, by instead measuring the performance of private 
equity-backed IPOs on an aggregated European basis. However, it is not part of the purpose to 
measure the operational performance of these firms. Making a comparison of operational 
performance prior and post private equity ownership would have been interesting. Still, since a 
sizeable part of all private equity fund acquisitions are of private nature, retrieving information would 
have proven both difficult and time consuming. 
 
The study does not attempt to investigate any variations in performance based on the characteristics 
of the private equity sponsor. An idea would have been to test if a sponsor with an international or 
pan-European reach could have had any effect on the firm’s performance. A sponsor with an 
international profile could possibly have a positive effect on a portfolio firm, in terms of both 
knowledge and possibility to enter new markets for the firm. However, the focus of the study needed 
to be limited somehow and since private equity firms tend to be focused to their own home market to 
a great extent, with the few exceptions of the largest ones such as 3i and KKR (Kohlberg Kravis 
Roberts & Co.). Adding to the problem is the small sample I would have been forced to base the 
variable on, since the sponsor information is dependant the firm existing in the Mergermarket 
database. With a small sample and skewed distribution of types sponsors, the results could possible 
have been misguided.  
 
Neither do I intend to study the performance on an exchange specific basis, again chiefly due to the 
skewness of the distribution. Table 1 illustrates this problem with a heavy sample weight towards the 
U.K. market. Nor is the single or multiple bookrunner variable part of this study, see Hu and Ritter 
(2007). This would have been interesting to examine, even more so due to the fact that multiple 
bookrunner representation is used increasingly over single, especially for private equity-backed IPOs 
(VCCircle, 2011). However, this field is relatively unexplored so far, it was actually unheard of before 
the year of 1997 (Hu and Ritter, 2007. The studies I have found on the matter, such as the one by 
Hu and Ritter (2007), is not related towards stock performance, but rather offer price and firm 
negotiation power. Also, since part of the purpose of the study is related to the difference between 
general IPOs and private equity-backed, a focus towards a more thoroughly investigated bookrunner 
phenomenon, i.e. bookrunner or underwriter reputation (see Carter, Frederick and Singh, 1998) 
seems more feasible. No attention has been directed towards the relative importance of the deal value 
of the issuance either. The deal value of most leveraged buyouts, and reasonably public exits by 
private equity firms, tend to be larger than average (Cao and Lerner, 2009). The suitability for 
comparing the results to the ones of studies on general IPOs is thus questionable.  
 
Regarding M&A-activity, no account is taken for the deal value of the merger or acquisition, an 
aspect, which could have been interesting to examine due to the relative importance as well as 
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potential synergies of an investment of varying size (see e.g. Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). 
However, the deal value of the M&As found in Mergermarket was not always specified and the 
sample for this variable would thus have been even smaller than the sample for the M&A-activity 
variable actually used in the study, displayed in terms of number of deals. 
 
1.5 Audience 
This study focuses on the private equity market and IPOs. The main audience then would have to be 
students and academics in finance, private equity practitioners or anyone with some interest in the 
equity capital market. Investors and traders might also find this paper interesting in terms of using 
the results as part of their trading strategy. Some statistical understanding would be beneficial for the 
reader when going through the method and results to fully grasp the significance of the results and 
how the study was performed. However, through providing the reader with background information 
about the industry, I believe to have broadened the scope of the potential audience, one must not be 
that conversant with the subject in order to appreciate the work. 
 
1.6 Disposit ion 
The study will continue on with section two, stating the approach of the thesis and describing the 
methods used and the particularities of those methods. It will also give the reader a good 
understanding of how the study was practically performed. In section three the novice reader is 
introduced to the subject and the Swedish private equity industry. The business model is described as 
well as what major players there are in the Swedish industry. Section four provides the reader with a 
theoretical frame of reference, explaining the most relevant theories for this subject, to be used in the 
analysis of the results. These theories are used in conjunction with the purpose to build hypotheses to 
be answered. The theories will also try to offer an explanation for the results displayed in section six, 
following the hypotheses. In section seven, the results will be followed by a thorough analysis. Section 
eight is the final section and summarizes the findings and conclusions that I have been able to draw, 
as well as poses suggestions for further research.  
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2 Methodology 
This section explains what method was used and describes how data was gathered, what 
complications that were encountered and provides with reasons for any sample tapering. It also 
argues for how credibility was ensured. 
 
2.1 Research object ives 
The private equity industry has been subject to debate for a long time. Lately the discussion in 
Sweden has been focused towards taxation and how most private equity companies manage to 
escape company taxation as well as taxation on portfolio company exits (Ekelund and Lundell, 
2011a). However, the dispute regarding whether or not these companies are value destroying and 
bad for the general public has been going on forever. Critics argue that the investment horizon is far 
too short and that private equity companies are only in it for the short run capital gain, with lay offs 
and downsizing as a result. With the recent crisis in the rear view mirror, private equity firms are also 
being accused of taking far too great risks with unhealthy leverages.  
 
Nevertheless, advocates may argue that the competition on the private equity scene has toughened 
and that bargains are more or less impossible to find these days. As stated in Mattson and Mårild 
(2006), internal value creation is today the most important factor for private equity firms. Thus, 
private equity firms have to create actual value, through active ownership and highly skilled 
management. Also, in response to the general opinion of private equity funds practising too high 
leverage, Kaplan and Strömberg (2008) found in their study that the annual default rate among 
private equity fund portfolio companies is 1.2%, compared to the average default rate for U.S. 
corporate bond issuers at 1.6%, portfolio companies are thus actually less prone to default than 
average (Hamilton, Varma, Ou and Cantor, 2006). Many private equity practitioners argue, on the 
contrary, that most listed companies are instead quite low leveraged. 
 
The study seeks to answer a few questions regarding exited private equity fund portfolio companies 
and their performance. The idea is to investigate how these companies perform after being floated 
compared to the general market, as well as how they differ from the average IPO, based on previous 
studies. That is, can any abnormal return be recognised and how do various aspects, such as timing, 
bookrunner reputation and M&A-activity among others, affect these potential abnormal returns? 
 
2.2 Research strategy 
The motives for investigating this matter further are not hard to find. The main objective of this 
study is to answer the question of whether or not private equity firms create value in their portfolio 
companies, preserved even after the exit. The particular characteristics of the study make an event 
study the optimal form of research. An event study is performed whenever one seeks to investigate a 
specific event or transformation phase as well as the circumstances surrounding it (Bryman and Bell, 
2003). The objective of this thesis is to be answered through quantitative analysis, by comparing the 
return of the sample with a general index as well as industry specific indices. This will be achieved 
through gathering enough data, used as the foundation of a number of statistical calculations, which 
in turn then will be the basis for the analysis.  
 
2.2 Quantitat ive and qual itat ive data 
There are basically two major ways to go about a study, quantitative or qualitative (Lekvall and 
Wahlbin, 2001). The quantitative method differentiates itself from the qualitative in a few distinct 
ways. It measures the performance of a greater sample population upon which the researcher can 
draw general conclusions of the entire sample population. The qualitative approach on the other 
hand usually relies on oral information, such as interviews, from which conclusions about a subject 
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are drawn (Eriksson and Wiedersheim-Paul, 2006). This study will take on a quantitative approach, 
as is consensus when performing this type of stock performance based research. Cao and Lerner 
(2009), who performed a similar study on reversed LBOs on the U.S. market, and Levis (2008), who 
studied the British private equity market, are merely two examples of similar studies with a 
quantitative method. The research will be based on a sample of, initially, 318 companies, 
representing all firms in Europe exited by private equity funds between 1994 and 2007. 
 
2.3 Scienti f ic approach 
When making a scientific study, one can approach the subject in one of two ways, inductively or 
deductively, or a combination of both. When using existing theory to build one’s analysis on, one is 
said to be using a deductive approach. Conversely, a researcher with an inductive approach uses no 
preconceived views or thoughts, i.e. theories and instead tries to create new theories based on the 
empirical results. However, no man can really be said to have no biases, even if one tried to set these 
aside, subconsciously one would still be affected by these (Jacobsen, 2002). 
 
Furthermore, since this is an event study which has been done before, a deductive approach seems 
reasonable when drawing conclusions, and thus basing them on existing theory and comparing the 
results in this study with results from earlier ones. At the same time, very few studies are pure 
deductive or inductive ones (Lundahl and Skärvad, 1999). I will try to back any conclusions made 
with existing theory, however, no clear distinction has been made towards using one approach over 
the other and an element of induction and general conclusions may prove necessary if any result ends 
up impossible to be supported by existing theory (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
 
2.4 Primary and secondary data 
There are two ways to gather data for analysis in which the data is referred to as either primary or 
secondary data. Primary data is data that is collected actively by the researcher himself while 
secondary data is data that has been collected by a third party (Lekvall and Wahlbin, 2001). I will be 
using secondary data for this entire study, as the time needed to spend on looking this data up myself 
would be extremely inefficiently spent. The databases used are all databases recognised by 
practitioners and used by many in their daily work (Dealogic, 2011: Mergermarket, 2011; Thomson 
Reuters, 2011). Thus, I see them as more than reliable enough.  
 
The record of the particular companies subject for scrutiny, the exited fund portfolio companies, was 
retrieved from a database provided by Dealogic. I found the stock price information about those 
companies in Thomson Reuters Datastream, which is a tool provided by the university and actively 
used by financial industry practitioners all around the world. Datastream was also the tool used when 
retrieving index performance for both S&P Europe 350 and the industry-specific benchmarks. 
Finally, the M&A-activity data was collected from the Mergermarket database, also a tool used by 
professionals in the industry for gathering information about M&A statistics.  
 
2.5 Credibi l i ty 
The veracity of a scientific study is crucial and expresses itself in three major ways: reliability, validity 
and objectivity. 
 
Reliability is really all about ensuring that the findings of the paper are consistent, regardless of who 
is making the study. That is, that anyone should be able to follow the procedures described in the 
paper and come up with the same results. But it is also about making sure that the results are not 
affected by temporary or random differences (Bryman and Bell, 2003). A time span ranging all the 
way from 1994 to 2007 should, hopefully, erase any such temporality or irregularity. Also, data 
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gathered from software such as Datastream and databases such as Mergermarket and Dealogic, 
would have to be seen as reliable as practitioners in the financial industry use them on a daily basis. 
The fact that share price data, deal specific information and M&A-activity related material, all has 
been collected from only one source per type of information, guarantees that there should be no 
differences in measurement or way of displaying results between any two companies (Björklund and 
Paulsson, 2003; Lundahl and Skärvad, 1999).  
 
The validity of a study tells you how well the author has measured what he or she intended (Bryman 
and Bell, 2003). Many authors separate internal validity from external, meaning that there is a 
difference between the validity one as a researcher is able to ensure and the validity of the actual 
sample, something the researcher is less able to guarantee. That is, making sure that one measures 
what was intended is one thing, whereas making sure that the data sample really reflects reality is 
another. When it comes to internal validity, I have used proven methods, used in similar previous 
studies and am thus certain that I have measured what was intended. The external validity is 
ensured through reliable sources and methods that should best reflect reality. The BHAR method is 
used for measuring abnormal returns and is used due to its realistic features. As it compounds the 
abnormal returns instead of summarising them, as done with CARs, it reflects the effect on an 
investor’s portfolio more accurately. However, CAR is used as well as a controlling variable. To make 
sure that the right-skewness of the BHARs is diminished as much as possible, the skewness-adjusted 
t-test has been used. However, the small sample used for measuring the effect of M&A-activity may 
pose problems of validity, as it perhaps cannot be seen as representative (Björklund and Paulsson, 
2003; Lundahl and Skärvad, 1999). 
 
Lastly objectivity, which is defined somewhat differently in various method literature, is basically 
related to the preconceived ideas and biases of the author. A researcher should always try to be as 
impartial and unbiased as possible to avoid letting anything compromise the results or the way the 
study is performed. It is always difficult to set aside preconceived opinions and even if one is 
successful in that attempt, they inevitably affect one unconsciously. I have tried to be aware of my 
biases to the greatest extent possible in order to be able to neutralise them, but I am still aware of the 
fact that perfect objectivity is almost impossible to attain and would like to inform the reader of the 
same. With that being said, I do not feel that this type of study is the one most affected by any 
biasness when actually working with retrieving and performing statistical calculations on data. 
Qualitative studies, performing e.g. interviews are much more affected by this type of problem when 
e.g. creating questions, as well as risking posing leading and slanted questions. The data retrieved 
does not change depending on any biases, however, it is still an important aspect for studies such as 
this one when it comes to interpreting the results. To come to terms with this problem, I have been 
extra attentive when interpreting the results, discussing my reasoning with my peers. Still, the fact 
that I am performing this study on my own could affect the objectivity negatively (Björklund and 
Paulsson, 2003; Lundahl and Skärvad, 1999). 
 
2.6 Sample 
 
2.6.1 Select ion of countries and stock exchanges 
This study limits its research to only measure the performance on private equity-backed IPOs and 
will thus not investigate the performance of the general IPO. Studies on general IPOs has already 
been performed numerous times, on multiple markets and during several time horizons, with 
examples such as Alvarez and Gonzalez (2005), Carter et al. (1998), Khurshed, Mudambi and 
Goergen (1999) and Ritter (1980, 1991), making yet another study seem redundant. My study is 
instead able to broaden its spectrum to include all private equity-
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reversed leveraged buyouts backed by private equity firms, see Cao and Lerner (2009). By 
broadening the sample, a general picture of the performance and quality of the IPOs backed by the 
private equity industry is achieved. However, the study has no intentions of incorporating venture 
capital-backed IPOs, done in Levis (2008) or Hege, Palomino and Schwienbacher (2003), since 
these firms are deemed as neither comparable to the general IPOs nor to the general market, due to 
their start-up like characteristics (SVCA, 2011). 
 
The countries included are displayed in Table 1, as well as their relative contribution to the sample. 
The exchange used for each country is the major exchange in the respective countries. These 
exchanges have been chosen since most leveraged buyouts, and reasonably public exits by private 
equity firms, are issued on the major markets due to the size of these firms usually being larger than 
average (Cao and Lerner, 2009). The particular countries have been chosen since it would be 
interesting to investigate the performance on an aggregated European basis, instead of on a country 
specific, see Björcke and Menzel (2006) and Henrysson and Petterson (2007). A lot of studies have 
also already been made on the U.S. market, such as Cao and Lerner (2009) and Mian and Rosenfeld 
(1993). By instead focusing on the aggregated European market, I hope to add to the research 
foundation of private equity-backed IPOs. 
 
Table 1 
Countries included in the sample and their  
relat ive contribution to the sample 
United Kingdom 37.9% 
Germany 11.6% 
France 10.8% 
Italy 7.6% 
Sweden 5.8% 
Switzerland 4.7% 
Poland 4.0% 
Norway 3.2% 
Spain 2.5% 
Austria 2.2% 
Belgium 2.2% 
Netherlands 2.2% 
Ireland 1.1% 
Czech Republic 0.7% 
Finland 0.7% 
Luxembourg 0.7% 
Russian Federation 0.7% 
Denmark 0.4% 
Faroe Islands 0.4% 
Greece 0.4% 
Portugal 0.4% 
This table shows that the largest equity market in Europe, United Kingdom, also seems to be the 
largest private equity market. It is also notable that the Swedish market seems to be the fifth largest 
contributor, remarkable given its size. 
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Looking at table 1, it is notable that the Swedish private equity market represents a large 
contribution relative its size, the largest one in Europe relative to its GDP, together with the U.K. 
market (SVCA, 2011). The Swedish private equity industry has also been subject to serious debate 
lately. The discussions have pertained to the lenient taxation of portfolio company exits and the 
obvious gaps in taxation policy for private equity firms, among other things (Ekelund, and Lundell, 
2011a). Thus, due to the relative importance, the industry description in section three will have a 
certain degree of special focus towards Sweden. However, private equity as a business idea is 
international, making the specifics for the Swedish industry relatively universal. 
 
2.6.2 Select ion of t ime period 
As I intend to build as large a database as possible, I have tried to find data reaching back as early as 
the database would let me. The earliest recorded data in Dealogica was from 1994 and in order to 
make certain a large enough time span of three years to study post-IPO, 2007 was clearly the most 
recent year I could use and analyse. Also, there seems to be a certain gap in the previous studies 
conducted, with Björcke and Menzel (2006) and Cao and Lerner (2009) displaying the most current 
results, ending in 2005 and 2003 respectively. The study will be conducted using four time horizons. 
Short-term will be defined as three months, short medium-term as six months, long medium-term as 
12 months and long-term as 36 months. The time period of the thesis will reach from 1994 to 2007. 
 
2.6.3 Select ion of candidates and criteria 
The study has identified 318 private equity-backed IPOs during the research period from 1994 to 
2007 on all of the covered markets combined. The sample should follow two main criteria, primarily, 
obviously, that it was in fact an IPO, and secondly that the IPO was backed by a private equity firm 
or a syndicate of private equity firms.  
 
However, some complications were encountered along the way. First of all, not all firms were 
covered in Datastream, which could be due to name changes not registered or acquisitions (see 
Appendix 1). Without any stock performance information about these companies they were excluded 
from the study all together. The lack of share price information reduced the sample from 318 to 277. 
Appendix 1 displays the companies included, as well as the country of origin, floating date (i.e. first 
day of trading) and industry the company operates in. Secondly, a large part of the sample was 
excluded when investigating the M&A-activity during the holding period. This was due to the fact 
that the date of acquisition and the portfolio firms’ acquisitions were hard to find. Only 111 out of 
the original 277 firms were registered in the Mergermarket database and thus eligible for M&A-
activity analysis (see, Appendix 1). Since there were firms registered in the database with no 
acquisitions, deeming the ones not found as having done no acquisitions seems erroneous. 
Furthermore, since Mergermarket was founded in 2000, there is limited information about deals 
being made previous to that year (Mergermarket, 2010). Thusly, including firms not in 
Mergermarket can distort the results,  seeing as a relatively large part of the sample is actually from 
before 2000, see graph 4. Table 2 displays the selected sample given certain criteria more clearly. 
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Table 2 
Sample Selection Criteria 
Total number of firms in the raw data sample 318 
Less: Observations not found in Datastream 41 
Regression and t-test on total sample and variables (excl. M&A-activity related)  277 
Less: Observations not found in Mergermarket  166 
Regression on M&A-activity related variables 111 
The 277 observations found in Datastream were used in the skewness-adjusted t-test as well as the 
multiple regression using dummy variables, explained further in the method section. The M&A-
activity related variables are calculated using the dummy variables, however, on 111 observations. 
 
2.7 Stock performance and required return 
When calculating the performance of a stock, one needs to put it in relation to some sort of 
benchmark in order to be able to evaluate whether or not the stock has outperformed or 
underperformed. A stock’s performance displayed in per cent on its own does not tell an investor 
much about how good of an investment it actually was. Even if the stock has risen by 15%, the 
investor could still have been better off by merely investing in the market portfolio if the market 
return was higher. However, it is also a matter of the risk-return trade off, the owner of an asset with 
higher risk also demands a higher return. The raw performance of a stock measured in per cent for 
time t is calculated by formula 1, displayed below. 
 !"#$%&! = !"#$%!        !"#$%!!! − 1   ×  100 
 (1) 
 
Thus, when determining if a stock has outperformed or underperformed, it is compared to the 
required return. The required return pertains to the expected, risk-adjusted return. That is, for a 
higher level of risk, a higher return is required. This relationship is explained by the CAPM-model or 
the Fama-French three factor model (Fama and French, 2004). If !!,! is the return of a time series 
of a portfolio of companies floated at time t, the forthcoming proposed tests can be seen as testing for ! in a time series model. 
 !!,! =   ! + (!!,!)! +   !! 
(2) 
 
Where, (!!,!)!  is the expected, or required, return and !!, the zero mean error term, at time t. As 
mentioned previously, (!!,!)!  can in turn be viewed from the CAPM or Fama-French three factor 
model perspective. Formula 3 illustrates the CAPM view.  
 (!!,!)! =   !!,! +   !(!!,! −   !!,!) 
(3) 
 
Where, !!,! is the risk-free rate at time t, and !!,! is the return of a specific benchmark. These 
benchmarks are discussed further in the subsequent section. With the restriction of ! = 1 and the 
usage of CAPM, proposed by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and followed by Gregory, Guermat and 
Al-Shawawreh (2010), a better specification is achieved (Lyon et al., 1999; cited in Gregory et al., 
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2010 p. 620). Through simplifying the model with the above mentioned assumptions, we end up 
with the following formula for the required return (Gregory et al., 2010): 
 (!!,!)! =   !!,! 
(4) 
 
Formula 4 thus states that the required return equals the benchmark. The proposed procedure was 
also implemented by Gregory et al. (2010), in their study about IPOs in the UK. 
 
2.8 The applied benchmarks 
In order to measure and compare company performance across industries, one would have to 
eliminate any industry related outperformance for each firm. This is accomplished through adjusting 
the performance of an individual firm for the performance of the entire industry. However, to be able 
to see the outperformance or underperformance over the general market, a benchmark reflecting the 
market portfolio is needed. Thus, two benchmarks will be used to properly examine the performance, 
S&P Europe 350 and an industry benchmark reflecting the performance for each IPO respectively. 
 
The S&P Europe 350 intends to cover at least 70% of the equity in Europe and serves as a general 
market portfolio comparison. This index represents 350 listed companies, leading their industry, in 
their home market, in 17 European countries. These companies then have to follow a list of criteria 
regarding e.g. liquidity and market capitalization. The countries included are Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The relative size of each market is 
then represented accordingly in the index (S&P, 2010). 
 
Moreover, 10 economic sectors, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Energy, Financials, 
Health Care, Industrials, Materials, Technology, Telecommunication Services, and Utilities in turn 
make up The S&P Europe 350. These benchmarks will be used to represent the industry-specific 
return for each industry included in the sample (S&P, 2010). Table 3 illustrates the distribution of 
economic sectors in the sample. Each company was already assigned to a specific industry when 
retrieved from Dealogic, however, due to the fact that so few companies were regarded to be working 
in consumer staples, the two consumer-related industries were combined into one. The few utility 
companies identified were of energy-related kind and were thus included in the energy sector. 
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Table 3 
Distr ibution of economic sectors in the sample  
Consumer Discretionary & Staples 21,3% 
Energy 4,7% 
Financial 6,9% 
Health care 15,2% 
Industrials 13,7% 
Materials 5,8% 
Technology 26,4% 
Telecom Svc 6,1% 
The graph displays how many companies in the sample were active in respective economic sector. 
The majority was found to be working in the technology and consumer industry, whereas the 
minority was found in the energy and materials sector, two very capital-intensive industries. 
 
2.9 Measuring abnormal returns 
There are some implications and factors to be aware of when choosing the proper method to perform 
this type of study, measuring stock performance. The buy-and-hold abnormal return method is 
frequently used in studies such as this, the most relevant being Cao and Lerner (2009). There are 
other ways of measurement, however none other replicates the effect on an investor’s portfolio as 
accurately, chiefly due to its compounding effect. The downside with BHARs is the fact that they 
tend to be right-skewed over time, with high kurtosis and inability to accurately measure short-term 
returns (Fama, 1998). Still, using average abnormal returns or cumulative abnormal returns would 
not reflect an investor’s return realistically (Buchheim, Grinstead, Janssen, Juan and Sahni, 2011). 
Due to these complications and to ensure consistency and validity in my results I have chosen to use 
both CARs as well as BHARs when assessing the abnormal returns for the companies in this study. 
Even though CARs do not measure the effect on an investors portfolio as realistically, it could prove 
more accurate when measuring short-term returns, where the BHAR-method experiences problems.  
 
As mentioned earlier, four time-horizons will be used in this study. Short-term, represented by three 
months, short medium-term, six months, long medium term, twelve months and long-term 36 
months. Measuring long-term abnormal returns is exceptionally hard and treacherous as Lyon et al. 
(1999) expressed it, and which Fama (1998) concurs on. They recommend to measure e.g. across 
both different time periods as well as financial markets, both of which have been done in this study. 
Time periods of three years from 1994 to 2007 have been used, as well as more than 20 financial 
markets. Long-term studies continuously suffer from a bad-model problem, where the results 
become somewhat misleading. For example, CARs grow linearly over time whereas its standard error 
only grows with the square root. This problem becomes even greater when using BHARs, as it grows 
exponentially instead of linearly. In the short-run, the effect is negligible, but in the long-run it can 
have substantial influence on the results. Additionally, due to its compounding characteristic, BHARs 
are also subject to severe skewness in the long-run (Drobetz, Kammermann, Wälchli, 2003).  
 
Nevertheless, the BHAR-method is still the one to be preferred since it is the only on that truly reflects 
the effect on an investor’s portfolio and it is thus the most frequently used one in empirical studies on 
long-run performance (Drobetz et al., 2003). Now, Lyon et al. (1999) actually developed a 
skewness-adjusted t-test in 1999, which adjusts for the skewness experienced when using BHARs. 
When computing test statistics for the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns for the entire sample, 
their procedure is used.  
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When comparing different variables however, I use a different approach referred to as multiple 
regression with categorical variables, or “dummy coding.” This linear regression is a useful method 
when one wishes to compare multiple variables and how their mean differs from both each other as 
well as the overall sample mean. It is most often used in time series analysis, such as this study, or 
qualitative survey analysis. When comparing e.g. exited fund portfolio companies across countries, 
economic sectors or based on their bookrunner, one needs to assign each company to a specific 
group. Dummy variables solve this issue easily by assigning respective company with a one or a zero. 
Dummy variables are also valuable when there are infinite possible independent variables, such as 
the market-to-book ratio for a company. With dummy variables, one can divide sets of groups with 
different ranges of ratios instead of evaluating each particular ratio separately. (Barreto and 
Howland, 2005; Garavaglia and Sharma, 1998).  
 
2.9.1 Cumulative abnormal return 
Even though the buy-and-hold abnormal return method is the one preferred in this study, as it most 
accurately replicates the effect on an investor’s portfolio, all calculations have been duplicated with 
the CAR-method. Furthermore, CARs are subject to skewness to a much lesser extent, which makes it 
a good controlling variable (Lyon et al., 1999). !"#!" is the sum of the t-period abnormal return for 
firm i, and is calculated as (Khotari and Warner, 2006): 
 !"!,! = !!,! −   !(!!,!) 
(5) 
where !(!!,!) is the expected return for firm i, which is the benchmark and, 
 !"#!" =    !"!,!!!!!  
(6) 
 
2.9.2 Buy-and-hold abnormal return 
The buy-and-hold abnormal return formula measures the compounded capital gain for a given 
period of time. Even though it suffers from both problems of skewness and short-term accuracy in 
performance measurement, it is still the only method which takes into account the compounding 
effect of actually owning a stock, i.e. that a 50% negative return is not perfectly corrected by a 
subsequent 50% positive return. However, the skewness of the method is adjusted for in a test 
statistic explained next and the short-term results are also compared to their respective CAR results. 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns are computed as follows: 
 !"#$ = 1!    1+ !!"!!!! −    1+ !!"!!!!!!!!  
(7) 
 
where rit is the return of IPO i and rbt is the return of benchmark b at the month t. N represents the 
number of firms.  
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2.9.3 The skewness-adjusted test  stat ist ic  
To deal with the problem of BHARs being skewed, I will follow the method of Lyon et al. (1999). 
The skewness-adjusted t-test stems from the work of Johnson (1978), originator of the skewness-
adjusted t-statistic.  
 
Johnsons (1978) skewness-adjusted t-statistic, in turn, branches from the conventional t-statistic: 
 ! =    !"!! !"! /√! 
(8) 
 
Where !"! and ! !"!  is the sample mean and the standard deviation of abnormal returns for a 
firm, respectively. N represents the number of firms. Johnson (1978) then adjusted the original t-test 
to better fit asymmetrical populations and came up with the skewness-adjusted t-statistic formula, 
denoted here as !!": 
 !!" =   √! ! +   13 !!! +    16! !  
(9) 
 
where ! = !"!! !"!  
(10) 
 
and ! = !"!" −   !"! !!!!!!"(!"!)!  
(11) 
 
Note that (10) is really nothing more than the conventional t-statistic equation (8). This formula 
adjusts the usual t-statistic by two terms through taking into consideration the skewness of the 
distribution of abnormal returns (Lyon et al., 1999). 
 
To interpret the results of the returns, I will follow the methods of Ritter (1991) and calculate the 
wealth relative.  
 !"#$%ℎ  !"#$%&'" = 1+ (!"#$!%#  !"!#$  !"#$!%  !"#  !" − !"#$%&  !"#$!)1+ (!"#$!%#  !"#$!%  !"#  !"#$ℎ!"#$%!)  
(12) 
 
The wealth relative indicates whether or not the private equity-backed IPOs underperform or 
outperform the benchmark during time t. A wealth relative of 0.8 suggests a 20% underperformance 
and 1.2 a 20% outperformance. 
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2.9.4 Mult iple regression using dummy variables 
When making comparisons within the sample a multiple regression with dummy variables is used. 
Dummy variables are most suitable when trying to conclude variations based on different aspects 
within a general sample population. When performing linear regression using dummy variables, all 
input variables take the values of either 1 or 0. The 1 represents all “true” values, that is, the input 
variables for which the independent variable statement is true are denoted with a 1, a 0 represents all 
others. For example, when comparing exited fund portfolio companies, all companies floated during 
the year of 2000 are assigned a 1 under the 2000 column and all the others get a 0. However, under 
the 2001 column, a 0 instead represents companies floated during 2000 and a 1 represents the ones 
listed during 2001, and so on.  
 
When the dummies are created for each variable, they are then used in a Classic Linear Regression 
(CLR) model, yielding standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results. The equation below explains 
how the dummy variables are used in such a regression analysis.  
 ! = !!!! +   !!!! +   …   + ! 
(13) 
 
When studying the variable i, its dummy variable !! takes on the value of one, whereas all the other 
variables are assigned with zeros. This renders in: 
 ! =   !! +   ! 
(14) 
 
Which states that the return of any variable really is dependent on nothing more than its related 
dummy coefficient plus an error term. Note that no intercept is included in the equation, if it was, 
multicollinearity would occur and the regression would not be able to run.  Without an intercept, the 
coefficient represents the expected return for each variable. When an intercept is used, one variable 
needs to be dropped from the equation and thus represents the intercept. Suppose one has three 
variables, a, b and c, when aiming to see how variables a and b differs from c, the latter is omitted 
from the regression, rendering in the following equation: 
 ! =   !! +   !!!! + !!!! + ! 
(15) 
 
Where !! is the intercept and !! and !! are the two variable coefficients. The coefficients of the 
other variables, now instead represent the mean difference from the omitted variable c, which in turn 
is represented by the intercept (Kennedy, 2003). 
 
This method involves a total of five assumptions, which need to be mentioned. First of all, the 
dependent variables, i.e. the abnormal return, should be a linear function of the independent 
variables, i.e. country of exchange or M&A-activity. Secondly, for simplicity, the error term is said to 
be zero. Thirdly, the error terms are all uncorrelated and have the same variance. The fourth 
assumption regards the possibility to repeat the sample with the same independent variables. Finally, 
the fifth assumption states that the number of observations in the sample should be greater than the 
independent variables and no linear relationship should exist between these variables, that is, the 
linear multicollinearity should be low.  
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3 The Private equity industry 
This section introduces the reader to the subject and its peculiarities, how the industry of private 
equity is set up and what characterises it. This is to make sure the reader understands the 
surrounding private equity environment, which hopefully improves the extent to which the reader 
may appreciate the study. 
 
3.1 Private equity 
Public equity is risk capital invested in firms listed on a public exchange, investing risk capital in 
firms not listed on an exchange is instead referred to as private equity. Firms devoted to this type of 
activity where the target companies are mature and the acquisitions are financed chiefly by debt are 
called buyout firms or private equity firms (Unionen, 2009). 
 
3.1.1 The Business model 
The business model of a private equity firm is to acquire firms at a lower value than what they are 
later sold for. Private equity firms acquire targets to a fund set up by the firm, that are deemed as 
having potential inefficiencies in either their capital structure or operating business or potential 
synergies with either existing fund portfolio companies or other competitors on the market. These 
inefficiencies are then evaluated and in due time hopefully diminished or completely erased and 
synergies are realized by the expertise held by the private equity firm. Through these actions private 
equity firms are able to increase growth in revenue and margins through organic growth and/or 
acquisitions as well as minimising weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and taxes paid through 
relatively high debt-to-equity ratios (Unionen, 2009). Private equity funds generally perform well 
(SVCA, 2011). For example, Ratos has an annual average IRR of 30%. Shown below is a Graph 1 
displaying how that is accomplished (Ratos Annual Report, 2008). 
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Graph 1 
Value creation in a fund portfol io company 
 
The graph describes how value is created by a private equity firm in a portfolio company, from Ratos 
point of view. Most of the value is created in increasing revenue growth and by improving margins. 
The perhaps preconceived notion of private equity firms only focusing on capital efficiency is only 
second priority. As noted, a lot of the financial effects are actually a product of internal development, 
rendering in industrial development making up as much as 90% of the value creation in a fund 
portfolio company.  
 
3.1.2 The Fund and its  investors 
A fund is set up and capital is raised, investors range from insurance companies to banks and pension 
funds to private investors through fund in funds and corporate investors. However, not all capital is 
raised at once, as potential targets are being identified and acquired, capital is raised accordingly. 
When the fund is completely covered, no more investments will be accepted and the investments 
already made in the fund is locked in for, more or less, the coming 10 years. The fund will most likely 
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have some sort of strategic focus, be it geographical, related to firm size, industry or development 
stage. 
 
The Swedish national pension funds represent a large part of the investors in this type of funds, some 
has mandate to invest a full 100% of the managed capital in buyout funds. However, the majority, 
75%, of investments come from outside of Sweden, primarily from other European countries and the 
U.S. (Unionen, 2009). 
 
3.1.3 Acquisit ions 
When the fund has been set up and investors have committed to investing, the fund acquires 
companies fitting the prerequisites regarding strategic focus and future value increasing potential. 
Targets for acquisitions are more often than not family companies, conservatively operated and in 
some way inefficient. However, it is rare to see these funds investing in firms or industries demanding 
high capital investments with a long payback horizon. Also, private equity funds try to stay away 
from highly cyclical firms since its aggressive take on leverage demands a steady stream of positive 
cash flow from its portfolio companies. Acquisitions made by private equity funds are actually 
leveraged up to 70%, while the average listed firm usually is funded by merely 30-50% debt. 
 
Through altering the capital structure and the way the company is managed, the acquiring private 
equity firm can increase the value of the firm and realise a profit and return to its investors. 
Obviously there is also the case where private firms acquire publicly traded firms and delists them. 
One particular LBO and delisting, which gained a lot of press in Sweden, was the buyout of Munters 
by Nordic Capital (Nordic Capital, 2010). In this case, the private equity firm was able to value the 
target higher, and offer a higher price as a result, partly due to its ability to handle a much higher 
leverage (Unionen, 2009). 
 
3.1.4 Exit  
Finally, the fund exits its positions in its portfolio companies and terminates the fund. The investment 
period is usually around three to six years, after which a suitable exit route is chosen based on the 
highest value of the portfolio firms can be derived. The most common exit has been, and continues to 
be, an industrial sale for the obvious reason that these firms tend to pay more. Another common 
route is a sale to another buyout firm, a so-called secondary buyout. Exits to the stock exchange are 
highly dependant on the current state of the market. During recessions, IPOs and obviously also 
private equity-backed IPOs are very rare. Conversely, we see the most and the largest IPOs being 
done during booms. Reasoning over the timing of IPOs and private equity-backed IPOs will be 
discussed in more detail in the coming parts of the paper. (Unionen, 2009) 
 
As seen in table 4, during 2008, and actually in 2009 as well, a great majority of companies owned 
by risk capitalists, that is, venture capitalists and buyout firms, were sold to industrial buyers. It is 
also noticeable that exits to stock exchanges make out a negligible part of the exits in 2008, which is 
in line with for example Benninga, Helmantel and Sarig (2004) and their findings of the positive 
correlation between IPOs and high stock prices (SVCA, 2009). Looking at table 4, we can see the 
consequences of the recession that hit more or less stock exchanges all around the world and its 
impact on stock prices, as a result not a lot of exits to the equity capital market was done by risk 
capitalists. Table 4 is a table collected directly from a study made by Kaplan and Strömberg (2008) 
and displays the types of exits used over a longer period of time worldwide. These statistics more or 
less concur with the ones from a Swedish and current standpoint. Worth to mention is the 
bankruptcy frequency, given the capital structure of these firms one would think leveraged buyouts 
suffer from bankruptcy more frequently than other firms. However, Kaplan and Strömberg argues in 
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their study from 2008 that the average annual default rate for leveraged buyouts is merely 1.2%, 
assuming an average holding period of six years. Surprisingly, the average default rate for U.S. 
corporate bond issuers was found to be 1.6% in a study made by S&P from 1980–2002 (Hamilton et 
al., 2006). It is also notable that IPOs as an exit have been steadily declining over the years while a 
strategic sale has been the most common form of exit consistently throughout the period.  
 
Table 4 
Exit  characterist ics of  leveraged buyouts across t ime       
 
  1970- 
1984 
  1985-
1989 
  1990-
1994 
 1995-
1999 
 2000-
2002 
 2003-
2005 
 2006-
2007 
Whole 
period Year of original LBO 
         Type of  ex it:  
        Bankruptcy 7% 6% 5% 8% 6% 3% 3% 6% 
IPO 28% 25% 23% 11% 9% 11% 1% 14% 
Sold to strategic buyer 31% 35% 38% 40% 37% 40% 35% 38% 
Sold to financial buyer 5% 13% 17% 23% 31% 31% 17% 24% 
Sold to LBO-backed firm 2% 3% 3% 5% 6% 7% 19% 5% 
Sold to management 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
Other/unknown 26% 18% 12% 11% 10% 7% 24% 11% 
         % of  deals  ex i ted within: 
        24 months (2 years) 14% 12% 14% 13% 9% 13% 
 
12% 
60 months (5 years) 47% 40% 53% 41% 40% 
  
42% 
72 months (6 years) 53% 48% 63% 49% 49% 
  
51% 
84 months (7 years) 61% 58% 70% 56% 55% 
  
58% 
120 months (10 years) 70% 75% 82% 73%       76% 
 
The table reports exit information for 17,171 worldwide leveraged buyout transactions that include 
every transaction with a financial sponsor in the CapitalIQ database announced between 1/1/1970 
and 6/30/2007. The numbers are expressed as a percentage of transactions, on an equally weighted 
basis. Exit status is determined using various databases, including CapitalIQ, SDC, Worldscope, 
Amadeus, Cao and Lerner (2007), as well as company and LBO firm web sites. See Strömberg 
(2008) for a more detailed description of the methodology. 
 Source: Kaplan and Strömberg, 2008 
 
3.2 The Swedish private equity industry 
Since 1986 and the launch of the very first private equity fund in Sweden by Procuritas Partners, the 
private equity industry has progressed immensely, both domestically and internationally. Nowadays, 
the Swedish private equity market is, in relation to the country’s GDP, one of the largest in the 
world. In 2007 more than one per cent of GDP was invested in buyouts and when it comes to listed 
private equity companies, the total market cap ranks Sweden as fifth in the world only surpassed by 
the U.S. U.K., France and Switzerland (SVCA, 2011). However, the market is fairly concentrated 
and ten buyout companies make up 90% of the entire market (Unionen, 2009). Table 5 gives the 
reader an insight into the Swedish private equity market, its major players as well as their 
importance. 
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Table 5 
Ten largest PE Companies in Sweden 2008     
 
Managed Capital 
(MSEK) 
Invested Capital 
(MSEK) 
Investments 
 
EQT 100 000 50 000 30 
IK Investment Partners 37 032 15 948 20 
Nordic Capital 32 000 - 21 
Altor 20 000 14 000 21 
Ratos - 12 000 20 
Hakon Invest 13 000 11 000 6 
Accent Equity Partners 9 000 6 000 14 
Segulah 8 500 2 500 8 
East Capital Private Equity 5 200 4 300 14 
Nordstjernan - - 11 
The most influential private equity firms in Sweden are the ones in top in this table, EQT, IK, Nordic 
Capital, Altor and Ratos who together make up almost 50% of the Swedish market. 
Source: Unionen, 2009 
 
Most of the acquisitions being made by these firms to their fund portfolios are done in Sweden, in fact 
two-thirds of all investments are made in firms located in Sweden. The remaining third is more or 
less exclusively focused towards other Nordic countries. Thus, private equity firms in Sweden display 
a certain home-biasness (Shefrin, 2005) in their investment patterns. This is obviously highly 
dependant on their competitive edge and experience being limited to dealing with Swedish or Nordic 
companies. It is also easier and more cost-effective in terms of culture and legal issues, dealing with 
markets you are familiar with. The major Swedish players on the Swedish private equity market are 
EQT, IK, Nordic Capital, Altor and Ratos. Together they managed capital succeeding SEK 200 
billion in 2008, resulting in a combined market share of 40-45% as the aggregated managed capital 
in the private equity industry was around SEK 465Bn during the same period (Ratos Annual Report, 
2008; Unionen, 2009). However, there are some major foreign players on the Swedish market, 
coming from outside the Nordic region. The most influential being 3i Nordic, Apax Partners and 
Pamira Advisors, all of which are based in Great Britain. For example, 3i Nordic once had Gant in 
their portfolio, Apax Partners had both Capio Health Services and Pamira SBS Broadcasting, Kanal 
5, Kanal 8 etc. (Unionen, 2009). 
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4 Literature review 
The following section presents previous research as well as theories within the field, providing a 
foundation upon which the analysis is to be built. 
 
4.1 Previous research 
Private equity as a business form is a relatively recent phenomenon and has not been around for that 
long. The industry was developed in the 1940’s (Nyman, 2002) but began to grow really, together 
with the leveraged buyouts, in the 1980’s and has since then grown more than a 100 times in terms 
of raised capital (Cao and Lerner, 2009). Previous research that has been conducted has focused 
chiefly either on fund performance, such as Kaplan and Schoar (2004) and Phalippou and Gottschal 
(2005) or on individual investments and their operating performance, such as Kaplan (1989) and 
Holthausen and Larcker (1996).  
 
Thus, extensive research exist when it comes to fund performance and operating performance of 
individual investments, however, not pertaining the aggregated private equity-backed firms exiting 
through the stock market. Now, there have been studies made, investigating the matter of reversed 
LBOs and their performance on the stock market, Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) and most 
recently Cao and Lerner (2009) for example, though not to the extent of fund and operating 
performance. Still, to my knowledge, there have only been a few studies made on the share price 
performance of private equity-backed IPOs, one example being Henrysson and Petterson (2007) 
who studied previously private equity owned companies on the Stockholm Stock Exchange and their 
stock performance subsequent to a floating. However, that study is far from comparable with mine, 
as my study is made on the aggregated European market, and the number of observations makes 
this study, to my knowledge, unprecedented. Björcke and Menzel (2006) did study the performance 
of private equity-backed IPOs, but they were limited to the Swedish equity market and long-term 
performance. Levis (2008) researched the U.K. private equity market during the period 1995-2006, 
focusing on buyouts and venture capitalist-backed IPOs. Coverage of the complete European 
market, and the to some extent the Swedish, is however generally limited.  
 
Still, the main source of inspiration for this thesis comes from Cao and Lerner (2009) and their paper 
on performance of reverse leveraged buyouts. The focus of their paper was in measuring the long-
term performance of reversed leveraged buyouts. The study had a research horizon of 22 years, from 
1981 to 2003 and sought out to discover any cross sectional differences as well as changes in patterns 
over time by scrutinising 526 reversed LBOs. However, unlike the purpose of this paper, Cao and 
Lerner (2009) also examined the operational performance pre and post IPO. Findings from this 
study were that RLBOs going public are larger in size, have more reputable underwriters, are more 
profitable and are more leveraged on average than their respective peers. The perhaps most 
interesting result, at least for this study, was that RLBOs seem to outperform peer-IPOs, the market 
as a whole as well as portfolios of other IPOs. Now, even though this study is performed on reversed 
LBOs, it is still a matter of listing a company. Since it has been off the public market for such a long 
time it is even referred to as a secondary IPO (Mian and Rosenfeld, 1993). Furthermore, as leveraged 
buyouts are more often than not conducted by private equity firms, the results for studies on the 
matter are of high importance for my own study (Olsen, 2003). The main difference however is that 
my study includes those listings which are not reversed LBOs as well. That is, where the private 
equity firms have listed firms they bought on the private market initially. This study also intends to 
measure the short-term stock performance of private equity-backed IPOs, both Mian and Rosenfeld 
(1993) as well as Cao and Lerner (2009) concentrates on long-term performance. 
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Cao and Lerner (2009), in turn, were themselves inspired by a number of studies which partly also 
have been the basis for this particular study. Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993), similarly to Cao and 
Lerner (2009), studied the performance of RLBOs post IPO, but with even more focus towards pre 
and post IPO operational performance. Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) investigated 62 RLBOs 
during the period 1983 to 1987. Their study found no proof of RLBOs performing worse than their 
peers post IPO, but neither were there any indications of outperformance. Holthausen and Lerker 
(1996) were also unable to come up with any findings of RLOB:s underperforming on the public 
market in their study between 1983 and 1988 of 90 LBOs, contrary to their initial expectations. 
Mian and Rosenfeld (1993) however, in their report came to the conclusion that RLBOs slightly 
outperform its IPO-peers long-term when researching 85 RLBOs during 1983 to 1988. Levis further 
confirms this view when he presented that buyouts on the U.K. market perform abnormal returns 
short-term, that is, on a one-, three-, six-, nine- and twelve-month basis.  
 
Thus, both Cao and Lerner (2009) and Mian and Rosenfeld (1993) came across findings that would 
indicate that RLBOs outperform stock market peers as well as the average IPO. Mian and Rosenfeld 
(1993) go on and explain that reversed LBOs should be less under-priced since these firms have 
already been listed once before. According to Ritter (1991) and the “investor-uncertainty 
hypothesis”, the average IPO underperforms long-term since the market’s only source of information 
about the companies are the prospectus written by the companies. The pricing of the stock is thus 
based on insufficient information and as the market receives additional information, the price is 
adjusted accordingly. However, with a reversed LBO, a lot more information is available from when 
the company was publically traded and thus the price is set more accurately (Mian and Rosenfeld, 
1993). Still, their results tell a different story with even higher short-term positive abnormal returns 
than the average IPO. Furthermore, Degeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) as well as Holthausen and 
Larcker (1996) did, at least, not find any indications on RLBOs performing worse than its industry 
peers. In conclusion, most research up to date on the performance of RLBOs point towards an 
outperformance compared to the market.  
 
The sample in the study performed by Cao and Lerner (2009) had a mean buy-and-hold abnormal 
return of 18.81% on a one-year basis and 42.15% on a three-year basis. Levis on the other hand 
showed that buyouts on the U.K. market perform a one-year mean buy-and-hold abnormal return of 
20%, using a benchmark of peers where all firms are equally weighted, and a mean of 11.7%, where 
the benchmark has been weighted according to market value. The study of Mian and Rosenfeld 
(1993) measured the long-term CAR of a sample of reversed LBOs, which experienced a mean one-
year abnormal return of 4.65% with their “matching firm” principle, similar to the industry specific 
benchmark used in this study, and 5.33% with their value-weighted method.  
 
As mentioned earlier, studies on general private equity-backed IPOs are scarce and the few found, 
such as Björcke and Menzel (2006), also tend to focus on long-term performance. To find research 
performed on short- and short medium-term stock returns, in this study denoted as three- and six-
months, one would have to turn to Levis (2008) and his findings on buyouts in the U.K. On a three-
month basis, Levis’ (2008) study shows for 14.4%, equally weighted, and 9.6%, value weighted, 
abnormal buy-and-hold abnormal returns. On a six-month basis they performed a 16.9% and 
10.4% abnormal return. 
 
4.1.1 IPOs - How does the average IPO perform?  
As a reference to the results in this study, one can look at how general IPOs have performed in the 
past. In a study from 1991, Ritter examines the performance of 1 526 IPOs on the U.S. market 
during the period 1975-84. In the study he mentions two well-documented phenomenon, the short-
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run under-pricing and the “hot issue” market. The first phenomenon regards the fact that IPOs tend 
to, on average, produce a return of 16.4% from the initial offering to the end of that day. This leaves 
reason to conclude that IPOs, on average, actually are under-priced. Meanwhile, private equity 
backed IPOs seem to be much less under-priced. 
 
Table 6 
Average init ial  day returns 
Ordinary IPOs 
 
PE-backed IPOs 
   16,40%  4,67% 
Note that the investigated periods as well as markets differ. The initial day returns of ordinary IPOs 
are retrieved from Ritter (1991) and his study on the U.S. market during the period 1975-84. 
Source: Ritter, 1991 
 
However, Ritter (1991) actually found that IPOs at the same time tend to be overpriced in the long 
run of three years. Ritter (1991) compared the performance of the IPO sample to comparable, 
already listed firms and discovered a noticeable underperformance by the IPOs during the 
investigated period. The investigated IPOs displayed an average return of 34.47% whereas the 
benchmark portfolio performed an average return of 61.86% over a three-year period. That is, they 
underperformed by more than 25% during this period. He finds the CAR of his sample to be -29.13% 
at a t-statistic of -5.89, substantially significant in other words. More recently, a study performed by 
Khurshed et al. (1999) on the Indian market showed for a long-run underperformance as well, of -
17.81%. Carter et al. (1998) experienced almost the same results when examining the U.S. market 
during 1979 to 1991 with an underperformance of -19.92%. The second phenomenon pertains to 
the variation in IPO stock returns from one year to another (Ritter, 1980). He tests the occurrence 
initially proved by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), and poses the theory that this could be explained by 
varying risk, which directly affects the potential returns through the risk-reward trade off. Riskier 
IPOs also tend to be more under-priced, also having a clear positive effect on future return as the 
market adjusts. Thus, if the IPOs floated one year are riskier than the ones floated during another, a 
higher overall return should be expected. However, Ritter (1980) experienced difficulties in finding a 
relationship between the risk level of the IPOs and their subsequent return. Instead, he discovered 
that the abnormalities were associated with industry and proved that firms operating in the natural 
resources business tended to outperform others (Ritter, 1980, 1991).  
 
4.1.2 IPO activity vs.  Private equity-backed IPO activity 
A lot of the theories used regarding regular IPOs should, as mentioned, also be able to be transferred 
to the private equity-backed IPO activities. Since the seller is always looking for the highest price for 
its company, the IPO activity and thus also the private equity-backed IPO activity tend to correlate 
with booms in the market and high stock prices. Graph 2 displays how the IPOs and private equity-
backed IPOs co-exist. Apart from the difference in listings during 2001 to 2002, the peaks and lows 
seem to coincide, showing for the similarities in timing between non PE-backed and PE-backed 
IPOs. 
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Graph 2 
 
The Graph displays the number of IPOs on the European Exchanges, from 1995 to 2010. The two 
charts seem, not surprisingly, to follow each other throughout the years.  
 
4.2 Capital  structure & Leverage 
A firm’s capital structure is simply how the firm has decided to finance itself, either voluntarily or due 
to its industry-specific characteristics or life cycle stage. To elaborate, some companies or industries 
are better suited for e.g. debt financing than others. The most important difference between debt and 
equity as a means of financing, from an optimal capital structure perspective, is the structure of 
compensation to stakeholders. Creditors demand a certain regular payment of debt and interest, 
whereas equity holders benefit from an increase in company value as well as any dividends, 
distributed on the company’s own initiative. Debt financing thus demands certain regularity in the 
cash flow of a company, too much volatility and irregularities, and it may not be able to meet the 
mandatory payments when due.  
 
How is this of importance to the private equity industry? Well, to begin with, this renders in 
particular industries, and certain companies at a certain stage in its life cycle, being less attractive to 
invest in than others. Private equity funds invest in mature companies and deploy a large amount of 
debt into the company’s capital structure. It is therefore perhaps not that interesting for a fund to 
invest in a company with already high levels of debt. However, companies with a lot of remaining 
debt capacity are at the same time probably more prone to seeking debt financing themselves before 
turning private equity, according to the pecking-order theory which states that companies turn to 
internal funds, then debt and lastly equity when in need of financing (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Furthermore, Ward (1993) discusses how the stage in a company’s life cycle determines the risks of a 
business and thus the appropriate type of funding for each stage. This theory somewhat questions the 
pecking-order theory as it recommends different pecking orders depending on what life-cycle stage 
the company is currently in. Ward (1993) is making the argument that debt is not a suitable source 
of funding for a company at an early stage, when its business risk is high. However, as the company 
matures, the business risk diminishes and should thus be replaced by more and more financial risk, 
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i.e. debt, in order to maintain a healthy risk-reward ratio. Accordingly, firms at a later stage of their 
life cycle are more attractive from a private equity point of view (Borell, Tykvova and Schmitt, 2009; 
Ward 1993). 
 
4.2.1 Trade-off  theory 
The trade-off theory continues on the matter of debt or equity as a means of financing, based on the 
trade-off between the benefits and costs of each form. This theory reaches back to the work of Kraus 
and Litzenberger (1973), who discussed the disadvantages of debt when it comes to bankruptcy 
costs and its benefits in terms of a tax shield. Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) go on and state that 
there is an optimal degree of leverage for each firm, based on these trade-offs. Miller, however, 
disputed this theory in 1977, stating that if this theory were true, firms would be much more 
leveraged than they are. 
 
4.3 Debt-overhang 
There are a lot of benefits with debt, some already mentioned, such as the tax shield and the lower 
cost. Other benefits, such as reduced monitoring costs for the equity stakeholders and the free cash 
flow hypothesis will be discussed more in detail later on. Nevertheless, there are obviously 
disadvantages as well. The trade-off theory deliberates over the major ones, but it does not take into 
consideration the debt-overhang problem. Debt-overhang occurs when the company has taken on so 
much debt that it no longer can invest in positive NPV-projects as they arise. Put differently, the firm 
may have to put off or decline positive NPV-projects due to lack of funding, caused by too high 
leverage. Since the firm is so highly leveraged, a bank loan to fund the project may be difficult to 
obtain, or at least too expensive, due to the high risk that is involved with additional debt. A rights 
issue could also prove too expensive and thus the firm is in the position where funding is either 
unobtainable or too costly compared to the return of the project and has to turn down the positive 
NPV-project (Hillier et al., 2008). However, Levis (2008) states that this, in spite of the generally 
high leverage, does not seem to affect private equity fund portfolio companies significantly. He found 
that his sample of private equity-backed IPOs tended to invest more in research and development 
than its non-private equity-backed equivalents. 
 
4.4 Information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry in corporate finance pertains to the difference in information between 
insiders in a firm and its stakeholders. Since insiders have superior access to information about the 
firm, they can more accurately assess the value of it. This problem has two sides to it, on one hand 
the firm is in the position of being able to sell “lemons” to its investors, that is overvaluing the firm. 
On the other hand, investors expect “lemons” which results in them discounting the firms value 
accordingly, whether the firm in question in fact is a “lemon” or not. Therefore, it is in the company’s 
best interest to increase the transparency of the firm and the available information. Thus, the less 
information asymmetry present between a firm and its investors, the higher it is theoretically valued, 
one could say companies are “rewarded” for making more information accessible (Akerlof, 1970; 
Holthausen and Larcker, 1996). 
 
The problems with information asymmetry are usually denoted as either adverse selection or moral 
hazard. Adverse selection refers to the problem discussed earlier and the market for lemons. Moral 
hazard involves the trust and reliance in the relationship between insiders in the firm and the 
stakeholders of that firm. Such a problem may manifest itself in e.g. managers exploiting their 
superior access to information in decisions with possible negative outcome for stakeholders. These 
decisions could include e.g. managers making extra risky choices for the firm, as they usually possess 
options on the company’s stock and thus are only exposed to the upside. It could also involve other 
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decisions not in the best interest for the firm, e.g. empire building. However, the private equity firm 
behind the acquisition usually deploys one or more of its own employees in the company’s 
management team, which further reduces the information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Shefrin, 2005). 
 
4.5 Jensen’s free cash f low hypothesis 
Continuing on the same path of management and stakeholder relationship is Jensen (1986) and the 
free cash flow hypothesis. Jensen (1986) argues that there is a positive correlation between a firm’s 
free cash flow and increasing agency costs. That is, with increasing free cash flow comes increasing 
agency costs. The idea is basically that with too much free cash flow, managers have too much 
freedom to spend this cash flow and tend to do so unwisely and not in the best interest of the 
company. As mentioned earlier, as part of the moral hazard problem, managers may engage in 
empire building where decisions boosting the managers’ own careers and reputation is put in 
forefront of the company itself (Shefrin, 2005). With an increased leverage, which is standard 
procedure for any private equity firm, the degree of free cash flow is diminished by increased interest 
costs. Thus, the problem with managers having too much freedom and perhaps too much free cash 
flow is minimised in the average private equity fund portfolio firm (Jensen, 1986).  
 
4.6 Principal-agent theory and agency costs  
The theory of the principal-agent describes the relationship between management, the agents, and 
the firm’s stakeholders, the principals. The theory states that there are conflicts of interest between 
the management of the firm and its stakeholders, where managers act in the best interest of 
themselves rather than in the best interest of the firm (Davis, Schoorman and Donald, 1997; Kim 
and Nofsinger, 2007). This could manifest itself in managers, yet again, engaging in empire building 
(Shefrin, 2005). It could also appear in the form of different acts of earnings management, such as 
earnings aggressiveness or earnings losses and decreases avoidance. Earnings management is an 
excellent way for management to steer the way information is distributed to stakeholders as well as 
what type of information that is released. Earnings aggressiveness is the act of making future 
earnings as current as possible as well as making current earnings available to the public as soon as 
possible. Earnings losses and decreases avoidance is basically the opposite procedure, but with losses 
and earnings decreases. Management thus put off losses and earnings decreases on the future, 
through various accounting measures, in an attempt to hide the bad results from the public. This 
enables management to profit from their role as intermediaries between the firm and its stakeholders 
when their possible stock options are either exercisable or in the midst of being set up (Chih, Shen 
and Kang, 2008). Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe the costs associated to monitoring 
management and their actions as agency costs.  
 
Companies have been trying to align these interests through e.g. stock-based compensation. These 
attempts are more common in private equity fund portfolio companies than others and are also 
proven to be more successful. Kaplan and Strömberg (2008) argues that it is partly because of the 
illiquid characteristics of the stocks in a private company that makes it more effective in aligning 
management’s interests with that of the firm. Since management cannot sell of its stocks, or exercise 
its options, on a public market until the company is exited they are more exposed to the firm’s 
downside as well as upside than they would have been in a traded company. According to Kaplan 
and Strömberg (2008) they are thus also less prone to engage in short-term profit maximising 
actions. 
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4.7 Timing 
Ritter describes, in his study from 1991 about long-rung performance by IPOs, how volumes in 
offerings seem to fluctuate with large variations over time (Ritter, 1991). In a more recent study, 
Benninga et al. (2004) investigated the timing of IPOs and concluded that variations in activity 
coincide with booms in the economy and high stock prices (Benninga et al., 2004). If these listings 
during peaks in IPO-activity underperform, it could be a sign of firms using the “window of 
opportunity” to go public and thus taking advantage of the optimism on the market to float their 
stock (Ritter, 1991). In a study from 1980, Ritter investigates the existence of a “hot issue” market. 
That is, that the return of IPOs during some particular years differ immensely from others. He offers 
some reasons for this, such as, that the issues during these years may be of higher risk and thus offer 
potential higher returns, as well as that they could suffer from a higher degree of under-pricing and 
through that leaving room for future stock price increases as the market aligns with the firm’s true 
value (Ritter, 1980).   
 
During recessions, IPOs as well as private equity-backed IPOs are very rare. Conversely, we see the 
most and the largest IPOs being done during booms. The reasons for these variations is the fact that 
the risk appetite and thus demand for stocks is low which in turn affects the value of the listed firms 
and their share price negatively. Adding to that is the low purchase power among consumers 
(Unionen, 2009). Benninga et al. (2004) support this fact and state that IPO activity is highly 
cyclical. This is fairly logical, since most businesses are cyclical and thus when the economy is 
flourishing, so are these companies and corporate finance theory states that firms tend to sell stock 
when it is high or over-valued and repurchase company stock when it is deemed as low or under-
valued (Dittmar, 2000). Thus, since the booming state of the economy is experienced by all sectors 
and companies, one public offering is consequently followed by others and we have waves of 
offerings. Graph 3 illustrates this relationship through mapping out GDP-growth in the European 
Union and comparing it to IPO activity among private equity funds.  
 
The timing of private equity acquisitions is more reliant on credit market conditions and access to 
“cheap” capital to finance them. Low interest rates are usually subsequent to bust periods and thus 
the buyout waves move contrary to the public market exits. However, since the focus of this study is 
geared more towards the exit of these acquisitions, that is private equity-backed IPOs, no further 
description of this phenomenon will be presented (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2008).  
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Graph 3 
 
 
This graph illustrates the correlation between GDP and IPO activity. From the graph one can easily 
see how the number of IPOs coincide with “boom” periods of rising GDP growth, the exception 
perhaps being the period 2001-2002. This period is directly subsequent to the IT-bubble and the 
miscorrelation may be due to the effect of firms still suffering from the aftermath of the bubble, 
making trade sales less attractive. Note that the number of IPOs on the right axis cannot be negative. 
Source: Eurostat 
 
4.8 Parenting advantage 
Grubb and Jonsson (2007) discuss in their study the effects private equity ownership. After 
interviewing practitioners in the field they found that having a private equity firm as an owner is 
superior to other owners and they are better able to create value. The private equity form of 
ownership is greater to others due to a number of reasons. According to their interview object, Näs, 
private equity firms have an optimal time horizon, there is enough time to implement structural 
changes but not too much either, which could have a negative effect on efficiency. Harald Mix, CEO 
of the Swedish private equity firm Altor, argues that the public equity market is far to short-sighted, 
focusing too much on growth, critics to the private equity industry usually accuse private equity firms 
of being the short-sighted ones but Harald Mix says: ”It is not the private equity firms with an 
investment horizon of five to seven years that are short-sighted, it is the public market.” He also 
states that private equity firms are better at analysing the firms than the public market, explaining 
the fact that so few fund portfolio companies are exited to the stock exchange (Ekelund and Lundell, 
2011b).  
 
Private equity firms differ from other firms in other ways as well, there is no emotional attachment 
for instance, which usually is the case in a family-run firm and could prove problematic in certain 
business decisions. Moreover, there is little to none media attention, contrary to any public firm. This 
fact gives management time to focus on implementing changes rather than having to spend their 
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time in the press (Grubb and Jonsson, 2007). Private equity firms also tend to be industry focused 
and thus become experts on those included in the focus of the firm. This entails a great network of 
contacts, valuable for finding business partners and headhunting, as well as in-house expertise on the 
industry (Berg and Gottschalg, 2003). The financial strength of the fund also enables private equity 
firms to engage in mergers and acquisitions and thus taking advantage of any possible synergy 
effects, not possible without the involvement of the private equity firm (Grubb and Johnson, 2007). 
 
4.9 Bookrunners 
A bookrunner is the party, usually an investment bank, in charge of selling the firm’s stock onto the 
public market through road shows and promoting the issuing company. Previous studies on the 
matter of prestigious bookrunners are few, most focus on the effect of prestigious underwriters, e.g. 
Carter et al. (1998). The underwriter, in turn, is the bookrunner or co-manager ensuring the 
issuance. Thus, I believe these findings and theories about underwriters to be applicable also for 
bookrunners. Hu and Ritter actually studied the effect of multiple bookrunners in 2007, though 
focusing on the offer price and the benefits to the issuing firm in terms of bargaining power. The 
usage of multiple bookrunners has increased dramatically and was a phenomenon unheard of before 
the year of 1997 (Hu and Ritter, 2007). According to an article in VCCircle, it is even more common 
in private equity-backed floatings (VCCircle, 2011). 
 
In terms of stock price performance, there are studies such as the one by Carter et al. (1998), who 
found in their study that IPOs over a three-year period, arranged by more prestigious underwriters, 
suffer from less underperformance than other IPOs. They also found similar results to previous 
research on under-pricing, where IPOs associated with more reputable underwriters are not as 
under-priced as others. Furthermore, Simutin, in his study from 2009, showed for strong positive 
relation between underwriter reputation and future abnormal returns: ”…in all but one case, 
underwriter rank strongly and positively relates to future raw and abnormal returns.” Wu, Liu and 
Wang (2003) concurred on this matter in their study on the effect of prestigious bookrunners on IPOs 
on the Chinese market. Also, in a recent study from 2007, Hu stated that high-quality firms and 
highly reputable bookrunners would profit from choosing each other (Hu, 2007).  
 
4.10 Market-to-book 
The market value of a firm and its shares is the price one would have to pay for it on a public 
market. The book value of its shares is the difference between the firm’s book value of assets and 
liabilities. The ratio, market-to-book is then nothing more than the market value of equity over the 
book value of equity (Damodaran, 2010). A low market-to-book value, less than one, either means 
that the market believes that the company’s assets are overvalued or that the company’s return on 
assets is very low or even negative. The former is obviously not positive, and the investor better stay 
clear from investing. The second does not necessarily have to be negative, if management is able to 
turn the firm around and improve its return on assets, an investor could profit from rising market 
value. Conversely, a high market-to-book is a sign of the firm experiencing high return on its assets 
However, market-to-book ratios can be deceiving, the ratios of firms with little to no capital assets 
are hard to interpret. Consultancy firms and other information and knowledge-based businesses, 
more or less per definition have high market-to-book ratios since they are valued for their experience, 
which does not show on the balance sheet. It could also prove misleading when evaluating firms with 
naturally high levels of debt, such as companies in the real estate industry (McClure, 2011). 
 
From this, one could draw the conclusion that a firm initially trading at a low market-to-book value 
is a firm where the private equity firm has failed to some extent. Such a firm, as stated earlier, either 
has problems with creating strong positive return on its assets or the public deems the value of the 
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firm’s assets as overstated. Either way, it does not sound like a healthy company that has benefited 
from being under the ownership of a private equity company. However, such a company, where the 
problem is low return on assets, is also perhaps the most undervalued firm, where the largest 
potential for an abnormal return lies. In a study from 2009 by Simutin, firms going through an IPO 
with a low market-to-book, or high book-to-market, experienced higher abnormal returns: ”IPO 
firms with higher book-to-market tend to earn better raw and abnormal returns following the issue” 
(Simutin, 2009). Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000), found similar results in their study, measuring 
the returns of firms on the U.S. market during 1975-1992. According to their research, firms with 
high market-to-book, or low book-to-market, underperform the market. “We find that 
underperformance is concentrated primarily in small issuing firms with low book-to-market ratios” 
(Brav et al., 2000). 
 
4.11 Mergers and acquisit ions 
As with private equity, whether or not mergers and acquisitions create value have been subject for 
debate for quite some time now. Many studies have been made trying to evaluate the effects of 
mergers and acquisitions by e.g. measuring the performance of firms, subsequent to certain merger 
and acquisition activity. So far, these studies have shown on patterns of not adding value to the 
acquiring firm. In a study by Haleblian et al. (2009), consolidating previous research in the field, a 
number of cases are presented where M&A-activity has a negative effect on firm value, both short- 
and long-term. Examples of studies measuring the short-term effect are, Asquith, 1983; Dodd, 1980; 
Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989; Malatesta, 1983. Studies that have been focusing on the long-term are, 
Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker, 1992; Asquith, 1983; Loderer and Martin, 1992 (cited in Haleblian 
et al., 2009 p. 470). Furthermore, previous research has even been able to confirm that M&A-
activity actually erodes value rather than adding to it (Chatterjee, 1992; D. K. Datta, Pinches, and 
Narayanan, 1992; King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin, 2004; Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2003; 
Seth, Song, and Pettit, 2002; cited in Haleblian et al., 2009 p. 470). Even though studies have been 
conducted, stating the contrary, these are still relatively few (Haleblian et al., 2009).  
 
One problem with M&As is that firms tend to acquire too many companies in a too short time frame, 
leaving the acquiring firm with problems of indigestion (Bower, 2001), the acquiring firm is then 
unable to efficiently integrate the acquired firms into its way of operating. Other problems include 
overstating synergy values as well as the time it will take to integrate the acquired firm, this leads to 
the firm paying overprice and the acquisition not adding value (Bower, 2001). One would then have 
to wonder, why firms acquire if they do not add value, but actually erode value. According to theory, 
the idea is, among others, to create economies of scale or scope, or diversify into new markets or 
products, or increase market power through an expanded market share (DePamphilis, 2010). 
However, in order for these actions to pay off and create value, this of course demands that the 
integration is implemented as efficiently as possible and that the acquiring firm does not end up with 
an overpriced asset. 
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5 Hypotheses 
In this section, the hypotheses are stipulated, built upon the previously mentioned theory. The 
hypotheses intend to answer the purpose of the paper by breaking it down into sub-purposes. 
 
Previous research on reversed LBOs and their stock performance tend to point towards an 
outperformance of reversed LBOs over its peers, two examples being Cao and Lerner (2009) and 
Mian and Rosenfeld (1993), both covering the U.S. market. There are a lot of similarities between 
the studies made on reversed LBOs and this one. The difference is that I include all IPOs backed by 
private equity firms, whereas the mentioned studies limit their sample to only include reversed LBOs 
and not true IPOs backed by private equity firms. Cao and Lerner (2009) identified its sample of 
reversed LBOs through a couple of criteria. First of all it needed to be a highly leveraged buyout and 
secondly it needed to be backed by a buyout firm. Private equity firms are the ones that are chiefly 
active in the buyout market and Cao and Lerner (2009) had problems sorting out the buyouts from 
all of the private equity-backed IPOs. As Cao and Lerner expresses it: “This gives rise to ambiguity in 
identifying the RLBOs among the universe of private equity-backed IPOs.” It is therefore not unlikely 
to believe that I will achieve similar results when investigating the European market for all private 
equity-backed IPOs. A lot of theories have also been sourced from previous research performed on 
the performance of the average IPO. Since these are also IPOs, only backed by private equity firms, it 
would be reasonable if the patterns of these IPOs follow those of the average ones. Following now is a 
presentation over the different hypotheses and independent variables used in the analysis.  
 
5.1 Private equity-backed IPOs vs.  S&P Europe 350  
The abnormal return is measured as the return for a company i during period t less the expected 
return during the same period. The expected return for any given company or portfolio of companies 
is a relatively subjective term and can be seen as the market portfolio. In this study the market 
portfolio is represented by the S&P Europe 350 index. Studies on the average IPO have shown for 
results pointing towards short-term abnormal returns followed by long-term underperformance. 
According to theory these findings are due to the fact that bookrunners under-price firms as they are 
being floated in order for their clients in the book, who have invested in the floated company, to be 
satisfied and enjoy a healthy rise in share price subsequent to the floating. However, according to 
Ritter (1991), the long-term underperformance is really just a result of the aftermarket price being 
too high. Nevertheless, it would be highly interesting to see how results and findings in previous 
research on the average IPO differs from that of a private equity fund portfolio company. 
 
H0: Private equity-backed IPOs show no signs of abnormal return and are thus equal to zero. 
 
H1: Private equity-backed IPOs display abnormal returns when compared to S&P Europe 350, 
during any of the measured periods and with any of the two methods CAR or BHAR. 
 
5.2 Private equity-backed IPOs vs.  i ts  respective f inancial  sector  
In order to make the study more reliable a second benchmark, or expected return, has been used. 
The performance of each firm has been compared to the performance of its respective financial sector 
during the observed periods. That is, the performance of a firm floated on the fifth of May in 1996 is 
compared to the performance of its financial sector, represented by indices provided by S&P. A more 
in-depth description over the financial sectors has previously been presented in Graph 3 and section 
2.7. 
 
H2: Private equity-backed IPOs display abnormal returns when compared to its respective financial 
sector, during any of the measured periods and with any of the two methods CAR or BHAR. 
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5.3 Sector specif ic performance 
In order to determine if any sector is the driving force behind the results, a variable for the different 
sectors has been constructed. This is to ensure that the results found are general for all private 
equity-backed IPOs and not specific for any individual sector. Ritter (1980) performed a study on 
the impact of the “hot issue” anomaly and discovered that the difference in post-IPO performance 
really could not be ascribed to the general sample population and was instead limited to a certain 
sector. This aspect could thus prove important to test and by doing so, being able to rule out any 
sector specific differences. 
 
H3: There are sector specific differences in private equity-backed post-IPO performance measured as 
CAR and BHAR, for all time-horizons. 
 
5.4 Private equity-backed IPOs and M&A-activity 
This section aims to test the relationship between M&A-activity and firm performance in private 
equity fund portfolio companies. A majority of the existing theory within the field state that merger 
and acquisitions are value destroying rather than value creating. Studies measuring the short-term 
effect, e.g. Asquith, 1983 (cited in Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, Davison, 2009 p.470), 
as well as the long-term effect, Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker, 1992 (cited in Haleblian et al., 2009 
p. 470) have shown results of underperformance of firms engaging in M&A-activity. There are even 
studies pointing towards the fact that mergers and acquisitions actually erodes value for acquiring 
firms, e.g. Chatterjee, 1992 (cited in Haleblian et al., 2009 p. 470). It is thus not unlikely to believe 
that the same goes for private equity fund portfolio companies. Hypothesis three relates to the 
presence or absence of M&A-activity and reads as follows: 
 
H4: Private equity-backed IPOs that have not been engaging in mergers and acquisition-related 
activities during the holding period outperform private equity-backed IPOs that have, during any of 
the measured periods, with any of the two benchmarks and with any of the two methods CAR or 
BHAR. 
 
M&A theory also debates the problem of firms acquiring too many firms during a too short time 
frame, causing problems of indigestion (Bower, 2001). The problem pertains to acquirers 
underestimating the resources needed for integration, thus perhaps ending up with non-integrated 
acquisitions and foregoing potential synergies. In order to examine the impact of relative M&A-
activity, the amount of acquisitions per year has been investigated. Due to the findings of Bower 
(2001) and the likes, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
 
H5: There is a negative correlation between higher mergers and acquisition-related activities for a 
fund portfolio company during the fund holding period and CAR or BHAR, for any given time period. 
 
The subsequent two tables, 7 and 8, illustrate the M&A-activity within the sample. The sample has 
been divided into five categories based on activity, shown in table 7.  
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Table 7 
  Categories of  acquis it ions per year   
 
0   0.1-0.5   0.6-1   1.1-1.5   1.6 -   
 70   10   19   6   6   
There is an evident skewness towards zero acquisitions during the fund holding period. One should 
be aware of that this fact might have a negative effect on the reliability of the results. 
 
Table 8 
M&A deals 
Acquisitions 
 
Holding period 
Average total   Average per year     Average   
0,8   0,33     1,79   
A fund portfolio firm makes almost one acquisition on average during the fund holding period, and 
around one acquisition every three years.  
 
5.5 Boom vs.  bust performance 
The idea here is that the quality of firms floated during bust periods is higher, partly due to the fact 
that they are fewer and thus even more subject to scrutiny. Firms floated during bust periods, when 
the state of the global economy is generally bad, would also have to struggle to attract investors as 
the overall appetite for risk is relatively low and thus the opportunity to invest would have to seem 
really attractive. During boom periods a lot of firms take advantage of the “window of opportunity”, 
the general outlook on firms during these periods is especially positive and may result in companies 
getting floated, even though they perhaps should not have (Ritter, 1991). The IT-bubble is a great 
example of this (Ritter, 1991; Unionen, 2009). The idea is to see how the years differ when put into 
context of general IPO-activity and GDP-growth. Firms listed the first three years subsequent to the 
IT-bubble have been sorted under the bust-period, whereas all other firms have been deemed as 
boom-listings. Looking at graph 2 and 3, one can see that during these years the average GDP-
growth is declining and the general IPO-activity is relatively low. I thus want to test the phenomenon 
of “window of opportunity” described by Ritter (1991), where he investigates the relationship 
between IPO-activity and performance, and concludes that it is both negative and cyclical. He states: 
”If the high volume periods are associated with poor long-run performance, this would indicate that 
issuers are successfully timing new issues to take advantage of "windows of opportunity.” 
Consequently, I assess the performance of the years with the lowest and declining activity in 
concurrence with a declining GDP-growth, found in graph 3 to be the years following the IT-bubble. 
The formula for CAR for this variable is displayed below as an example.  
 !"# =   !! +   !!!"#$! + ! 
(15) 
 
Where, !!  represents listings made during boom-periods, !  is set to zero and bust-listings are 
represented by the dummy-variable BUST. 
 
H6: Private equity-backed IPOs floated during bust periods outperform private equity-backed IPOs 
during boom periods, during any of the measured periods, with any of the two benchmarks and with 
any of the two methods CAR or BHAR. 
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5.6 Market-to-book 
The market-to-book ratio measures the market value of a company’s equity over the book value of 
its equity. High market-to-book ratios tells an investor that return on assets are high, low market-to-
book ratios is instead a sign of the company suffering from really low return on assets or overvalued 
assets. However, a firm initially trading at a low market-to-book ratio does at the same time have the 
largest potential upside if the firm’s management is able to turn the company around and create 
higher return on assets. In a study from 2009 by Simutin, firms going through an IPO with a low 
market-to-book, or high book-to-market, experienced higher abnormal returns. Thus, there is 
reason to believe that low market-to-book ratios are positively related to abnormal returns. Each 
sample firm has been divided into decentiles of ten, according to its market-to-book ratio for the first 
day of trading. The lowest ten per cent of market-to-book ratios are put into the first decentile, the 
second lowest ten per cent in the second decentile, and so forth. Table 9 depicts the different ranges 
of market-to-book ratios. 
 
Table 9 
Decentiles Market-to-book 
1st 0.06 - 1.44 
2nd 1.45 - 1.89 
3rd 1.90 - 2.25 
4th 2.29 - 2.68 
5th 2.69 - 2.93 
6th 2.94 - 3.47 
7th 3.48 - 4.03 
8th 4.04 - 5.09 
9th 5.10 - 7.32 
10th 7.47 - 95.06 
Judging by the table, a market-to-book of around two to three seems most common, since two 
decentiles exist within the range 2.29 to 2.93. 
 
H7: There is a positive relationship between low market-to-book and firm performance for private 
equity-backed IPOs in the sample, during any of the measured periods, with any of the two 
benchmarks and with any of the two methods CAR or BHAR. 
 
5.7 Bookrunner reputation and f irm performance 
Previous research has evaluated the effect of underwriter/bookrunner reputation of an IPO on the 
performance of the share. Carter et al. (1998) found in their study that IPOs backed by more 
reputable underwriters suffer from less underperformance than the average IPO on a long-term 
basis. For example, Simutin (2009) presented in his study a positive relationship between 
underwriter reputation and abnormal returns. That is, that having a highly reputable bookrunner 
has a positive effect on firm performance. The method used to assign a certain degree of reputation 
differs somewhat from study to study, the process in my study is inspired by the one laid out by 
Carter et al. (1998). Carter et al. (1998) used a proxy of number of IPOs underwritten in 
combination with the relative market share of the listing. In this study, I looked at how many IPOs 
each bookrunner represented, be it in conjunction with others or not. The most active bookrunners 
were: Bank of America ML, Citi, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, 
Morgan Stanley and UBS, and have thus been chosen to be specially scrutinised. These bookrunners 
have all been the eight most active ones during the period. These are then compared to the deals 
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where none of the eight bookrunners have been active to determine if how the performance of the 
most active bookrunners differs from the rest. These previous findings end up in a hypothesis of my 
own shown below. 
 
H8: Private equity-backed IPOs with a highly reputable bookrunner enjoy abnormal returns 
compared to those who do not, during any of the measured periods, with any of the two benchmarks 
and with any of the two methods CAR or BHAR. 
  
5.8 Summary of hypotheses and dummy variables 
To clarify, the variables measuring the sector specific performance, M&A-activity and the market-to-
book ratio have been calculated with an intercept of zero, making the returns absolute. However, the 
bookrunner-effect as well as the boom- and bust-effect and M&A transactions per year, have all been 
measured with an intercept represented by the deals that these investigated bookrunners have not 
been engaged in, the boom-years and zero acquisitions, respectively. This results in the coefficients of 
the bookrunner, boom or bust, and acquisitions per year variables, being displayed relative to the 
intercept instead of being absolute.  
 
Table 10 
Hypothesis    Variables  
3 There are sector specific differences in private equity-backed post-IPO performance SECTOR 
4 PE-backed IPOs that have not been engaging in M&As outperform those who have M&AACTIVE 
5 There is a negative correlation between holding period mergers per year and firm stock performance M&AYEAR 
6 PE-backed IPOs during bust periods outperform the ones during boom periods BOOMBUST 
7 There is a positive relationship between low market-to-book and firm performance for PE-backed IPOs MARKETBOOK 
8 PE-backed IPOs with a highly reputable/active bookrunner enjoy higher abnormal returns  BOOKRUNNER 
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6 Empirical  foundation 
This section presents the findings of the study. These findings are then analysed and placed in 
context of previous research in section 7.  
 
6.1 Skewness adjusted t-test  
The sample has not gone through any regression analysis in its entirety, however, a skewness-
adjusted t-test has been conducted for both CARs and BHARs. Initially, the results from the CAR-
method will be presented, followed by the BHAR-method.  
 
6.1.1 Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
Table 11 displays the CARs over all time periods, for both benchmarks. The mean CARs tend to 
show increasing returns as the holding period increases for the industry specific benchmark. 
However, when using the S&P Europe 350 as benchmark, the abnormal return seems to stay around 
6% until the holding period is increased to three years, where it suddenly increases by around three 
percentage points. The observations on CARs all show signs of significance and more or less coincide 
with previous research using CARs, e.g. Mian and Rosenfeld (1993). However, the study by Björcke 
and Menzel (2006) displayed completely different results when covering the Swedish market. Their 
abnormal returns were negative for private equity-backed IPOs. However, this must be seen as an 
exception since most studies on private equity-backed IPOs or reverse LBOs show significant positive 
returns. 
 
The CARs for all periods are significantly positive, independent of benchmark used. The abnormal 
return for the industry specific benchmark is higher for all periods. This could be explained by the 
fact that the industry specific index adjusts for any differences in performance between industries and 
more accurately compares the relative performance to the peers of the private equity-backed IPO. 
 
Table 11 
  Skewness-adjusted T-test  
Observations: 277 CAR 
 
Mean 
 
t-statistic 
3-month AR vs. S&P Europe 350 6.37% 
 
4.4360 *** 
3-month AR vs. industry spec. 8.39% 
 
5.8749 *** 
6-month AR vs. S&P Europe 350 6.34% 
 
3.3376 *** 
6-month AR vs. industry spec. 8.74% 
 
4.7702 *** 
1-year AR vs. S&P Europe 350 6.18% 
 
2.0993 ** 
1-year AR vs. industry spec. 9.25% 
 
3.1965 *** 
3-year AR vs. S&P Europe 350 9.86% 
 
2.1052 ** 
3-year AR vs. industry spec. 13.74% 
 
2.8924 *** 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01   
The observations of CARs are displayed in a chronologic order, beginning with the S&P Europe 350 
index as benchmark, followed by the industry (economic sector) specific indices. 
 
6.1.2 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) 
According to table 12, the BHAR-method seems to follow a clear pattern of increasing returns over 
time. The BHAR mean increases from 7.76% and 9.32% to 8.87% and 11.28% for the three-month 
period and the two benchmarks respectively, it then continues to rise for all of the time horizons and 
ends up performing a 14.75% and 18.02% abnormal return over the three-year period. The BHARs 
are generally higher than the CARs of the sample, the notable increasing pattern over time for BHARs 
is also recognised by Levis (2008). 
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Table 12 
  Skewness-adjusted T-test  
Observations: 277 
 
BHAR 
  
Mean 
 
t-statistic 
3-month AR vs. S&P Europe 350 
 
7.76% 
 
5.9264 *** 
3-month AR vs. industry spec. 
 
9.32% 
 
7.2164 *** 
6-month AR vs. S&P Europe 350 
 
8.87% 
 
4.3811 *** 
6-month AR vs. industry spec. 
 
11.28% 
 
5.8269 *** 
1-year AR vs. S&P Europe 350 
 
10.49% 
 
3.4974 *** 
1-year AR vs. industry spec. 
 
13.70% 
 
4.7899 *** 
3-year AR vs. S&P Europe 350 
 
14.75% 
 
3.4640 *** 
3-year AR vs. industry spec. 
 
18.02% 
 
4.3866 *** 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01   
The observations of BHARs are displayed in a chronologic order, beginning with the S&P Europe 
350 index as benchmark, followed by the industry (economic sector) specific indices. 
 
Even though the returns of this study are significantly lower than the returns confirmed by Cao and 
Lerner (2009), possibly explained by the fact that they covered the U.S. market, they are still 
positive. The results of this study are more in line with Levis’ (2008), presumably due to the fact that 
he covered the U.K. market, representing 37.9% of my sample.  
 
Table 13 
  BHAR – Wealth re lat ives  
 
3-month 6-month 1-year 3-year 
Benchmark 
    S&P Europe 350 1.08 1.15 1.10 1.16 
Industry spec. 1.09 1.17 1.14 1.20 
This table illustrates the wealth relatives described in 2.8.3, formula nine.  
 
The wealth relatives show the relative difference in wealth for holding a portfolio of the studied IPOs 
for the given periods in relation to the two benchmarks. It gives an investor an idea of his relative 
wealth gain if he had bought these IPOs and held them to the end of each given period instead of, 
either investing in the market portfolio, i.e. the S&P Europe 350, or a portfolio consisting of a set of 
matching firms, i.e. the industry specific indices. Table 13 shows that an investor would have profited 
from investing in the IPOs, given both benchmarks, for all periods. The results also indicate a 
tendency of higher wealth relatives as the holding period increases. 
 
6.2 Linear regression using dummy-variables 
The different variables in hypotheses three to seven were calculated using dummy variables. The 
abnormal performance for these variables is presented individually in the following sub-sections.  
 
6.2.1 SECTOR 
Table 14 illustrates the differences in the sample with respect to the respective sectors. Interesting to 
see is that the abnormal short-term performance, i.e. three- and six-months, seems to be chiefly 
driven by the sectors: technology, materials, industrials and financial, when using the S&P Europe 
350 index as benchmark. However, on a longer perspective it seems to shift towards materials, 
financial and energy. Financial firms tend to yield high returns both short and long run, using both 
benchmarks. Using the industry specific benchmark, technology and financial firms tend to be the 
two sectors contributing to the abnormal return for private equity-backed IPOs the most. 
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Table 14 
SECTOR       
Observations: 277     CAR   
  3-month   6-month   1-year   3-year   
S&P Europe 350                         
Sector Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    
Financial 17.59% 2.992 *** 18.80% 2.373 ** 18.22% 1.611   41.43% 2.327 ** 
Energy  5.64% 0.794   2.15% 0.224   18.24% 1.334   21.78% 1.012   
Health care 3.45% 0.874   2.82% 0.530   -1.94% -0.255   9.81% 0.819   
Consumer discretionary -0.02% -0.007   -2.36% -0.526   -4.88% -0.760   4.03% 0.399   
Industrials 8.18% 1.967 * 10.26% 1.831 * 13.88% 1.736 * 2.41% 0.192   
Materials 15.21% 2.374 ** 21.40% 2.479 ** 27.07% 2.197 ** 16.16% 0.833   
Technology 7.66% 2.555 ** 7.28% 1.801 * 4.63% 0.802   6.53% 0.719   
Telecom Svc 5.89% 0.948   7.53% 0.899   11.76% 0.983   10.85% 0.576   
Industry spec.                          
Sector                         
Financial 16.83% 2.716 *** 18.76% 2.302 ** 20.17% 1.758 * 48.72% 2.699 *** 
Energy  7.06% 0.942   5.64% 0.573   14.76% 1.064   5.72% 0.262   
Health care 4.24% 1.016   5.57% 1.016   -0.76% -0.099   8.86% 0.729   
Consumer discretionary 1.40% 0.397   0.00% 0.001   -2.51% -0.386   6.68% 0.653   
Industrials 8.84% 2.017 ** 10.26% 1.781 * 12.37% 1.525   -2.31% -0.181   
Materials 11.96% 1.770 * 13.71% 1.544   9.72% 0.777   -14.77% -0.751   
Technology 13.64% 4.316 *** 13.81% 3.322 *** 17.69% 3.022 *** 29.04% 3.153 *** 
Telecom Svc 7.56% 1.154   8.26% 0.959   14.81% 1.221   14.36% 0.753   
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
These coefficients are absolute and reflect the abnormal return for each sector. 
 
The results with the BHAR-method produce similar results with the financial sector yielding 
consistently high abnormal returns. However, technology is not as influential, neither short- nor long-
term. Again, note that financial firms significantly outperform both the market as well as its peers on 
all time horizons. However, the general tendency is still that all sectors outperform, using both 
methods.  
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Table 15 
SECTOR       
Observations: 277   BHAR 
  3-month   6-month   1-year   3-year   
S&P Europe 350                         
Sector Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    
Financial 20.10% 3.420 *** 22.21% 2.346 ** 18.52% 1.418   53.21% 2.856 *** 
Energy  7.15% 1.007   9.77% 0.854   41.57% 2.634 *** 28.45% 1.263   
Health care 2.46% 0.622   5.79% 0.909   -3.60% -0.410   9.88% 0788   
Consumer discretionary 1.23% 0.368   -2.72% -0.506   -4.00% -0.540   3.89% 0.368   
Industrials 9.83% 2.366 ** 14.93% 2.230 ** 26.79% 2.902 *** 11.96% 0.908   
Materials 17.02% 2.658 *** 25.51% 2.473 ** 38.08% 2.677 *** 26.96% 1328   
Technology 9.77% 3.259 *** 8.52% 1.764 * 6.79% 1.019   8.64% 0.909   
Telecom Svc 8.18% 1.317   13.41% 1.340   16.39% 1.188   32.05% 1.627   
Industry spec.                      
 
  
Sector                         
Financial 18.97% 3.115 *** 22.04% 2.272 ** 20.27% 1.555   61.72% 3.328 *** 
Energy  8.21% 1.115   13.82% 1.179   39.56% 2.510 ** 20.74% 0.925   
Health care 3.33% 0.812   8.71% 1.334   -0.96% -0.110   5.98% 0.479   
Consumer discretionary 1.84% 0.534   -0.54% -0.098   -1.07% -0.144   7.81% 0.742   
Industrials 9.67% 2.245 ** 14.73% 2.148 ** 24.77% 2.687 *** 7.67% 0.585   
Materials 13.72% 2.068 ** 17.23% 1.630   19.33% 1.361   -8.59% -0425   
Technology 15.24% 4.906 *** 15.37% 3.107 *** 19.68% 2.959 *** 28.89% 3.053 *** 
Telecom Svc 9.86% 1.531   13.80% 1.346   18.38% 1.334   33.83% 1.725 * 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
See table 14 for descriptive information about the specifics. 
 
6.2.2 M&A-ACTIVE 
The results of CARs and BHARs in table 16 differ a lot for the various periods and between the 
different benchmarks. The dummy variable method returns statistical significant results, for both 
acquisition active and non-acquisition active firms, only during the three-month period as well as the 
one-year period when using the BHAR-method. Even though the significance is high for these results, 
the abnormal returns differ merely by around one percentage point. With that being said, in all but 
one case, firms not acquiring during the holding period yield a statistical significant higher abnormal 
return on a three-month basis. 
 
However, looking merely at the coefficients, one is able to detect some patterns. For instance, when 
using S&P Europe 350 as benchmark, the CARs tend to be higher for acquisition active firms than 
for non-active, for all periods. Using the industry specific benchmark, not engaging in M&A activities 
produces higher abnormal returns short-term, that is, on a three-month and six-moth basis, whereas 
it produces lower returns long-term, i.e. on a one- and three-year basis.  
 
The BHAR-method depicts a completely different pattern, using the industry specific benchmark, the 
abnormal return for not acquiring firms is consistently higher no matter the holding period for the 
stock. Adding to that fact is the presence of statistical significance, especially on a three-month as well 
as a one-year basis where both acquiring and not acquiring firms.  
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Table 16 
M&AACTIVE 
Observations: 111   CAR   BHAR 
    Coefficient 
 
t-statistic     Coefficient 
 
t-statistic   
3-month AR vs. S&P 
Europe 350 
Acquisition 7.80% 
 
2.606 *** 8.41% 
 
2.514 ** 
No acquisition 6.99% 
 
3.050 *** 8.70% 
 
3.396 *** 
    
   
    
   
  
6-month AR vs. S&P 
Europe 350 
Acquisition 3.20% 
 
0.766     3.87% 
 
0.802   
No acquisition 2.61% 
 
0.816     4.99% 
 
1.353   
    
   
    
   
  
1-year AR vs.  
S&P Europe 350 
Acquisition 9.87% 
 
1.349     14.65% 
 
1.506   
No acquisition 4.19% 
 
0.749     12.06% 
 
1.619   
    
   
    
   
  
3-year AR vs.  
S&P Europe 350 
Acquisition 17.21% 
 
1.558     7.30% 
 
0.671   
No acquisition 8.63% 
 
1.021     21.62% 
 
2.595 *** 
    
   
    
   
  
3-month AR vs. industry 
spec. 
Acquisition 8.95% 
 
2.887 *** 9.20% 
 
2.734 *** 
No acquisition 9.77% 
 
4.122 *** 10.70% 
 
4.154 *** 
    
   
    
   
  
6-month AR vs. industry 
spec. 
Acquisition 4.43% 
 
1.061     4.93% 
 
1.031   
No acquisition 5.35% 
 
1.675 *   7.97% 
 
2.176 ** 
    
   
    
   
  
1-year AR vs. industry 
spec. 
Acquisition 12.50% 
 
1.625 *   15.78% 
 
1.633 * 
No acquisition 8.76% 
 
1.488     16.13% 
 
2.180 * 
    
   
    
   
  
3-year AR vs. industry 
spec. 
Acquisition 13.23% 
 
1.154     8.33% 
 
0.736   
No acquisition 11.06% 
 
1.260     23.43% 
 
2.706 *** 
                      
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01                   
The results are sorted by type of benchmark in a sequential order, beginning with the shortest 
horizon. Firms that have engaged in M&A activities during the holding period are sorted under 
“Acquisition” and firms who have not are denoted as “No acquisition”. Note that all of these results 
are absolute. 
 
6.2.3 M&AYEAR 
Analysing the results, method for method, we can see that the highest significant CAR is experienced 
by firms acquiring 1.1-1.5 targets per year, with a time horizon of one year. These firms have a 
42.40% significantly higher CAR than firms acquiring zero targets per year. Between the 
benchmarks, there are not any great differences really. Although, the market portfolio benchmark 
suggests that, on a three-year basis, acquiring firms has a positive effect on firm stock performance, 
however not significantly. Using the industry specific benchmarks and comparing to peers on the 
other hand, that relationship is not as strong. The CARs also show signs of firms acquiring targets 
being worse off on a six-month basis, for both benchmarks. All of these acquiring firms actually 
perform a negative CAR compared to firms not engaging in acquisitions, except for the ones 
acquiring 1.1-1.5 targets per year. The somewhat deviating results of firms in the 1.1-1.5 group 
could perhaps be explained by the small sample. Still, it is difficult to find any signs of relative M&A-
activity being positively or negatively related to firm stock performance subsequent to an IPO. That 
is, that firms perform better or worse given a certain degree of M&A-activity with respect to the 
length of their fund holding period, e.g. higher CARs with increasing relative acquisitions or vice 
versa. 
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Table 17 
M&AYEAR       
Observations: 111   CAR   
  3-month   6-month   1-year   3-year   
S&P Europe 350                         
Acquis i t ions per yr.  Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    
Intercept 6.99% 3.025 *** 2.61% 0.819   4.19% 0.756   8.63% 1.010   
0.1-0.5 -2.91% -0.445   -3.75% -0.416   -4.15% -0.265   1.47% 0.061   
0.6-1.0 2.66% 0.531   -1.28% -0.186   -3.65% -0.304   4.96% 0.268   
1.1-1.5 5.39% 0.656   19.46% 1.716 * 42.40% 2.148 ** 30.82% 1.013   
1.6 - -3.40% -0.413   -5.11% -0.451   14.86% 0.753   9.69% 0.319   
Industry spec.                          
Acquis i t ions per yr.                          
Intercept 9.77% 4.077 *** 5.35% 1.683 * 8.76% 1.503   11.06% 1.249   
0.1-0.5 -3.31% -0.488   -4.96% -0.552   -6.26% -0.380   -8.18% -0.327   
0.6-1.0 -0.20% -0.039   -4.17% -0.606   -7.27% -0.576   -3.02% -0.158   
1.1-1.5 3.96% 0.464   19.14% 1.692 * 39.12% 1.886 * 30.74% 0.976   
1.6 - -3.46% -0.405   -3.98% -0.352   19.88% 0.958   7.30% 0.232   
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01  
Again, note that the intercept represents zero acquisitions and that the other coefficients are relative 
to the intercept. 
 
The BHAR results do not differ dramatically from those achieved by the CAR-method. On a six-
month basis, as well as on a three-month basis using the industry specific benchmark, firms that 
acquire tend to perform worse than those who do not. Similar to the outcomes found with the CAR-
method, the deviating factor here is firms acquiring 1.1-1.5 targets per year. This deviation is, 
interestingly enough also found in the only group, besides the one engaging in zero acquisitions, with 
significant results. However, the BHAR-method produces results that differ from those found by 
using CAR in chiefly one case. With a horizon of three-years, firms not acquiring at all seem to 
outperform the ones that do, for both benchmarks and all M&A-activity groups. Although, none of 
the results for the groups with activity are significant and one still struggles with finding any positive 
or negative relationship between relative M&A-activity and firm performance, even for the BHARs. 
 
Table 18 
M&AYEAR       
Observations: 111   BHAR   
  3-month   6-month   1-year   3-year   
S&P Europe 350                         
Acquis i t ions per yr.  Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    
Intercept 8.70% 3.367 *** 4.99% 1.359   12.06% 1.663 * 21.62% 2.561 ** 
0.1-0.5 -5.33% -0.730   -6.69% -0.644   -8.74% -0.426   -7.87% -0.330   
0.6-1.0 2.25% 0.403   -3.47% -0.437   -15.02% -0.957   -18.41% -1.008   
1.1-1.5 3.47% 0.377   22.06% 1.687 * 67.83% 2.629 *** -8.36% -0.278   
1.6 - -3.66% -0.398   -7.62% -0.583   12.07% 0.468   -18.06% -0.601   
Industry spec.                          
Acquis i t ions per yr.                          
Intercept 10.70% 4.108 *** 7.97% 2.192 ** 16.13% 2.248 ** 23.43% 2.670 *** 
0.1-0.5 -4.59% -0.624   -8.35% -0.812   -9.99% -0.493   -10.44% -0.420   
0.6-1.0 -0.38% -0.067   -6.89% -0.876   -21.17% -1.364   -18.72% -0.985   
1.1-1.5 2.92% 0.315   21.49% 1.661 * 63.51% 2.488 ** -9.76% -0.313   
1.6 - -4.29% -0.463   -6.48% -0.501   17.81% 0.698   -16.77% -0.537   
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01  
See table 17 for specifications regarding the intercept and coefficients. 
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6.2.4 BOOMBUST 
Since very few listings were made during the bust-periods, see graph 4, achieving high significance 
for the results proved difficult. Per definition, bust-periods are defined as periods of low IPO-activity, 
partially due to the effect of deteriorating risk appetite. Still, for all periods but one, the six-month, 
listings during bust-periods performed higher positive abnormal returns than those during boom-
periods. Interesting to see is that bust-period listings achieve higher differences in abnormal return 
long-term than short-term. These findings are somewhat in line with Ritter (1991) and his study on 
long-run performance of the average IPO, in which he found that IPOs in general tend to perform 
better when floated during bust-periods.  
 
Table 19 
BOOMBUST     
Observations: 277   CAR   BHAR 
    Coefficient 
 
t-statistic     Coefficient 
 
t-statistic   
3-month AR vs.  
S&P Europe 350 
Intercept 6.15% 
 
3.754 *** 7.54% 
 
4.580 *** 
Bust 2.09% 
 
0.412     2.09% 
 
0.411   
    
   
    
   
  
6-month AR vs.  
S&P Europe 350 
Intercept 6.19% 
 
2.802 *** 9.07% 
 
3.433 *** 
Bust 1.38% 
 
0.202     -1.88% 
 
-0.230   
    
   
    
   
  
1-year AR vs.  
S&P Europe 350 
Intercept 5.23% 
 
1.660 *   9.86% 
 
2.671 *** 
Bust 9.13% 
 
0.938     6.07% 
 
0.532   
    
   
    
   
  
3-year AR vs.  
S&P Europe 350 
Intercept 8.35% 
 
1.703 *   12.82% 
 
2.485 *** 
Bust 14.41% 
 
0.951     18.47% 
 
1.158   
    
   
    
   
  
3-month AR vs. industry 
spec. 
Intercept 8.17% 
 
4.729 *** 9.17% 
 
5.369 *** 
Bust 2.11% 
 
0.396     1.48% 
 
0.281   
    
   
    
   
  
6-month AR vs. industry 
spec. 
Intercept 8.57% 
 
3.793 *** 11.44% 
 
4.252 *** 
Bust 1.60% 
 
0.229     -1.56% 
 
-0.188   
    
   
    
   
  
1-year AR vs. industry 
spec. 
Intercept 8.43% 
 
2.647 *** 12.99% 
 
3.561 *** 
Bust 7.83% 
 
0.795     6.84% 
 
0.607   
    
   
    
   
  
3-year AR vs. industry 
spec. 
Intercept 12.55% 
 
2.493 **   15.79% 
 
3.054 *** 
Bust 11.35% 
 
0.729     21.30% 
 
1.333   
           
 * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01  
In this table, “Intercept” represents the absolute performance of listings made during the boom-
periods. “Bust” entails the relative performance, for listings during the bust-periods, to booms. 
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Graph 4 
 
As the graph exhibits, the majority of all listings took place during the last boom during 2004-2007. 
The low interest and cheap source of capital that followed the IT-bubble in 2000 should have 
contributed to private equity companies acquiring candidates during the subsequent years of the 
bubble and sold them off as interest began to rise. 
 
6.2.5 MARKETBOOK 
Generally, it is difficult to discover any obvious pattern for the CARs in table 20. However, on a 
three-year basis there seems to be a slight tendency for higher abnormal returns, for higher market-
to-book ratios. During this period, high, significant positive abnormal returns can be observed for the 
9th and 5th decentiles. Also, with the same horizon and using the industry specific benchmark, firms 
in the 1st and 3rd decentile produce a negative abnormal return. When only analysing the results on 
a three-month basis, the highest and most significant results can be found around the 4th, 5th and 
6th decentiles. This, somewhat, goes against the findings of Simutin (2009), who stated that firms 
with initially low market-to-book ratios tend to outperform firms with initially high ratios. 
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Table 20 
MARKETBOOK       
Observations: 277   CAR   
  3-month   6-month   1-year   3-year   
S&P Europe 350                       
Decenti les  Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    
1st 4.70% 0.947 
 
5.35% 0.751 
 
12.87% 1.263 
 
-9.71% -0.613 
 2nd 9.77% 2.124 ** 11.38% 1.728 * 6.35% 0.673 
 
14.38% 0.980 
 3rd 2.51% 0.506 
 
-4.22% -0.594 
 
4.69% 0.461 
 
1.06% 0.067 
 4th 9.67% 1.986 ** 2.57% 0.368 
 
5.85% 0.586 
 
5.14% 0.331 
 5th 9.81% 2.016 ** 8.75% 1.255 
 
3.22% 0.322 
 
25.97% 1.672 * 
6th 13.17% 2.706 *** 18.46% 2.647 *** 19.29% 1.931 * 13.15% 0.847 
 7th 3.74% 0.785 
 
2.57% 0.376 
 
7.26% 0.741 
 
9.44% 0.620 
 8th 7.30% 1.470 
 
4.14% 0.582 
 
-3.27% -0.321 
 
2.12% 0.133 
 9th 6.72% 1.380 
 
13.12% 1.882 * 7.35% 0.736 
 
34.53% 2.224 ** 
10th 6.33% 1.274 
 
4.35% 0.611 
 
3.20% 0.314 
 
2.49% 0.157 
 Industry spec.                          
Decenti les              
1st 6.51% 1.234 
 
5.73% 0.781 
 
9.20% 0.886 
 
-12.36% -0.765 
 2nd 10.34% 2.118 ** 11.14% 1.640 * 3.70% 0.384 
 
7.43% 0.497 
 3rd 5.36% 1.016 
 
-1.94% -0.265 
 
4.00% 0.385 
 
-2.38% -0.147 
 4th 15.45% 2.989 *** 8.11% 1.129 
 
10.73% 1.055 
 
16.02% 1.012 
 5th 12.97% 2.509 ** 14.75% 2.052 ** 11.03% 1.084 
 
31.65% 2.000 ** 
6th 12.70% 2.458 ** 19.38% 2.696 *** 18.10% 1.779 * 8.26% 0.522 
 7th 4.87% 0.962 
 
4.50% 0.638 
 
14.15% 1.418 
 
13.23% 0.852 
 8th 10.39% 1.969 ** 5.54% 0.755 
 
1.40% 0.135 
 
8.10% 0.502 
 9th 7.26% 1.405 
 
15.55% 2.164 ** 14.97% 1.472 
 
49.45% 3.124 *** 
10th 8.38% 1.589 
 
6.91% 0.942 
 
2.41% 0.232 
 
4.14% 0.256 
 * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01             
The decentiles represent the relative book-to-market ratios for firms on the first day of trading. Firms 
with the lowest ten per cent are in the first decentile and so on. Note that the coefficients are 
absolute. 
 
According to table 21, which shows the difference in CAR between the highest and lowest five 
decentiles, firms with higher initial market-to-book seem to outperform those with lower on a long-
term basis, that is, one to three years. Short-term however, the results are a bit more vague.  
 
Table 21 
MARKETBOOK  CAR 
 
3-month 
 
6-month 
 
1-year 
 
3-year 
 
Average Median 
 
Average Median 
 
Average Median 
 
Average Median 
S&P Europe 350 
           Decentiles 
           1-5 7.29% 9.67% 
 
4.77% 5.35% 
 
6.60% 5.85% 
 
7.37% 5.14% 
6-10 7.45% 6.72% 
 
8.53% 4.35% 
 
6.77% 7.26% 
 
12.35% 9.44% 
Industry spec.  
           Decentiles 
           1-5 10.13% 10.34% 
 
7.56% 8.11% 
 
7.73% 9.20% 
 
8.07% 7.43% 
6-10 8.72% 8.38% 
 
10.38% 6.91% 
 
10.21% 14.15% 
 
16.64% 8.26% 
To better illustrate the differences between “high” and “low” market-to-book ratios, a table over the 
average and median CAR is presented. 
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Table 22 illustrates the results from the regression with the BHAR-method. These findings are not 
that much different from the ones found with the CAR-method. Short-term, on a three-month basis, 
the highest and most significant returns are found between decentiles four and six. Whereas long-
term, a slight tendency for higher abnormal returns for higher market-to-book ratios is observed.  
 
Table 22 
MARKETBOOK       
Observations: 277   BHAR   
  3-month   6-month   1-year   3-year   
S&P Europe 350                       
Decenti les  Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    
1st 3.97% 0.762 
 
5.69% 0.663 
 
19.08% 1.552 
 
-0.48% -0.029 
 2nd 11.74% 2.435 ** 13.94% 1.755 * 16.15% 1.419 
 
21.62% 1.403 
 3rd 3.12% 0.599 
 
-0.39% -0.046 
 
10.48% 0.853 
 
2.18% 0.131 
 4th 10.12% 1.985 ** 1.48% 0.176 
 
4.49% 0.373 
 
1.18% 0.072 
 5th 10.22% 2.004 ** 10.91% 1.298 
 
7.90% 0.656 
 
29.27% 1.794 * 
6th 13.11% 2.570 *** 27.88% 3.317 *** 28.81% 2.392 ** 1.25% 0.077 
 7th 5.57% 1.114 
 
4.97% 0.603 
 
8.35% 0.707 
 
27.32% 1.708 * 
8th 10.07% 1.935 * 4.64% 0.541 
 
0.04% 0.003 
 
5.53% 0.332 
 9th 10.02% 1.965 ** 17.67% 2.102 ** 0.34% 0.028 
 
22.70% 1.391 
 10th 7.64% 1.468 
 
6.25% 0.728 
 
14.87% 1.210 
 
21.68% 1.302 
 Industry spec.                          
Decenti les              
1st 6.32% 1.164 
 
5.69% 0.650 
 
16.72% 1.373 
 
-3.05% -0.183 
 2nd 11.07% 2.203 ** 13.62% 1.679 * 13.62% 1.208 
 
14.65% 0.949 
 3rd 6.15% 1.133 
 
1.83% 0.209 
 
10.73% 0.881 
 
5.39% 0.323 
 4th 15.09% 2.839 *** 7.27% 0.847 
 
13.05% 1.094 
 
5.87% 0.359 
 5th 13.12% 2.467 ** 16.86% 1.964 ** 16.12% 1.350 
 
40.29% 2.467 ** 
6th 12.48% 2.348 ** 28.89% 3.365 *** 27.04% 2.266 ** -4.09% -0.250 
 7th 5.86% 1.123 
 
6.95% 0.826 
 
12.63% 1.080 
 
33.46% 2.089 ** 
8th 11.51% 2.122 ** 5.81% 0.663 
 
4.87% 0.399 
 
13.42% 0.805 
 9th 10.28% 1.934 * 20.54% 2.393 ** 7.81% 0.654 
 
31.43% 1.924 * 
10th 8.71% 1.605   8.60% 0.982   14.47% 1.188   21.38% 1.283   
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01             
Displayed the same way as the CARs, we can see the decentiles to the left, where each firm has been 
divided according to their book-to-market ratio. The coefficients are all absolute. 
 
The results from the BHAR-method, over the highest and lowest five decentiles, are even more 
convincing than the ones found with the CAR-method. Table 23 illustrates that firms with higher 
market-to-book ratios tend to outperform firms with lower ratios, when looking at a three-year 
horizon. However, on a one-year basis, the relationship seems to be the opposite.  
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Table 23 
MARKETBOOK  BHAR 
 
3-month 
 
6-month 
 
1-year 
 
3-year 
 
Average Median 
 
Average Median 
 
Average Median 
 
Average Median 
S&P Europe 350 
           Decentiles 
           1-5 7.83% 10.12% 
 
6.33% 5.69% 
 
11.62% 10.48% 
 
10.75% 2.18% 
6-10 9.28% 10.02% 
 
12.28% 6.25% 
 
10.48% 8.35% 
 
15.70% 21.68% 
Industry spec.  
           Decentiles 
           1-5 10.35% 11.07% 
 
9.05% 7.27% 
 
14.05% 13.62% 
 
12.63% 5.87% 
6-10 9.77% 10.28% 
 
14.16% 8.60% 
 
13.36% 12.63% 
 
19.12% 21.38% 
See table 22 for a description over the attributes in the table. 
 
6.2.6 BOOKRUNNER 
The bookrunner-effect of more reputable bookrunners can be observed in table 24. In this study, 
reputation is defined as correlating with activity, and the degree of involvement in the deals studied is 
shown in graph 5. According to table 24, UBS significantly outperforms deals with no reputable 
bookrunner involvement, on a three-year basis by 5.17%. Deutsche Bank also significantly 
outperforms with the same stock holding period by a striking 23.6%. Goldman Sachs on the other 
hand underperforms significantly on a one-year basis with a negative 9.42%. The one pattern that 
might be noticed is the fact that, when using the S&P Europe 350 index, six of the eight bookrunners 
display positive coefficients, with UBS and Deutsche Bank as two examples with significance. 
 
Table 24 
BOOKRUNNER       
Observations: 277   CAR   
  3-month   6-month   1-year   3-year   
S&P Europe 350                         
Bookrunners Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    
Intercept 6.00% 2.896 *** 7.91% 2.824 *** 6.00% 1.513   8.04% 1.303   
Bank of America ML 3.14% 0.638   -5.12% -0.770   -8.73% -0.925   1.42% 0.097   
Citi -5.77% -0.984   3.16% 0.399   7.11% 0.633   22.60% 1.294   
Credit Suisse 5.02% 1.019   -6.79% -1.020   -5.12% -0.543   -10.69% -0.728   
Deutsche Bank -5.75% -1.049   3.44% 0.464   19.59% 1.867   23.60% 1.448 * 
Goldman Sachs 2.44% 0.457   -1.04% -0.144   -9.42% -0.921 * 3.62% 0.228   
J.P. Morgan -0.06% -0.010   -5.01% -0.609   5.48% 0.470   3.26% 0.180   
Morgan Stanley 0.78% 0.151   -0.70% -0.100   -4.85% -0.487   -22.56% -1.456   
UBS 1.29% 0.232   -2.64% -0.352   4.28% 0.404   5.17% 0.314 ** 
Industry spec.                          
Bookrunners             
Intercept 9.25% 4.242 *** 10.53% 3.676 *** 9.22% 2.290 ** 11.93% 1.880 * 
Bank of America ML -2.22% -0.429   -3.75% -0.550   -4.86% -0.507   8.15% 0,540   
Citi 0.60% 0.098   0.24% 0.030   6.73% 0.591   26.49% 1,475   
Credit Suisse -8.61% -1.660   -5.16% -0.757   -2.16% -0.225   -8.13% -0.538   
Deutsche Bank 3.60% 0.625   2.40% 0.317   15.81% 1.485   15.92% 0.949   
Goldman Sachs -3.21% -0.572   -5.71% -0.773   -12.59% -1.213   2.78% 0.170   
J.P. Morgan -3.47% -0.542   -7.07% -0.839   2.73% 0.231   -5.78% -0.310   
Morgan Stanley 3.87% 0.706   2.14% 0.298   -5.25% -0.519   -18.65% -1.170   
UBS 2.08% 0.357   -1.37% -0.179   4.61% 0.428   1.83% 0.108   
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01             
The “Intercept” in this table consists of all deals in which the bookrunners under scrutiny are not 
involved in.  
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Graph 5 
 
As the graph depicts, the bookrunners under special scrutiny together make up around 80% of the 
aggregated deals under the period and individually they each contribute with around 10%. 
 
Looking at the BHARs in table 25, we again find Deutsche Bank significantly outperforming, this 
time on a one-year basis using both benchmarks. Conversely, Morgan Stanley underperforms 
significantly by a striking -36.53% on a three-year basis and insignificantly on both a six-month and 
one-year basis. Contrary to the results achieved by the CAR-method, using BHAR, it is actually 
possible to detect some negative tendency for the investigated bookrunners during the six-month and 
one-year periods, when using the industry specific benchmark. For the one-year holding period, six 
out of the eight bookrunners display negative returns relative to the intercept and for the six-month 
period all but one bookrunner achieve negative returns, however insignificantly. On the other hand, 
on a three-month basis, using the S&P 350 benchmark, as well as on a three-year basis, using the 
industry specific benchmark, six out of eight outperform. 
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Table 25 
BOOKRUNNER       
Observations: 277     BHAR   
  3-month   6-month   1-year   3-year   
S&P Europe 350                         
Bookrunners Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    
Intercept 7.53% 3.611 *** 10.77% 3.218 *** 11.04% 2.383 ** 14.08% 2.174 ** 
Bank of America ML 1.75% 0.353   -4.54% -0.571   -14.83% -1.348   8.00% 0.520   
Citi -4.63% -0.785   0.99% 0.105   0.34% 0.026   18.37% 1.002   
Credit Suisse 5.08% 1.024   -5.66% -0.711   -2.01% -0.183   -0.93% -0.060   
Deutsche Bank -5.36% -0.972   6.71% 0.758   28.59% 2.336 ** 18.59% 1.086   
Goldman Sachs 1.98% 0.369   -4.36% -0.506   -13.11% -1.098   9.25% 0.554   
J.P. Morgan 0.30% 0.049   -6.11% -0.621   1.91% 0.140   -12.06% -0.634   
Morgan Stanley 0.58% 0.111   -3.39% -0.403   -3.10% -0.266   -36.23% -2.227 ** 
UBS 0.48% 0.087   -2.41% -0.270   1.50% 0.121   1.69% 0.097   
Industry spec.                          
Bookrunners             
Intercept 10.18% 4.717 *** 13.38% 3.924 *** 14.53% 3.166 *** 16.98% 2.616 *** 
Bank of America ML -2.16% -0.421   -2.80% -0.346   -12.11% -1.110   11.47% 0.744   
Citi 0.35% 0.057   -1.54% -0.160   -0.14% -0.011   20.96% 1.141   
Credit Suisse -7.59% -1.478   -4.40% -0.543   -0.93% -0.085   1.00% 0.065   
Deutsche Bank 3.66% 0.641   5.45% 0.604   23.94% 1.973 ** 13.14% 0.766   
Goldman Sachs -3.51% -0.631   -8.84% -1.006   -16.86% -1.425   10.36% 0.619   
J.P. Morgan -4.01% -0.633   -8.25% -0.823   -1.24% -0.092   -16.40% -0.860   
Morgan Stanley 2.98% 0.549   -0.51% -0.060   -0.45% -0.039   -36.53% -2.240 ** 
UBS 2.69% 0.467   -1.19% -0.130   2.83% 0.231   4.90% 0.283   
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01             
Just as in table 24, the intercept contains all deals that none of the bookrunners have had any 
involvement in and the coefficients of the dummy variables are relative to the intercept. 
 
In order to better see the difference in performance between reputable and non-reputable 
bookrunners, a comparison between reputable-classified bookrunners and the ones not classified as 
reputable, is displayed in tables 26 and 27. That is, all independently scrutinized bookrunners have 
been summed into one category. Even though it exhibits no significant results, it suggests that IPOs 
with more reputable bookrunners yield a higher CAR than those without, on all horizons except for 
the long-term of three years. 
 
Table 26 
BOOKRUNNER       
Observations: 277     CAR   
  3-month   6-month   1-year   3-year   
 
                        
S&P Europe 350  Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    
Intercept 6.67% 4.045 *** 6.91% 3.112 *** 7.18% 2.266 ** 9.62% 1.946 * 
Prestigious bookrunners -2.57% -0.530 
 
-4.97% -0.761 
 
-8.62% -0.925 
 
2.07% 0.142 
                           
Industry spec.                          
Intercept 8.66% 4.982 *** 9.21% 4.050 *** 9.84% 3.069 *** 12.73% 2.512 ** 
Prestigious bookrunners -2.31% -0.452   -4.02% -0.601   -5.10% -0.540   8.74% 0.586   
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
The coefficients are relative to the intercept. 
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Table 27 
BOOKRUNNER       
Observations: 277    BHAR   
  3-month   6-month   1-year   3-year   
S&P Europe 350                         
  Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    
Intercept 8.13% 4,914 *** 9.42% 3.547 *** 12.26% 3.311 *** 13.91% 2.675 *** 
0.1-0.5 -3.25% -0,668 
 
-4.77% -0.611 
 
-15.26% -1.401 
 
7.29% 0.476 
                           
Industry spec.                          
Intercept 9.60% 5.588 *** 11.68% 4.313 *** 15.19% 4.148 *** 16.82% 3.225 *** 
0.1-0.5 -2.39% -0.473   -3.43% -0.430   -12.86% -1.194   10.42% 0.679   
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
See table 26 for descriptive information over the table. 
 
The results from the BHAR-method are similar to the ones when using the CAR-method. No real 
significance can be proven, still, the tendency described in the previous paragraph is even stronger for 
the BHARs. 
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7 Analysis  
In order to bring some clarity to the reader about the findings and their contribution to answering the 
hypotheses, a set of subsections will follow. The results are analysed with regards to existing theory as 
well as previous studies.  
 
7.1 Private equity-backed IPO performance 
The hypotheses one and two, both sought out to clarify how private equity-backed IPOs performed 
when compared to the general market, using the S&P Europe 350, and their respective financial 
sector, using industry specific indexes for each individual firm and time horizon. The results 
presented in table 11 and 12, under section 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 respectively, clearly shows that no matter 
the method used and no matter the horizon, private equity-backed IPOs significantly outperform the 
market as well as their industry specific peers. This is in line with previous studies on reversed LBOs, 
e.g. Cao and Lerner (2009) and Mian and Rosenfeld (1993), but differ somewhat from the study 
made on private equity-backed IPOs on the Swedish market by Björcke and Menzel (2006). It is also 
interesting to compare these results to those of Ritter (1991) and his findings on long-term IPO 
performance. When adjusting for comparable firms, the IPOs in his sample yield a long-term CAR of 
-29.1% at the 0.01 significance level, whereas my sample, using a similar method with an industry-
specific benchmark, yield a CAR of 13.74% and a BHAR of 18.02%, both at the 0.01 significance 
level. Thus, the private equity-backed IPOs in my sample outperform his sample by over 40 and 
almost 50 percentage points respectively, be it on different markets and during dissimilar time 
frames. 
 
For an investor, the wealth gain may be of greatest interest. In table 13, the wealth relatives for the 
given periods are presented. Contrary to the wealth relatives of 0.880 experienced by Ritter (1991), 
when studying the long-term performance of IPOs, private equity-backed IPOs seem to produce 
wealth relatives higher than 1.00 over all periods and for both benchmarks. The returns experienced 
with a holding period of three years resulted in a wealth relative of 1.16 over the market portfolio 
and 1.20 over matching firms. These results indicates that an investor would earn 20 cents to the 
dollar by investing in private equity-backed IPOs instead of a set of matching firms, and 16 cents 
more for each invested dollar in private equity-backed IPOs over the market portfolio.  
 
The reasons behind this outperformance of the market and industry peers, short-term, could lie in 
previous research on general IPOs and the under-pricing phenomenon (Ritter, 1991) described in 
section 4.1.1. Long-term, general IPOs tend to underperform on average (Ritter, 1991), making the 
application of general IPO research less appropriate for explaining the long-term private equity-
backed IPO performance. Mian and Rosenfeld (1993) mention the effect of leverage and the benefits 
of an increased tax-shield as one reason. They also discuss how the financial risk differs between 
reversed LBOs and other firms, and an increased financial risk should offer potential greater returns 
according to the risk-reward trade-off. Since the average private equity-backed IPO is highly 
leveraged, one would deem this theory as applicable also for the current study. The level of leverage 
also helps to minimise the effects of Jensen’s free cash flow theory. With less free cash flow for 
management to spend on destructive investments for personal gain, due to the increased regular 
interest payments, a higher value can be obtained. Interest payments also put pressure on 
management to perform well, since their employer would seize to exist upon default due to lack of 
funds.  
 
Grubb and Jonsson (2007) discuss the parenting advantage and the effects of having a private equity 
firm as an owner. According to their study, private equity firms are superior in creating value due to a 
number of reasons. They state that private equity firms, have an optimal investment horizon, can 
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work efficiently distant from the media spotlight, are often industry experts with a lot of knowledge 
and the fund offers financial strength with the possibility to acquire. The effect of acquiring firms is 
answered more in detail in a subsequent sub-section. Still, it would seem as if these advantages of 
being private equity-owned are sustained also for the long run. Levis (2008) concurs on this fact, 
supported by his research on previous studies. According to Levis (2008), previous studies conclude 
that the characteristics of a venture capital firm are often seen as a highly contributing factor to the 
outperformance of their portfolio firms following a listing, characteristics that are true for most 
private equity firms as well. These attributes are denoted, as previously mentioned, as proficient 
management teams and superior corporate governance structures, skills and terms that are kept 
within the firm even on a long-term basis (Levis, 2008). The corporate governance structure of a 
fund portfolio firm generally differs from the average firm and attempts to align the interests of 
management with those of stakeholders are more common in a portfolio firm than others (Kaplan 
and Strömberg, 2008). Thus, agency costs are lower and may also be an explanatory factor for the 
outperformance. In short, it would seem as if private equity companies create portfolio more efficient 
firms of higher quality with sustainable future profits as a result. 
 
7.1.2 The Relative importance of the sectors 
As Ritter (1980) explored in his study on the existence of the “hot issue” anomaly, the sector specific 
performance can prove important for the conclusions on the performance of the aggregated sample. 
In my study, the difference in performance over the various sectors is quite substantial. The sectors: 
technology, materials, industrials and financial seem to be the underlying driving force behind the 
positive abnormal returns in the short run and materials, technology, financial and energy in the long 
run. Overall, the financial industry is the one performing more or less consistently above the others.  
 
Firms in the technology industry do not seem to outperform the market substantially, however, 
compared to its peers the abnormal return is relatively high. The abnormality could derive from the, 
often, capital intense characteristics of these kind of firms. The technology industry is usually 
dependant on funding for research or marketing, in order to get the product out to the general public 
and thereby generating income. High-tech firms also profit from economies of scale, with high initial 
fixed costs and diminishing variable costs, as production increases. A necessity for increasing 
production, without suffering from losses, is a coinciding increase in sales. Private equity firms can 
use their expertise and capital strength to improve efficiency as well as enter new markets, by 
acquiring or not, and thereby expanding the customer base for the portfolio firm. A similar 
explanation could be given for the materials industry, which also is relatively capital intense. 
Financial firms are per definition capital intense, seeing as part of their business is to supply with 
access to capital, and could therefore also be especially suitable for private equity ownership. 
 
Still, all sectors show for positive abnormal returns, except for the consumer discretionary, health 
care and materials industry that during some of the investment horizons show for negative abnormal 
return, however not significant and far from substantial. All other observations are consistently 
positive, whereas Ritter’s (1980) observations differed dramatically, as he expresses it: “there was a 
tremendous disparity in the behaviour of monthly average initial returns on natural resource issues 
and on non-natural resource issues.” This, however, does not seem to be the case for my study, I thus 
deem it unreasonable to attribute the entire abnormal return to only some of the industries as Ritter 
(1980) did. 
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7.2 M&A-activity 
Through taking into consideration whether or not the sample firms have been engaging in M&A-
related activities, this study intended to assess the effect of acquisitions during the fund holding 
period. That is, if there are any differences between fund portfolio firms only relying on organic 
growth and firms growing wholly or partially through acquisitions. Table 16 displayed some 
interesting results, in all cases but one, not acquiring generated significantly higher CARs and BHARs 
on a three month-basis. A similar tendency can be observed on a one-year basis, showing for 
significantly higher BHARs compared to firm peers. Furthermore, in all but one case, not acquiring 
generated higher significant or insignificant BHARs. This effect on firm performance is in line with 
previous studies mentioned in Haleblian et al. (2009), stating that acquisitions have a negative effect 
on firm value. In these studies, this effect is explained by the problems related to both assessing the 
value of the target firm as well as the amount of resources needed to integrate it with the existing 
business.  According to Bower (2001), firms suffer from problems of indigestion and tend to overstate 
synergy values. Even though private equity firms usually are supposed to be experts in their 
respective fields (Levis, 2008), the BHAR results indicate that they seem to be affected by these 
acquisition related problems as well. 
 
However, just as there are studies stating the opposite (Haleblian et al., 2009), that firms engaging in 
mergers and acquisitions are better off than firms that do not, my study also shows signs of M&As 
being value creating. The CARs in table 16 reflect a somewhat different pattern compared to the 
BHARs. Six out of eight observations actually imply that firms produce higher positive abnormal 
returns when acquiring compared to those who not. Still, only two of the total eight observations of 
CARs are significant. One of which suggests that engaging in M&As is value creating short-term and 
the other that it is not beneficial in the long run, making it difficult to read too much into the findings 
of CARs. However, it implies that M&As add to firm value short-term but fails to do so long-term, 
perhaps due to an initial overvaluation of synergies or underestimation of resources needed for 
implementation.  
 
Furthermore, in order to test the relative M&A-activity for each firm engaging in acquisitions, I 
conducted a test on the number of acquisitions in relation to the fund holding period, displayed in 
tables 17 and 18. As mentioned earlier, achieving any statistical significance proved difficult for two 
major reasons; the sample was somewhat small, and heavily skewed towards zero acquisitions. Still, 
it offered some support for the results stated earlier regarding the comparison between M&A-activity 
versus no M&A-activity. On a three-year basis, using the industry specific benchmark, acquiring 
firms has a negative effect on stock performance, no matter how many targets that are acquired per 
year, on average. It is also interesting to see that, with the BHAR-method, acquiring more than 1.6 
targets a year has an increasingly negative effect on stock performance as time progresses, with the 
exception of the one-year horizon. This effect is in line with the digestive problem-theory, indicating 
that a heavy focus towards acquisitions has a negative effect on firm performance, an effect that thus 
is increasingly noticeable the longer the investment horizon. It also suggests that the market grows 
more and more aware of the possibly overstated synergy effects and/or resources needed and the fact 
that the acquisitions could have been value destroying. 
 
With somewhat conflicting results using the two methods, it is also a matter of what method one 
deems as most reliable. As mentioned previously, BHARs replicate the effect of an investor’s portfolio 
much more accurately, as it compounds the returns instead of merely adding them up. Thus, from 
an investor’s point of view, BHARs would be the most accurate, implying that merger and 
acquisitions during the private equity fund holding period have a negative effect on firm stock 
performance, both short-term and long-term. 
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7.3 Timing – Boom vs.  Bust 
The boom or bust hypothesis originated from the previous studies of Ritter (1980, 1991) and his 
theory on the “windows of opportunity” as well as  “hot issue” markets. According to theory, IPOs 
fluctuate with the economic cycle and the activity increases during booms and decreases during 
busts. Benninga et al. (2004) and Ritter (1991), support this statement, and by looking at graph 3, 
there seems to be a tendency towards IPO-activity coinciding with the movements in GDP-growth. 
However, due to this nature and the size of the sample, there are obvious difficulties in showing for 
statistical significance. Graph 4 illustrates the problem, where only 29 out of the total 277 listings 
took place during the investigated bust period.  
 
Nevertheless, the findings in table 19, showing for a tendency of private equity-backed IPOs issued 
during busts performing better than the ones during booms, are in line with the results experienced 
by Ritter (1991). He concludes that the performance of IPOs is highly cyclical and varies with the 
volume and IPO-activity. The “hot issue” market phenomenon expresses the matter in another 
fashion, initially presented by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), and thoroughly explained and tested in 
Ritter (1980). He argues in his study (1980), that an increase in return for a certain year could 
perhaps be explained by the risk profile of the IPOs that particular year. Riskier IPOs also tend to be 
more under-priced than less riskier ones, making this essentially a matter of under-pricing. Even 
though Ritter (1980) finds no support for the statement proclaimed by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975), 
this could very well be an explanatory factor for the positive deviations found in table 19 during bust 
periods, at least short-term. It is not unlikely to believe that firms need to sell the its stock at 
relatively low prices in order to entice a market, which during busts, on average is lacking appetite 
for risk. Or, as Ibbotson (1975, p.264) expresses it when referring to under-pricing, firms need to 
“leave a good taste in investors’ mouths so that future underwritings from the same issuer could be 
sold at attractive prices.” Given the state of the market, IPOs during busts could perhaps be seen as 
riskier investments than IPOs during booms, due to the uncertainty of future performance. This 
relatively high degree of under-pricing is subsequently corrected by the market, which has a strong, 
positive effect on stock performance, and could possibly explain the short-run outperformance during 
bust-years.  
 
However, as the under-pricing is corrected, it may be dubious to justify the long-term 
outperformance through the “hot issue” phenomenon. Instead, one would have to turn to e.g. Ritter’s 
study from 1991, mentioned previously in this section, and his theory about “window of 
opportunity.” The theory states that firms take advantage of the positive attitude amongst investors 
during peaks in the economic growth and issue their stock at a relatively high price, that is, relatively 
over-priced, leading to a presumable subsequent drop (Ritter, 1991). It seems logical to believe, that 
since IPOs are more under-priced during busts according to Ritter (1980), IPOs during booms 
should at least be not as under-priced. Due to the general positive atmosphere, firms are presumably 
also not as scrutinized, adding to the problem, with low quality firms entering the public market. 
This would entail that firms during busts are instead relatively thoroughly investigated and thus of 
higher quality. High quality firms should be able to perform better than those that are not, even 
long-term. Aggregating these factors of relative pricing, quality and “window of opportunity”, it is 
perhaps not surprising to see a tendency for firms, of varying quality, timing their issuance with 
peaks in IPO activity and economic growth, exploiting the general positive approach to floatings.  
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7.4 Market-to-book effect 
The market-to-book ratio measures the market value of a firm’s equity over its book value. Previous 
studies have been testing for the effect of market-to-book ratio on a firm’s performance following a 
listing. Theory states that the market-to-book value is representative of a firms return on assets or 
the valuation of said assets. A firm with a market-to-book ratio below one either have assets that are 
overvalued by the firm or earning a too low return. If the low valuation pertains to a low return on 
assets, then a possibility for management to improve it exists. This possibility leaves room for a 
potential upside, whereas firms with initially high ratios could be deemed as already highly valued, 
with less upside, and could perhaps explain the findings in previous studies. Simutin (2009) 
discovered that firms with low book-to-market ratios, performing an IPO, tended to outperform the 
ones with relatively high ratios. Brav et al. (2000) who stated, conversely, that firms with high 
market-to-book ratios seem to underperform, concurs on this matter.  
 
However, the results presented in tables 20 to 23 point towards the opposite tendency, where tables 
21 and 23 depict a strong pattern of higher long-term returns for firms with higher market-to-book 
ratios. The outcome of studying this variable is somewhat inconsistent, showing for a positive 
correlation for some investment horizons and benchmarks and a negative for other. Still, looking 
foremost at table 21, higher ratios tend to perform better than low ratios with an increasing 
magnitude. The observations in line with Brav et al. (2000) and Simutin (2009) can be explained by 
the potential upside in these firms with low market-to-book, whereas the conflicting observations 
could possibly be related to the characteristics of the studied firms. 
 
The sample firms are, unlike in the two previously mentioned studies, backed by private equity firms, 
and part of the business idea in the private equity industry, is to implement their superior expertise to 
the fund portfolio firms. Graph 1 illustrates the value creation process in such a portfolio firm and 
according to Ratos (2008), almost 90% can be attributed to internal development, i.e. improved 
margins and revenue growth. The value creation process has in recent years shifted from being 
capital structure driven to becoming more about improving operating efficiency (Mattson and 
Mårild, 2006). In a sense, the success or failure of a fund portfolio firm is thusly dependant on the 
private equity firm’s ability to increase the portfolio firm’s return on assets. By reasoning, a portfolio 
firm going through an IPO and initially trading at a relatively low market-to-book ratio is, either 
relatively low-valued by the market or yielding relatively low return on assets. However, as it is in the 
best interest of the private equity firm to ensure a high valuation and thus a high return on its 
investment, the low-valuation explanation seems unreasonable. First day returns, an indicator of 
under-pricing is, as seen in table 6, a lot lower than for traditional IPOs. It is also unlikely that they 
have not tried to increase the return on assets during the holding period in every possible way, given 
a reasonable investment that could earn a reasonable rate of return. Such a firm could then be 
deemed as earning low return on its assets and thus somewhat of a failure by the private equity firm, 
since the return on assets should be the driving force behind the value creation in a portfolio firm. A 
subsequent underperformance is for these reasons not unlikely since the private equity firm, in a 
sense, has floated a low-quality portfolio firm with which it has presumably failed to achieve what it 
intended. 
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7.5 Bookrunner reputation 
The bookrunner has the important task of actually selling the firm’s stock to the public through road 
shows and other promotional activities. The reputation of a bookrunner thus plays a vital part of the 
impression a firm wants to send to its investors. Using a highly reputable bookrunner signals a certain 
degree of legitimacy and that the bookrunner deems the floating as one of high quality.  
 
Reasoning presented in previous studies, e.g. Carter et al. (1998) and Simutin (2009), contemplate 
over both short-term and long-term effects of bookrunner reputation. On a short-term basis, IPOs 
arranged by more reputable bookrunners tend to be less under-priced than the ones that are not. 
Thus, these IPOs with higher bookrunner reputation experience a lower return initially and on a 
short-term investment horizon it could surely have a negative effect on the aggregated return. The 
reduced under-pricing phenomenon could possibly explain the results experienced on a three- and 
six-month basis as well as with a one-year investment horizon. Tables 26 and 27 display the negative 
impact of reputable bookrunners on these mentioned horizons. Regardless of which of the two 
abnormal return-models used, the pattern is quite convincing with negative returns for all of these 
three horizons, although not significant.  
 
However, long-term, i.e. in my case three-years, the tendency is the opposite and is more in line with 
previous studies on the matter. Both Wu et al. (2003) as well as Simutin (2009) suggest that there is 
a strong positive correlation between underwriter reputation and a firm’s future stock performance. 
The study performed by Wu et al actually had an investment horizon of three years and is thus more 
comparable with the results found on a similar time frame. These results suggest that the under-
pricing effect on IPOs arranged by more reputable bookrunners has been eliminated long-term and 
that these firms, of presumably higher quality, outperform those that have not been sponsored by 
more reputable bookrunners in the long run. It also says something about the bookrunners and their 
ability to identify high-quality firms sustainable for the long run. These bookrunners profit from their 
reputation and should seek the firms of the highest quality to maintain a healthy relationship with 
their investors. They should also seek these firms since there evidently seems to exist a win-win 
situation between the two, Hu (2007) states: “high-quality companies and reputable underwriters 
are very likely to choose each other, because this combination will generate a higher amount of 
surplus than the high and low (or low and high) matched pairs.” The results on a long-term basis 
imply that, either bookrunners posses this ability to find long-term high-quality firms or that these 
firms actively choose bookrunners with greater reputation to sponsor their floating.   
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8 Conclusions 
For the purpose of concision, the reader is presented with a summary of the major findings and 
answers to the questions posed in section one, as well as any suggestions on future research.  
 
8.1 Major f indings 
This paper has documented that private equity-backed IPOs, on an aggregated European basis, 
outperform both the market as well as its industry peers. It also seems as if private equity-backed 
IPOs differ from the general IPO in terms of performance, both short-term and long-term. Private 
equity-backed IPOs yield a significant positive average CAR and BHAR, on all investment horizons, 
in contrast to the previous findings on general IPOs that tend to outperform only short-term and 
instead underperform long-term. However, the results are in line with previous studies on reversed 
LBOs, e.g. Cao and Lerner (2009) and Mian and Rosenfeld (1993). For an investor, investing in 
private equity-backed IPOs should result in an abnormal return of 20 cents to the dollar instead of a 
set of matching firms, and 16 cents more for each invested dollar compared to the market portfolio. 
These results have been accredited to the characteristics of a private equity firm, described as the 
parenting advantage, superior capital and corporate governance structure as well as industry specific 
expertise, among others. The study has also been able to more or less out rule the fact that such an 
outperformance would be attributable to merely one or two of the industries, even though there 
appears to be industrial specific differences in performance. Furthermore, private equity-backed 
IPOs tend to coincide with other IPOs as well as the overall state of the economy. These concurrences 
seem to have an effect on the post-IPO performance of exited fund portfolio firms, with firms floated 
during low IPO activity outperforming the ones issued during highs, implying that firms take 
advantage of the “window of opportunity”. Regarding the relative importance of bookrunners and 
their reputation, the study suggests that, as for general IPOs, firms with more reputable bookrunners 
promoting and selling their stock has a positive effect on long-term firm performance. These results 
imply that there is a positive relationship between long-term firm quality and bookrunner reputation. 
Regardless if one party seeks out the other or they both seek out each other, reputable bookrunners 
seem to, on average, signal long-term high-quality firms.  
 
However, the effect of M&A-activity is not clear. There does not appear to be any strong relationship 
between M&A-activity and firm performance. Still, acquiring more than 1.6 targets a year tends to 
have an increasingly negative effect on the average abnormal return of the sample firms, as time 
progresses. This effect is in line with the digestive problem-theory, indicating that a heavy focus 
towards acquisitions has a negative effect on firm performance. Nevertheless the answers are not 
significant and somewhat conflicting based on the method used. The effect of a firm’s initial trading 
market-to-book ratio has been even harder to depict. Depending on the investment horizon and 
method used, the results have varied. On one hand, a low market-to-book ratio seems to represent a 
great upside and potential undervaluation, whereas it in some cases tends to indicate a low-quality 
portfolio firm with which the private equity firm has presumably failed to achieve what it intended. 
 
Achieving statistical significance has proved difficult on a more detailed basis, nevertheless, 
indications can still be distinguished based on the average results of the sample, as depicted by the 
previous reasoning. The study attempted to answer the question whether or not fund portfolio firms 
are of higher quality than the average firm based on the performance of their subsequent floating as 
well as certain descriptive variables. Through the methods used, this study proves that private 
equity-backed IPOs in Europe, on average, significantly outperform both the market and its peers, 
short- and long-term, and thus differ from previous studies on the performance of average IPOs. 
These results indicate that exited portfolio firms are in fact able to maintain the benefits that come 
with being under the ownership of a private equity firm in the long run, even after the issuance. The 
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results also suggest that these firms are of higher quality than the average floated firm. However, the 
effect of M&A-activity in a firm during the holding period is vague, illustrated by conflicting results in 
post-IPO performance. Still, the tendency is that acquiring a high number of firms during a short 
time frame has a negative effect on firm performance, a tendency that increases with time. 
 
8.2 Suggest ions on future research  
Since the M&A effect on firm performance could not be significantly distinguished, another study on 
the matter would be desirable. One solution to the small sample problem of M&A-activity could be to 
include or switch the study to the U.S. market. Extending the time horizon would probably not have 
any effect, due to the fact that private equity backed IPO activity before 1994, as well as data over 
mergers and acquisitions from before the year of 2000, is presumably scarce.  
 
It could also be interesting to have another view on M&A-activity, and instead focusing on how many 
acquisitions or mergers that have been made in close conjunction with the listing. That is, how M&A-
activity prior to a listing affects the subsequent post-IPO performance. If the deal value of the M&As 
somehow could be found at a higher rate, then another take on the issue would be to account for the 
relative size of the M&A, in order to measure the effect on firm performance as a result of large or 
small investments. As mentioned, Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) tested this variable in their study 
on synergy realisations in M&A deals. Larsson and Finkelstein (1999) presented some interesting 
theories on how the size of the target could have an important effect on potential synergies (Kusewitt 
1985, Seth 1990; cited in Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999 p.8) as well as on managerial attention, 
stating that too small M&As would not receive the attention needed (Diven 1984, Ravenscraft and 
Scherer 1987; cited in Larsson and Finkelstein, 1999). 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. Table of portfol io companies 
Sector Float ing Date Company Datastream Mergermarket  
Financial 2000-02-25 3i European Technology Trust plc yes no 
Financial 1994-03-29 3i Group yes no 
Industrials 1998-06-03 A-Rakennusmies Oyj (Ramirent) yes yes 
Energy 2006-07-03 Ability Group ASA - AGR yes yes 
Health care 2007-11-06 Ablynx NV yes no 
Materials 2006-05-15 Acertec plc yes no 
Health care 2007-05-22 Addex Pharmaceuticals SA yes yes 
Financial 2004-09-22 Admiral Group plc yes yes 
Financial 2006-11-21 AerCap Holdings NV yes yes 
Health care 2006-02-24 AGI Therapeutics plc yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2002-04-11 Alain Afflelou SA yes yes 
Industrials 2002-05-17 Alfa Laval AB yes no 
Telecom Svc 2007-05-16 Alfacam Group yes yes 
Health care 2007-03-27 Algeta ASA no no 
Technology 2010-04-27 Amadeus IT Holding SA yes no 
Materials 2007-07-11 AMG Advanced Metallurgical Group NV yes yes 
Health care 2007-06-20 AMT - Amsterdam Molecular Therapeutics BV yes no 
Technology 2004-12-02 Andor Technology Ltd yes yes 
Industrials 2001-06-22 Andritz AG yes no 
Technology 2004-12-22 Anker plc yes no 
Health care 2005-03-08 Ardana plc yes no 
Health care 2004-03-02 Ark Therapeutics Group plc yes no 
Technology 2004-12-09 ArmorGroup International Ltd yes yes 
Health care 2005-05-03 Arpida Ltd no no 
Financial 2006-10-11 Ashmore Group plc yes no 
Materials 2004-06-10 ATH Resources plc yes no 
Technology 2004-05-14 austriamicrosystems AG - AMS yes yes 
Financial 2004-07-06 Azimut Holding SpA yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2002-06-19 Ballingslov International AB yes yes 
Technology 2006-06-19 Bankier.pl SA yes no 
Industrials 2006-07-03 Bauer AG yes no 
Industrials 1997-11-13 BCH Group plc yes no 
Materials 2006-11-24 BE Group AB yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2006-11-03 BENE AG yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2010-10-22 Betfair Group Ltd no no 
Health care 2000-07-28 Biosearch Italia SpA yes no 
Health care 2006-09-15 Biovitrum AB yes yes 
Health care 2007-10-08 Bouty Healthcare SpA yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 1996-11-06 Brands Hatch Leisure plc yes no 
Materials 2010-03-29 Brenntag AG no no 
Industrials 2006-06-26 Burckhardt Compression AG yes yes 
Technology 2007-10-22 Bureau Veritas SA yes yes 
Telecom Svc 2008-06-19 Burkhalter Holding AG no no 
Industrials 2010-06-02 Byggmax AB no no 
Consumer Discretionary 2004-05-14 Cantrell & Cochrane Group plc no yes 
Technology 2005-02-01 Carter & Carter Group plc yes yes 
Financial 2004-03-31 Catlin Group Ltd yes yes 
Health care 2007-02-06 Cellectis SA yes no 
Technology 2005-10-26 Celoxica Holdings Ltd yes no 
Health care 2010-06-03 Chr. Hansen Holding A/S no no 
Consumer Discretionary 2007-04-26 Cineworld Group plc yes no 
Technology 2004-02-27 Civica plc yes no 
Health care 2007-04-02 Clinica Baviera SA yes yes 
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Technology 2006-06-22 ClinPhone Ltd yes no 
Industrials 1994-12-07 Clydeport plc yes no 
Financial 2000-10-23 Collins Stewart Holdings plc yes no 
Technology 2000-07-14 Condat AG no no 
Health care 2002-05-08 Corin Group plc yes no 
Health care 2005-07-13 Corporacion Dermoestetica SA yes yes 
Financial 1995-11-29 Cox Insurance Holdings plc yes no 
Technology 2004-02-25 CSR plc yes no 
Health care 2007-10-09 CVS Group plc yes no 
Financial 2005-11-21 Davenham Group plc yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2006-05-03 Debenhams yes yes 
Industrials 2006-06-22 Demag Cranes AG yes no 
Industrials 2011-02-03 Derby Cycle AG no no 
Consumer Discretionary 2007-07-25 Devin AD no yes 
Health care 2007-07-18 DiaSorin SpA yes no 
Technology 2007-08-09 Digital Avenue SA yes no 
Technology 2006-05-12 Digital Identification Solutions AG yes no 
Technology 2004-04-01 Dignity Caring Funerals Services yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2007-05-18 Dixy Group OAO yes no 
Technology 1997-05-06 DOCdata NV yes no 
Financial 2010-12-28 Dom Maklerski TMS Brokers SA no no 
Consumer Discretionary 1999-03-19 Ducati Motor Holding SpA yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2005-12-06 Dufry Travel Retail Ltd yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2007-11-14 Duni AB yes yes 
Technology 2004-07-14 e2v Technologies plc yes yes 
Technology 2007-06-21 EAG Ltd - Evans Analytical Group no no 
Consumer Discretionary 1999-03-30 Edscha AG yes no 
Technology 2006-04-21 EEMS Italia SpA yes yes 
Health care 1999-01-28 Effik SA yes no 
Telecom Svc 2004-03-19 Eircom plc yes yes 
Energy 2007-03-30 Electromagnetic GeoServices ASA yes yes 
Technology 2000-03-07 Elior SCA yes no 
Technology 2010-09-29 Elster Group SE no no 
Industrials 2005-07-01 Entrepose Contracting SA yes no 
Health care 2004-07-19 Epigenomics AG yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2000-06-28 Euphon SpA no no 
Health care 2007-05-16 Eurand NV yes yes 
Industrials 2004-06-24 Eurocastle Investment Ltd yes no 
Materials 2006-06-05 Eurofilms SA yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2005-12-16 Eurofly SpA no yes 
Telecom Svc 2005-11-30 Eutelsat SA yes yes 
Health care 2005-11-17 ExonHit Therapeutics yes no 
Energy 2003-06-18 Faroe Petroleum plc yes no 
Industrials 2000-06-19 Ferretti SpA yes no 
Technology 2004-05-24 Findexa AS yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2010-10-21 Fortuna Entertainment Group NV no no 
Materials 2005-05-09 Foseco plc yes no 
Industrials 2007-06-27 Fountaine Pajot SA yes no 
Technology 2006-11-30 Francotyp-Postalia Holding AG yes no 
Technology 1999-06-17 Future Network plc no no 
Industrials 2006-10-19 Gagfah SA yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2006-03-28 Gant Co AB yes yes 
Financial 2009-12-11 Gartmore Group Ltd no no 
Consumer Discretionary 1999-06-21 Geberit AG yes no 
Technology 2000-12-07 Gemplus International SA yes no 
Industrials 2006-06-12 General de Alquiler de Maquinaria SA - GAM yes yes 
Health care 2001-06-19 Generale de Sante SA yes no 
Health care 2000-10-10 Genmab A/S yes no 
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Consumer Discretionary 2007-06-08 Gerresheimer Glas AG yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2000-06-15 Gifi SA yes no 
Industrials 2001-11-20 Ginger SA yes no 
Technology 2007-07-25 GlobeOp Financial Services SA yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2005-11-02 Gondola Holdings plc yes no 
Telecom Svc 2004-03-29 Grupo Media Capital SGPS SA yes yes 
Materials 2005-11-18 Guala Closures SpA yes yes 
Financial 2006-05-08 H&T Group plc yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2004-06-03 Halfords Group yes yes 
Industrials 2004-07-14 Hamworthy plc yes no 
Materials 2005-11-24 Hargreaves Services plc yes yes 
Technology 2007-10-19 HMS Industrial Networks AB yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2002-05-08 HMV yes no 
Technology 2006-10-06 Hogg Robinson plc yes yes 
Industrials 2007-07-13 Homag Group AG yes yes 
Health care 2007-12-18 Hybrigenics SA yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2005-04-28 IG Group Holdings plc yes yes 
Telecom Svc 2004-01-29 Iliad SA yes no 
Telecom Svc 2005-06-17 Inmarsat yes yes 
Technology 2006-05-19 Inova Holding plc yes no 
Industrials 2006-06-02 Inspired Gaming Group plc yes yes 
Health care 2002-02-08 Integrated Dental Holdings plc yes no 
Health care 2005-02-25 Intercell AG yes no 
Health care 2006-02-01 Intercytex Group plc yes no 
Financial 2005-09-28 Interhyp AG yes no 
Industrials 1996-12-16 Interpump SpA yes no 
Health care 2002-05-23 Intertek Testing Services plc yes no 
Telecom Svc 2011-01-27 InterXion Holding NV no no 
Financial 2002-06-06 Intrum Justitia AB yes yes 
Health care 2005-12-06 Ipsen SA yes yes 
Materials 2010-10-13 IRC Ltd no no 
Technology 2000-07-11 iSOFT Group plc yes yes 
Technology 1998-06-04 ITNET plc yes no 
Technology 2006-04-07 IX Europe plc no no 
Health care 2005-10-31 Jerini AG yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2004-10-29 Jessops yes yes 
Financial 2010-06-16 Jupiter Fund Management plc no no 
Financial 2006-11-28 Just Retirement Holdings Ltd yes no 
Telecom Svc 2010-03-19 Kabel Deutschland GmbH no no 
Consumer Discretionary 2006-02-23 KappAhl AB yes no 
Materials 2006-06-28 Kloeckner & Co AG yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2005-06-23 Kongsberg Automotive Holding ASA yes yes 
Financial 2005-12-12 Lancashire Holdings Ltd yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2005-07-21 Land of Leather Holdings plc yes yes 
Technology 2006-04-06 Legrand SA yes yes 
Technology 2000-07-11 Leica Geosystems Holdings AG yes yes 
Telecom Svc 2006-10-25 LHS AG yes no 
Materials 2006-12-01 Lindab AB yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 1995-04-07 Lindex AB yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 1998-05-15 Ludwig Beck am Rathauseck-Textilhaus Feldmeier AG yes no 
Financial 2007-09-25 Magellan yes yes 
Technology 2006-04-06 Magix AG yes no 
Industrials 2005-06-15 Mapeley Ltd yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2006-02-10 Marazzi Gruppo Ceramiche SpA yes yes 
Technology 1997-12-01 Market Link Publishing plc yes no 
Technology 2001-04-04 Marlborough Stirling plc yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2005-06-17 Marr SpA yes yes 
Technology 2004-08-20 Mediasurface plc yes no 
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Health care 2010-02-09 Medica France SA no no 
Health care 2006-06-23 Medicrea International SA yes yes 
Technology 2007-07-17 Mercor SA yes yes 
Technology 2000-08-10 Meta4 NV yes no 
Technology 2006-12-11 Metris International Holding NV yes no 
Technology 2005-05-12 Micro Focus International plc yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2004-11-30 MicroEmissive Displays Ltd yes no 
Technology 2000-03-09 Micronic Laser Systems AB yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 1999-05-31 Mirato SpA yes no 
Industrials 2004-03-12 Moneybox plc yes no 
Health care 2009-12-03 Movetis NV no no 
Consumer Discretionary 2010-06-17 MQ Holding AB no no 
Technology 1999-09-06 MSH International Service AG yes no 
Industrials 2005-06-06 MTU Aero Engines Holding AG yes yes 
Technology 2004-07-09 NCC Group plc yes yes 
Industrials 2007-05-14 Nederman Holding AB yes yes 
Materials 2001-11-01 Negri Bossi SpA yes no 
Industrials 1999-02-23 Neopost SA yes no 
Telecom Svc 2000-04-06 Netgem SA yes no 
Telecom Svc 1999-07-28 Netia Holdings SA yes no 
Telecom Svc 2006-10-24 Neuf Cegetel SA yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 1998-06-12 New Look Group plc yes no 
Materials 2008-05-06 New World Resources BV no no 
Health care 2006-12-08 Newron Pharmaceuticals SpA yes no 
Technology 1997-10-16 Newsquest plc yes no 
Industrials 2004-10-21 Nexity SA yes yes 
Telecom Svc 2005-10-06 NextradioTV yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2002-06-18 Nobia AB yes no 
Industrials 2007-07-16 Norcros (Holdings) Ltd yes yes 
Health care 2010-07-21 Novagali Pharma SA no no 
Health care 2000-11-02 Novuspharma SpA yes no 
Technology 2010-08-05 NXP Semiconductors NV no no 
Consumer Discretionary 2004-06-24 office2office plc yes no 
Health care 2006-06-26 OncoMethylome Sciences SA yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2006-08-22 One-2-One SA yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2005-06-17 Opoczno SA yes yes 
Technology 2000-10-05 Orbital Software Holdings plc yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2004-03-24 Oriflame Cosmetic SA yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2010-04-22 Orior AG no no 
Telecom Svc 2007-03-13 Outremer Telecom SA yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2004-07-07 Oxbow yes yes 
Telecom Svc 1996-06-19 Pace Micro Technology plc no no 
Consumer Discretionary 2010-10-05 Pandora A/S no no 
Financial 2007-07-12 Paris Re Holdings Ltd yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2002-05-22 Parkdean Holidays plc yes no 
Technology 2001-06-29 Parkman Group plc yes yes 
Telecom Svc 2006-06-27 Parrot SA yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2001-03-15 Patientline plc yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 1999-11-26 Peacock Group plc yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2006-12-15 Pegas Nonwovens SA yes no 
Energy 2005-10-03 Petrofac yes no 
Energy 2006-11-30 Petroplus Holdings AG yes no 
Energy 2006-11-06 Petrotec AG yes yes 
Technology 2007-07-03 Phion AG no no 
Technology 2004-11-10 Phoenix IT Group plc yes no 
Health care 2005-11-03 Phoqus Group plc yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2001-06-26 PHS Group plc yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2006-07-06 Piaggio & C SpA yes yes 
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Consumer Discretionary 2004-05-07 Pinewood Shepperton plc yes no 
Technology 2003-12-02 Pixology plc yes no 
Materials 2005-04-22 Polimoon AS yes no 
Health care 2010-10-06 Polmed SA no no 
Consumer Discretionary 2006-11-10 Poltrona Frau SpA yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2006-04-27 Polytec Holding AG yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2004-07-20 Premier Foods plc yes no 
Telecom Svc 2005-03-08 Premiere AG (SKY Deutschland) yes yes 
Technology 2010-03-12 Promethean World plc no no 
Health care 2007-10-11 Pronova BioPharma ASA yes yes 
Financial 2002-05-16 Property Fund Management plc yes no 
Health care 2005-06-10 ProStrakan Group Ltd yes no 
Materials 2007-04-30 Prysmian Cables & Systems SpA yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2002-05-20 Punch Taverns plc yes no 
Technology 2004-12-14 Pure Wafer Ltd yes no 
Energy 2007-06-06 PV Crystalox Solar plc yes no 
Technology 2005-10-05 Q-Cells AG yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2006-02-09 QinetiQ Group plc yes yes 
Industrials 2005-07-14 Quintana Maritime Ltd yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2001-02-01 QXL.com plc yes no 
Industrials 2004-12-01 Raymarine plc yes yes 
Health care 2005-08-05 ReNeuron Group plc yes no 
Industrials 2006-04-04 Renta Corporacion yes no 
Energy 2005-06-27 Revus Energy AS yes no 
Technology 2007-04-04 Rexel SA yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2005-07-19 RHM plc yes yes 
Technology 2000-12-08 RiverSoft plc yes no 
Technology 2005-09-29 RueDuCommerce SA yes no 
Technology 2007-08-02 S4E SA yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2007-07-25 SAF-Holland SA yes yes 
Industrials 2007-03-09 Safestore Holdings plc yes yes 
Health care 2005-12-05 Safilo Group SpA yes yes 
Technology 2005-06-30 Saft Groupe SA yes no 
Technology 1998-05-10 SAIA-Burgess Electronics Holding AG yes no 
Energy 2006-11-30 Salamander Energy plc yes no 
Technology 2006-03-10 Salcomp Oy yes yes 
Technology 2004-12-16 Sanderson Group yes yes 
Technology 1998-06-15 Schaffner Holding AG yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2007-06-07 Screen Service Broadcasting Technologies - SSBT yes yes 
Technology 2006-11-30 SeLoger.com SA yes yes 
Technology 1997-05-20 Semcon AB yes no 
Telecom Svc 2007-07-31 Sepura plc yes no 
Industrials 2007-10-17 SHB AG no no 
Materials 2007-03-13 Smurfit Kappa Group plc yes yes 
Industrials 2004-07-09 Societe Marseillaise du Tunnel Prado-Carenage no no 
Technology 2005-11-02 Software Radio Technology plc yes no 
Energy 2003-06-05 Sondex plc yes yes 
Health care 2006-07-07 Southern Cross Healthcare Group plc yes yes 
Health care 2010-10-22 Stentys SA no no 
Technology 2005-11-10 SThree plc yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 1998-05-10 Superdiplo SA yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2007-07-12 Superglass Holdings plc yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2006-12-08 Symrise AG yes no 
Health care 2005-11-07 Synexus Clinical Research Ltd yes no 
Technology 2005-06-22 System C Healthcare plc yes no 
Technology 1998-06-25 TDS Informationstechnologie AG yes no 
Technology 2000-02-23 Techem AG yes no 
Technology 2007-10-24 TelecityGroup yes yes 
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Telecom Svc 2005-10-10 Telenet NV yes yes 
Technology 2005-11-17 Teta SA yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2007-06-29 Tognum yes yes 
Consumer Discretionary 2010-03-24 Tom Tailor AG no no 
Industrials 2001-03-12 Tornos Holding SA yes no 
Technology 2007-06-12 Transics International NV yes yes 
Technology 2005-07-01 Travelplanet.pl SA no no 
Energy 2000-07-05 Tredi Environnement SA yes no 
Industrials 2003-11-03 Trevisan SpA yes yes 
Technology 2007-10-26 u-blox Holding AG yes no 
Technology 2005-05-19 Ubiquity Software Corp plc yes no 
Industrials 1996-10-02 Ultra Electronics Holdings plc yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2004-05-28 Umbro Holdings Ltd yes yes 
Industrials 2007-10-19 Uster Technologies AG yes yes 
Telecom Svc 2007-04-26 Versatel Deutschland Holding GmbH yes yes 
Technology 2005-06-06 VIA Travel Group ASA yes yes 
Energy 2007-04-20 Volga Gas plc yes yes 
Industrials 2007-06-27 VTG AG yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2006-11-29 Vueling Airlines SA yes yes 
Industrials 2007-05-14 Wacker Construction Equipment AG yes no 
Industrials 2006-10-12 Wavin NV yes yes 
Energy 2007-04-25 Wellstream Holdings plc yes no 
Health care 2006-11-09 Wilex AG yes no 
Consumer Discretionary 2002-06-14 William Hill yes no 
Financial 2001-06-11 Willis Group Holdings Ltd yes no 
Technology 2004-05-18 Wincor Nixdorf AG yes no 
Industrials 1998-05-11 Winkler & Duennebier AG yes yes 
Materials 2005-06-30 Winterthur Technologie AG yes no 
Technology 2007-04-25 Xchanging plc yes no 
Technology 2003-07-10 Yell Group plc yes yes 
Health care 2004-06-23 Zentiva NV yes no 
Materials 2005-02-28 Zetkama SA yes no 
Technology 2006-05-11 Zumtobel AG yes yes 
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Appendix 2. Year by year CARs 
BOOMBUST   
Observations: 277   CAR   
  3-month   6-month   1-year   3-year   
S&P Europe 350                         
Year Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    
1994 12.22% 0.678   26.46% 1.070   24.07% 0.676   -4.15% -0.076   
1995 -10.60% -0.588   -5.68% -0.230   -10.71% -0.301   49.38% 0.901   
1996 1.39% 0.095   -9.60% -0.475   -21.77% -0.748   -4.26% -0.095   
1997 -11.50% -1.009   -2.25% -0.144   -0.04% -0.002   -14.22% -0.410   
1998 10.40% 1.224   15.99% 1.372   5.83% 0.347   -17.32% -0.670   
1999 -8.73% -1.027   13.80% 1.184   0.20% 0.012   -0.96% -0.037   
2000 19.09% 3.177 *** 9.28% 1.126   10.79% 0.908   18.53% 1.014   
2001 5.72% 0.744   9.25% 0.878   15.28% 1.006   2.01% 0.086   
2002 12.64% 1.787 * 10.88% 1.121   20.60% 1.473   53.51% 2.489 *** 
2003 2.36% 0.207   -4.70% -0.300   -3.92% -0.174   -11.52% -0.332   
2004 8.90% 2.181 ** 10.81% 1.931 * 10.39% 1.287   18.33% 1.477   
2005 11.35% 3.179 *** 10.15% 2.074 * 4.74% 0.672   10.73% 0.989   
2006 6.05% 1.808 * 6.34% 1.380   5.95% 0.900   -6.54% -0.643   
2007 -1.14% -0.322   -3.99% -0.823   1.82% 0.260   19.48% 1.812   
Industry spec.                          
1994 12.38% 0.659   27.69% 1.103   27.27% 0.761   3.72% 0.067   
1995 -7.87% -0.419   -1.93% -0.077   -10.06% -0.281   47.64% 0.858   
1996 3.80% 0,248   -4.65% -0.227   -10.81% -0.370   18.25% 0.403   
1997 -6.01% -0.506   0.99% 0.063   10.09% 0.445   1.38% 0.039   
1998 17.41% 1.967   26.93% 2.275 *** 12.96% 0.768   -1.19% -0.045   
1999 -8.51% -0.962   14.16% 1.197   2.42% 0.143   7.95% 0.304   
2000 25.65% 4.098 *** 19.14% 2.286 ** 29.42% 2.463 ** 61.52% 3.326 ***  
2001 6.30% 0.787   9.48% 0.885   16.83% 1.101   -1.01% -0.043   
2002 16.52% 2.243 ** 13.64% 1.385   22.41% 1.594   57.73% 2.652 *** 
2003 2.82% 0.237   2.69% 0.169   -0.94% -0.042   -9.26% -0.264   
2004 12.64% 2.972 *** 14.50% 2.550 ** 14.58% 1.797 * 24.92% 1.983 * 
2005 12.15% 3.267 *** 10.46% 2.103 * 7.11% 1.002   14.20% 1.292   
2006 8.03% 2.304 ** 7.96% 1.707 * 6.31% 0.948   -9.48% -0.920   
2007 -1.64% -0.444   -3.67% -0.746   1.43% 0.204   12.20% 1.121  
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01             
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Appendix 3. Year by year BHARs  
BOOMBUST       
Observations: 277   BHAR   
  3-month   6-month   1-year   3-year   
S&P Europe 350                         
Year Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    Coeff ic .  t-stat    
1994 13,56% 0,751   30,30% 1,025   24,89% 0,599   -29,32% -0,523   
1995 -11,76% -0,652   -5,57% -0,189   -10,00% -0,240   123,48% 2,202 ** 
1996 1,33% 0,090   -12,55% -0,520   -29,88% -0,881   -26,68% -0,583   
1997 -13,61% -1,192   -3,56% -0,190   10,57% 0,402   -39,54% -1,115   
1998 15,06% 1,770 * 18,69% 1,342   4,17% 0,213   -23,00% -0,870   
1999 -9,00% -1,058   18,32% 1,315   -9,50% -0,485   -0,99% -0,038   
2000 22,34% 3,713 *** 17,17% 1,743 * 13,96% 1,008   10,57% 0,565   
2001 9,06% 1,177   8,73% 0,693   20,28% 1,144   19,56% 0,818   
2002 12,92% 1,825 * 9,87% 0,852   18,18% 1,115   59,82% 2,719 *** 
2003 2,33% 0,205   -3,17% -0,170   0,47% 0,018   -17,09% -0,482   
2004 9,92% 2,426 ** 12,50% 1,868 * 12,00% 1,275   33,73% 2,656 *** 
2005 11,30% 3,161 *** 14,19% 2,425 ** 6,38% 0,776   40,47% 3,644 *** 
2006 7,59% 2,264 ** 9,64% 1,756 * 20,50% 2,656 * -1,35% -0,130   
2007 1,35% 0,382   -3,04% -0,524   5,12% 0,628   -0,13% -0,012   
Industry spec.                          
1994 12,29% 0,665   31,51% 1,053   28,46% 0,694   -13,48% -0,240   
1995 -6,21% -0,336   -1,51% -0,050   -9,17% -0,224   133,92% 2,383 ** 
1996 3,50% 0,232   -6,68% -0,273   -15,10% -0,451   17,98% 0,392   
1997 -6,43% -0,550   0,37% 0,020   22,62% 0,873   -8,12% -0,228   
1998 17,33% 1,989 ** 27,91% 1,978 ** 11,96% 0,619   -6,42% -0,242   
1999 -8,35% -0,958   18,39% 1,303   -5,87% -0,304   6,52% 0,246   
2000 28,12% 4,565 *** 27,78% 2,784 *** 30,87% 2,259 ** 27,06% 1,444   
2001 7,81% 0,990   9,18% 0,719   23,64% 1,353   21,69% 0,905   
2002 15,32% 2,113 ** 12,28% 1,046   22,15% 1,378   66,57% 3,019 *** 
2003 4,77% 0,408   5,18% 0,274   5,38% 0,208   -5,67% -0,159   
2004 13,71% 3,276 *** 16,21% 2,392 ** 17,04% 1,836 * 42,48% 3,338 *** 
2005 13,01% 3,553 *** 14,50% 2,447 ** 9,08% 1,119   38,79% 3,485 *** 
2006 9,58% 2,791 *** 11,35% 2,043 ** 20,19% 2,653 *** -2,91% -0,278   
2007 -1,10% -0,304   -2,91% -0,495   3,94% 0,490   -5,62% -0,510   
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01             
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Appendix 4. Companies in M&A regression 
Acquis i t ion 
Date 
Float ing 
Date Company 
Holding 
per iod 
N.o.  
acquis i t ions  
2004-09-17 2006-07-03 Ability Group ASA - AGR 1,79 3 
2006-08-23 2007-11-06 Ablynx NV 1,21 0 
1999-10-01 2004-09-22 Admiral Group plc 4,98 1 
2005-07-04 2006-11-21 AerCap Holdings NV 1,38 2 
2004-05-11 2006-02-24 AGI Therapeutics plc 1,79 0 
2000-05-03 2002-04-11 Alain Afflelou SA 1,94 0 
2000-08-11 2002-05-17 Alfa Laval AB 1,76 1 
2005-09-06 2007-03-27 Algeta ASA 1,55 0 
2006-07-01 2007-06-20 AMT - Amsterdam Molecular Therapeutics BV 0,97 0 
1999-12-31 2001-06-22 Andritz AG 1,48 2 
2003-11-26 2004-12-09 ArmorGroup International Ltd 1,04 0 
2000-06-01 2004-05-14 austriamicrosystems AG - AMS 3,95 0 
2002-02-12 2004-07-06 Azimut Holding SpA 2,40 0 
1998-06-29 2002-06-19 Ballingslov International AB 3,98 0 
2001-06-11 2006-09-15 Biovitrum AB 5,27 2 
2002-11-01 2007-10-08 Bouty Healthcare SpA 4,94 0 
2002-04-18 2006-06-26 Burckhardt Compression AG 4,19 0 
2004-09-06 2007-10-22 Bureau Veritas SA 3,13 7 
2001-01-31 2005-02-01 Carter & Carter Group plc 4,01 1 
2002-07-04 2004-03-31 Catlin Group Ltd 1,74 0 
2005-05-16 2007-04-02 Clinica Baviera SA 1,88 1 
2002-05-04 2005-07-13 Corporacion Dermoestetica SA 3,19 1 
2000-06-20 2005-11-21 Davenham Group plc 5,42 0 
2003-12-04 2006-05-03 Debenhams 2,41 0 
2002-02-10 2004-04-01 Dignity Caring Funerals Services 2,14 0 
1998-08-31 1999-03-19 Ducati Motor Holding SpA 0,55 0 
2004-03-01 2005-12-06 Dufry Travel Retail Ltd 1,77 0 
2001-09-27 2007-11-14 Duni AB 6,13 1 
2002-07-12 2004-07-14 e2v Technologies plc 2,01 0 
1999-05-27 2006-04-21 EEMS Italia SpA 6,91 0 
2001-10-01 2004-03-19 Eircom plc 2,47 0 
2004-07-06 2007-03-30 Electromagnetic GeoServices ASA 2,73 0 
1999-04-15 2007-05-16 Eurand NV 8,09 0 
2002-12-13 2005-11-30 Eutelsat SA 2,97 0 
2001-09-17 2004-05-24 Findexa AS 2,68 2 
2003-07-01 2006-03-28 Gant Co AB 2,74 0 
2003-07-11 2006-06-12 General de Alquiler de Maquinaria SA - GAM 2,92 3 
2004-11-11 2007-06-08 Gerresheimer Glas AG 2,57 4 
1999-09-14 2004-03-29 Grupo Media Capital SGPS SA 4,54 0 
2000-11-21 2005-11-18 Guala Closures SpA 4,99 1 
2002-07-25 2004-06-03 Halfords Group 1,86 0 
2004-05-04 2005-11-24 Hargreaves Services plc 1,56 1 
2004-08-16 2007-10-19 HMS Industrial Networks AB 3,18 0 
2000-05-10 2006-10-06 Hogg Robinson plc 6,41 5 
2006-11-15 2007-07-13 Homag Group AG 0,66 0 
2003-07-29 2005-04-28 IG Group Holdings plc 1,75 0 
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2003-10-16 2005-06-17 Inmarsat 1,67 0 
2001-09-09 2006-06-02 Inspired Gaming Group plc 4,73 0 
1998-02-10 2002-06-06 Intrum Justitia AB 4,32 1 
2004-02-29 2005-12-06 Ipsen SA 1,77 0 
1999-06-16 2000-07-11 iSOFT Group plc 1,07 0 
2002-09-15 2004-10-29 Jessops 2,12 0 
2004-12-18 2006-06-28 Kloeckner & Co AG 1,53 2 
2001-07-06 2005-06-23 Kongsberg Automotive Holding ASA 3,97 2 
2004-07-23 2005-07-21 Land of Leather Holdings plc 0,99 0 
2002-07-24 2006-04-06 Legrand SA 3,70 5 
1998-09-03 2000-07-11 Leica Geosystems Holdings AG 1,85 0 
2001-05-14 2006-12-01 Lindab AB 5,55 0 
2003-03-27 2007-09-25 Magellan 4,50 0 
2004-10-27 2006-02-10 Marazzi Gruppo Ceramiche SpA 1,29 1 
2003-04-08 2005-06-17 Marr SpA 2,19 2 
2002-09-23 2006-06-23 Medicrea International SA 3,75 0 
2006-01-12 2007-07-17 Mercor SA 1,51 0 
2001-06-12 2005-05-12 Micro Focus International plc 3,92 0 
2003-11-21 2005-06-06 MTU Aero Engines Holding AG 1,54 0 
2003-04-16 2004-07-09 NCC Group plc 1,23 0 
1999-12-17 2007-05-14 Nederman Holding AB 7,41 0 
2000-03-10 2004-10-21 Nexity SA 4,62 0 
1999-10-06 2007-07-16 Norcros (Holdings) Ltd 7,78 0 
2004-05-07 2005-06-17 Opoczno SA 1,11 0 
1999-09-13 2004-03-24 Oriflame Cosmetic SA 4,53 0 
2003-12-18 2004-07-07 Oxbow 0,55 0 
2000-05-15 2001-06-29 Parkman Group plc 1,12 0 
2006-04-13 2006-11-06 Petrotec AG 0,57 0 
1999-07-09 2001-06-26 PHS Group plc 1,97 0 
2003-09-25 2006-07-06 Piaggio & C SpA 2,78 0 
2003-10-15 2006-11-10 Poltrona Frau SpA 3,07 2 
2000-08-04 2006-04-27 Polytec Holding AG 5,73 1 
2003-02-15 2005-03-08 Premiere AG (Sky Deutschland) 2,06 0 
2003-12-23 2007-10-11 Pronova BioPharma ASA 3,80 0 
2005-06-01 2007-04-30 Prysmian Cables & Systems SpA 1,91 1 
2002-12-15 2006-02-09 QinetiQ Group plc 3,16 6 
2001-01-30 2004-12-01 Raymarine plc 3,84 0 
2004-12-13 2007-04-04 Rexel SA 2,31 7 
2000-07-21 2005-07-19 RHM plc 5,00 0 
2005-12-22 2007-07-25 SAF-Holland SA 1,59 1 
2003-08-21 2007-03-09 Safestore Holdings plc 3,55 2 
2002-12-16 2005-12-05 Safilo Group SpA 2,97 0 
1999-10-10 2006-03-10 Salcomp Oy 6,42 0 
1999-12-03 2004-12-16 Sanderson Group 5,04 0 
2004-07-08 2007-06-07 Screen Service Broadcasting Technologies - SSBT 2,92 0 
2005-11-25 2006-11-30 SeLoger.com SA 1,01 0 
2002-06-17 2007-03-13 Smurfit Kappa Group plc 4,74 4 
2002-10-31 2003-06-05 Sondex plc 0,59 0 
2004-09-16 2006-07-07 Southern Cross Healthcare Group plc 1,81 4 
2005-08-19 2007-07-12 Superglass Holdings plc 1,90 0 
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2005-07-18 2007-10-24 TelecityGroup 2,27 2 
2001-02-22 2005-10-10 Telenet NV 4,63 1 
2005-12-28 2007-06-29 Tognum 1,50 2 
2006-05-18 2007-06-12 Transics International NV 1,07 1 
2002-07-30 2003-11-03 Trevisan SpA 1,26 0 
1999-04-26 2004-05-28 Umbro Holdings Ltd 5,09 0 
2006-11-08 2007-10-19 Uster Technologies AG 0,95 0 
2003-06-12 2005-06-06 VIA Travel Group ASA 1,99 1 
2005-06-06 2007-06-27 VTG AG 2,06 2 
2003-12-19 2007-05-14 Wacker Construction Equipment AG 3,40 1 
2005-07-11 2006-10-12 Wavin NV 1,25 1 
2003-03-11 2007-04-25 Wellstream Holdings plc 4,13 0 
1999-02-20 2002-06-14 William Hill 3,32 0 
2001-05-25 2003-07-10 Yell Group plc 2,13 2 
2002-12-01 2006-05-11 Zumtobel AG 3,44 0 
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Appendix 5. Bookrunners 
Company Bookrunners  
3i European Technology Trust plc Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner 
3i Group ING - Bookrunner 
A-Rakennusmies Oyj (Ramirent) 
BNP Paribas - Bookrunner; 
JPMorgan - Bookrunner; 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
Nomura - Bookrunner; 
Ability Group ASA - AGR 
Pareto AS - Bookrunner; 
SEB - Bookrunner 
Ablynx NV 
JPMorgan - Bookrunner; 
KBC - Bookrunner; 
Acertec plc Collins Stewart - Bookrunner 
Addex Pharmaceuticals SA Nomura - Bookrunner; 
Admiral Group plc 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Citi - Bookrunner 
AerCap Holdings NV Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
AGI Therapeutics plc Davy Stockbrokers - Bookrunner 
Alain Afflelou SA Credit Agricole CIB - Bookrunner 
Alfa Laval AB 
Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Nomura - Bookrunner; 
Alfacam Group 
ING - Bookrunner; 
KBC - Bookrunner 
Algeta ASA 
ABG Sundal Collier Holding ASA - Bookrunner; 
DnB NOR Bank ASA - Bookrunner; 
AMG Advanced Metallurgical Group NV Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
AMT - Amsterdam Molecular Therapeutics BV 
RBS - Bookrunner; 
Van Lanschot NV - Bookrunner 
Andor Technology Ltd Landsbanki Islands hf - Bookrunner 
Andritz AG Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Anker plc Collins Stewart - Bookrunner 
Ardana plc Nomura - Bookrunner 
Ark Therapeutics Group plc 
Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
ArmorGroup International Ltd RBS - Bookrunner 
Ashmore Group plc 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner 
ATH Resources plc Seymour Pierce - Bookrunner 
austriamicrosystems AG - AMS 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
Azimut Holding SpA 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
UniCredit - Bookrunner; 
Ballingslov International AB 
BNP Paribas - Bookrunner; 
ING - Bookrunner; 
Bankier.pl SA Dom Maklerski IDM SA - Bookrunner 
Bauer AG Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
BCH Group plc HSBC - Bookrunner 
BE Group AB Svenska Handelsbanken AB - Bookrunner; 
BENE AG 
RBS - Bookrunner; 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG - Bookrunner 
Biosearch Italia SpA Intesa Sanpaolo - Bookrunner; 
Biovitrum AB Carnegie - Bookrunner; 
Bouty Healthcare SpA Intermonte - Bookrunner 
Brands Hatch Leisure plc Evolution Securities - Bookrunner 
Burckhardt Compression AG Lombard Odier & Cie - Bookrunner; 
Bureau Veritas SA BNP Paribas - Bookrunner; 
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Carter & Carter Group plc RBS - Bookrunner 
Catlin Group Ltd 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
JPMorgan - Bookrunner; 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner 
Cellectis SA SG Corporate & Investment Banking - Bookrunner 
Celoxica Holdings Ltd Arbuthnot Securities Ltd - Bookrunner 
Cineworld Group plc 
JPMorgan - Bookrunner; 
Nomura - Bookrunner 
Civica plc Seymour Pierce - Bookrunner 
Clinica Baviera SA 
Banco Financiero y de Ahorros SA - Bookrunner; 
Banco Popular Espanol SA - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
ClinPhone Ltd Investec Inc - Bookrunner 
Clydeport plc Allied Provincial Securities Ltd - Bookrunner 
Collins Stewart Holdings plc HSBC - Bookrunner 
Corin Group plc Evolution Securities - Bookrunner 
Corporacion Dermoestetica SA Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
Cox Insurance Holdings plc Numis Securities - Bookrunner 
CSR plc Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
CVS Group plc Panmure Gordon/ThinkEquity - Bookrunner 
Davenham Group plc Panmure Gordon/ThinkEquity - Bookrunner 
Debenhams Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Demag Cranes AG 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
Mediobanca - Bookrunner; 
DiaSorin SpA 
Mediobanca - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner 
Digital Avenue SA Wroclawski Dom Maklerski SA - Bookrunner 
Digital Identification Solutions AG DZ Bank - Bookrunner 
Dignity Caring Funerals Services Panmure Gordon/ThinkEquity - Bookrunner; 
Dixy Group OAO 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
JPMorgan - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner 
DOCdata NV 
Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
UniCredit - Bookrunner; 
Ducati Motor Holding SpA Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Dufry Travel Retail Ltd Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Duni AB 
ABG Sundal Collier Holding ASA - Bookrunner; 
SEB - Bookrunner; 
e2v Technologies plc RBS - Bookrunner 
Edscha AG 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
EEMS Italia SpA 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
Effik SA 
BNP Paribas - Bookrunner; 
HSBC - Bookrunner 
Eircom plc 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
Davy Stockbrokers - Bookrunner; 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner 
Electromagnetic GeoServices ASA 
ABG Sundal Collier Holding ASA - Bookrunner; 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
Nomura - Bookrunner; 
Elior SCA 
Credit Agricole CIB - Bookrunner; 
Lazard - Bookrunner; 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
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Entrepose Contracting SA Natixis - Bookrunner 
Epigenomics AG Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
Eurand NV 
Barclays Capital - Bookrunner; 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Eurocastle Investment Ltd Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
Eurofilms SA Millennium Investment Banking - Bookrunner 
Eutelsat SA 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
JPMorgan - Bookrunner 
ExonHit Therapeutics SG Corporate & Investment Banking - Bookrunner 
Faroe Petroleum plc Evolution Securities - Bookrunner 
Ferretti SpA 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
UniCredit - Bookrunner; 
Findexa AS 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
Oppenheimer & Co Inc - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
Foseco plc Collins Stewart - Bookrunner 
Fountaine Pajot SA Portzamparc Societe de bourse - Bookrunner 
Francotyp-Postalia Holding AG Cazenove AG - Bookrunner; 
Gagfah SA Commerzbank Group - Bookrunner; 
Gant Co AB SEB - Bookrunner; 
Geberit AG Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Gemplus International SA Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
General de Alquiler de Maquinaria SA - GAM Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
Generale de Sante SA 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
RBS - Bookrunner; 
Genmab A/S UBS - Bookrunner; 
Gerresheimer Glas AG 
Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
JPMorgan - Bookrunner; 
Gifi SA Credit Agricole CIB - Bookrunner 
Ginger SA Credit Agricole CIB - Bookrunner 
GlobeOp Financial Services SA 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
JPMorgan - Bookrunner; 
RBS - Bookrunner; 
Gondola Holdings plc 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Credit Agricole CIB - Bookrunner; 
Lazard - Bookrunner; 
Grupo Media Capital SGPS SA 
Banco Espirito Santo - Bookrunner; 
Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Guala Closures SpA 
Intesa Sanpaolo - Bookrunner; 
JPMorgan - Bookrunner; 
H&T Group plc Numis Securities - Bookrunner 
Halfords Group 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Barclays Capital - Bookrunner; 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
Hamworthy plc Collins Stewart - Bookrunner 
Hargreaves Services plc Brewin Dolphin Ltd - Bookrunner 
HMS Industrial Networks AB SEB - Bookrunner 
HMV 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
Hogg Robinson plc Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Homag Group AG Commerzbank Group - Bookrunner; 
Hybrigenics SA 
Euroland Finance SA - Bookrunner; 
Oddo & Cie - Bookrunner 
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IG Group Holdings plc UBS - Bookrunner; 
Iliad SA SG Corporate & Investment Banking - Bookrunner; 
Inmarsat 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Intesa Sanpaolo - Bookrunner; 
UniCredit - Bookrunner; 
Inova Holding plc Daniel Stewart & Co plc - Bookrunner 
Inspired Gaming Group plc Evolution Securities - Bookrunner 
Integrated Dental Holdings plc Altium Capital - Bookrunner 
Intercell AG 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
Nomura - Bookrunner; 
Intercytex Group plc Piper Jaffray & Co - Bookrunner 
Interhyp AG Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner 
Interpump SpA Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
Intertek Testing Services plc 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner 
Intrum Justitia AB 
Carnegie - Bookrunner; 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner 
Ipsen SA 
BNP Paribas - Bookrunner; 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Credit Agricole CIB - Bookrunner; 
JPMorgan - Bookrunner; 
Nomura - Bookrunner; 
iSOFT Group plc RBS - Bookrunner 
ITNET plc RHJ International SA - Bookrunner 
Jerini AG Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Jessops RBS - Bookrunner 
Just Retirement Holdings Ltd 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
KappAhl AB 
Carnegie - Bookrunner; 
DnB NOR Bank ASA - Bookrunner 
Kloeckner & Co AG 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
Kongsberg Automotive Holding ASA 
Carnegie - Bookrunner; 
SEB - Bookrunner; 
Lancashire Holdings Ltd 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
JPMorgan - Bookrunner; 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
Nomura - Bookrunner 
Land of Leather Holdings plc Investec Inc - Bookrunner 
Legrand SA 
BNP Paribas - Bookrunner; 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
Leica Geosystems Holdings AG Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
LHS AG 
Cazenove AG - Bookrunner; 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Lindab AB 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
Santander - Bookrunner; 
Lindex AB 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
Ludwig Beck am Rathauseck-Textilhaus Feldmeier AG Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
Magellan UniCredit - Bookrunner 
Magix AG 
Commerzbank Group - Bookrunner; 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
Mapeley Ltd 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Commerzbank Group - Bookrunner; 
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Marazzi Gruppo Ceramiche SpA 
Mediobanca - Bookrunner; 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner 
Market Link Publishing plc Landsbanki Islands hf - Bookrunner 
Marlborough Stirling plc UBS - Bookrunner; 
Marr SpA 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
Mediasurface plc KBC Peel Hunt - Bookrunner 
Medicrea International SA Bryan Garnier & Co - Bookrunner 
Mercor SA UniCredit - Bookrunner 
Meta4 NV Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Metris International Holding NV KBC - Bookrunner; 
Micro Focus International plc 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
MicroEmissive Displays Ltd Brewin Dolphin Ltd - Bookrunner 
Micronic Laser Systems AB Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Mirato SpA Intesa Sanpaolo - Bookrunner 
Moneybox plc Numis Securities - Bookrunner 
MSH International Service AG 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
MTU Aero Engines Holding AG 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
NCC Group plc Commerzbank Group - Bookrunner 
Nederman Holding AB Svenska Handelsbanken AB - Bookrunner 
Negri Bossi SpA 
Banca Akros - Bookrunner; 
Credito Emiliano - Bookrunner 
Neopost SA UBS - Bookrunner; 
Netgem SA 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner 
Netia Holdings SA 
Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
Neuf Cegetel SA BNP Paribas - Bookrunner; 
New Look Group plc JPMorgan - Bookrunner 
Newron Pharmaceuticals SpA Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
Newsquest plc 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
Nexity SA 
Credit Agricole CIB - Bookrunner; 
RBS - Bookrunner; 
NextradioTV BNP Paribas - Bookrunner; 
Nobia AB Carnegie - Bookrunner; 
Norcros (Holdings) Ltd Altium Capital - Bookrunner 
Novuspharma SpA 
Cowen & Co LLC - Bookrunner; 
Intesa Sanpaolo - Bookrunner; 
office2office plc Panmure Gordon/ThinkEquity - Bookrunner 
OncoMethylome Sciences SA 
ABN AMRO Bank - Bookrunner; 
ING - Bookrunner; 
One-2-One SA Dom Maklerski IDM SA - Bookrunner 
Opoczno SA Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Orbital Software Holdings plc Evolution Securities - Bookrunner 
Oriflame Cosmetic SA Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Outremer Telecom SA 
Natixis - Bookrunner; 
SG Corporate & Investment Banking - Bookrunner 
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Oxbow 
BGC Partners Inc - Bookrunner; 
BNP Paribas - Bookrunner; 
Paris Re Holdings Ltd 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
Commerzbank Group - Bookrunner; 
Parkdean Holidays plc Charles Stanley Group plc - Bookrunner 
Parkman Group plc RBS - Bookrunner 
Parrot SA 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
JPMorgan - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
Patientline plc ING - Bookrunner 
Peacock Group plc ING - Bookrunner 
Pegas Nonwovens SA ING - Bookrunner; 
Petrofac 
Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Intesa Sanpaolo - Bookrunner; 
Mediobanca - Bookrunner; 
Petroplus Holdings AG 
Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Erste Group Bank AG - Bookrunner 
Petrotec AG 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner 
Phoenix IT Group plc UBS - Bookrunner 
Phoqus Group plc Nomura - Bookrunner 
PHS Group plc 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Carnegie - Bookrunner 
Piaggio & C SpA 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Pinewood Shepperton plc JPMorgan - Bookrunner 
Pixology plc Canaccord Genuity Corp - Bookrunner 
Polimoon AS 
Carnegie - Bookrunner; 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Poltrona Frau SpA 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
UniCredit - Bookrunner; 
Polytec Holding AG 
Nomura - Bookrunner; 
UniCredit - Bookrunner; 
Premier Foods plc 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
JPMorgan - Bookrunner; 
KBC - Bookrunner; 
Nomura - Bookrunner; 
Premiere AG (Sky Deutschland) 
Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
HSBC - Bookrunner; 
Pronova BioPharma ASA 
Carnegie - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
Property Fund Management plc HSBC - Bookrunner 
ProStrakan Group Ltd Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
Prysmian Cables & Systems SpA 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
Lazard-NATIXIS - Bookrunner 
Punch Taverns plc 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Carnegie - Bookrunner; 
Pure Wafer Ltd Numis Securities - Bookrunner 
PV Crystalox Solar plc JPMorgan - Bookrunner; 
Q-Cells AG 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
Commerzbank Group - Bookrunner; 
QinetiQ Group plc 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Nomura - Bookrunner 
Quintana Maritime Ltd 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
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QXL.com plc Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Raymarine plc Collins Stewart - Bookrunner 
ReNeuron Group plc Collins Stewart - Bookrunner 
Renta Corporacion 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
Santander - Bookrunner; 
Revus Energy AS 
SEB - Bookrunner; 
Swedbank Markets - Bookrunner 
Rexel SA BNP Paribas - Bookrunner; 
RHM plc Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
RiverSoft plc 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
UniCredit - Bookrunner; 
RueDuCommerce SA 
Lazard-NATIXIS - Bookrunner; 
Natixis - Bookrunner 
S4E SA Wroclawski Dom Maklerski SA - Bookrunner 
SAF-Holland SA Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
Safestore Holdings plc Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Safilo Group SpA 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner 
Saft Groupe SA Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
SAIA-Burgess Electronics Holding AG UBS - Bookrunner; 
Salamander Energy plc 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Oriel Securities Ltd - Bookrunner 
Salcomp Oy Danske Bank - Bookrunner 
Sanderson Group Arden Partners plc - Bookrunner 
Schaffner Holding AG Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Screen Service Broadcasting Technologies - SSBT Mediobanca - Bookrunner 
SeLoger.com SA 
BNP Paribas - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
Semcon AB SEB - Bookrunner 
Sepura plc 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Intesa Sanpaolo - Bookrunner; 
Mediobanca - Bookrunner; 
Nomura - Bookrunner 
Smurfit Kappa Group plc 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Software Radio Technology plc Westhouse Securities LLP - Bookrunner 
Sondex plc Collins Stewart - Bookrunner 
Southern Cross Healthcare Group plc 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB - Bookrunner; 
SThree plc UBS - Bookrunner; 
Superdiplo SA 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
Nomura - Bookrunner; 
Superglass Holdings plc Brewin Dolphin Ltd - Bookrunner 
Symrise AG 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
Synexus Clinical Research Ltd Brewin Dolphin Ltd - Bookrunner 
System C Healthcare plc Collins Stewart - Bookrunner 
TDS Informationstechnologie AG 
Commerzbank Group - Bookrunner; 
JPMorgan - Bookrunner; 
Techem AG Citi - Bookrunner; 
TelecityGroup 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
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Telenet NV 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Intesa Sanpaolo - Bookrunner; 
Teta SA Dom Maklerski IDM SA - Bookrunner 
Tognum Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Tornos Holding SA 
Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Transics International NV 
BNP Paribas - Bookrunner; 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
HSBC - Bookrunner; 
SG Corporate & Investment Banking - Bookrunner; 
Tredi Environnement SA 
BNP Paribas - Bookrunner; 
Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
JPMorgan - Bookrunner; 
Trevisan SpA 
Credito Emiliano - Bookrunner; 
Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa - UBI Banca - Bookrunner; 
u-blox Holding AG 
Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
SEB - Bookrunner; 
Ubiquity Software Corp plc Evolution Securities - Bookrunner 
Ultra Electronics Holdings plc JPMorgan - Bookrunner 
Umbro Holdings Ltd JPMorgan - Bookrunner; 
Uster Technologies AG Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Versatel Deutschland Holding GmbH Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
VIA Travel Group ASA 
DnB NOR Bank ASA - Bookrunner; 
SEB - Bookrunner 
Volga Gas plc Renaissance Capital - Bookrunner; 
VTG AG 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
Vueling Airlines SA 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner; 
Intesa Sanpaolo - Bookrunner; 
Wacker Construction Equipment AG 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Renaissance Capital - Bookrunner; 
Wavin NV 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Nomura - Bookrunner; 
RBS - Bookrunner; 
Wellstream Holdings plc Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Wilex AG WestLB - Bookrunner; 
William Hill 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Willis Group Holdings Ltd 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
Intesa Sanpaolo - Bookrunner 
Wincor Nixdorf AG Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Winkler & Duennebier AG HSBC - Bookrunner; 
Winterthur Technologie AG Credit Suisse - Bookrunner; 
Xchanging plc 
Citi - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
Yell Group plc 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner 
Zentiva NV 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch - Bookrunner; 
Deutsche Bank - Bookrunner; 
Goldman Sachs - Bookrunner 
Zetkama SA UniCredit - Bookrunner 
Zumtobel AG 
Morgan Stanley - Bookrunner; 
UBS - Bookrunner; 
  
